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COASE’S PARADOX AND THE INEFFICIENCY OF 
PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS 
SETH D. HARRIS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A small but important body of scholarship has developed over the past 
two decades suggesting that the Coase Theorem1 can help to justify and 
explain interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the 
Act).2 The affinity between the Coase Theorem and the NLRA appears 
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 1. The “theorem” was derived from, but not explicitly stated in, R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]. Coase later ratified George 
Stigler’s statement of the theorem (“under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal”) 
in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 14, 174-75 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, THE 
FIRM]. Coase’s Social Cost is among the most influential law review articles ever written. See, e.g., 
Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797, 806 n.40 
(1994) (noting that Coase’s article is the most-cited article in all of the social sciences). Coase is the 
intellectual father of the law and economics movement. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody 
Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 397 
(1997) (“[I]f there is anything that can be described as the canon of ‘law and economics,’ the Coase 
Theorem is at the heart of it.”). See also id. at 399 (quoting Richard Posner as saying that Social Cost 
“as everybody knows—it’s silly to dwell on it—is basic to the whole economic analysis of law”). 
 2. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and 
Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (1995) [hereinafter Bierman & Gely, Striker 
Replacements]; George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and 
Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 113 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining 
Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 419 (1992); Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 471 
(1993); Keith N. Hylton & Maria O’Brien Hylton, Rent Appropriation and the Labor Law Doctrine of 
Successorship, 70 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1990); Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase 
Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1987) [hereinafter Schwab, Collective Bargaining]; Michael L. 
Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and 
Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1349 (1988).  
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obvious.3 Both the theorem and the Act acknowledge bargaining as a 
potentially efficient problem-solving strategy. Both the theorem and the 
Act set efficiency as a goal. This Article examines this apparent affinity 
and challenges the idea that the Coase Theorem and the NLRA are 
compatible.4 
A. Mackay Radio’s Inefficiency 
This Article’s challenge to the purported relationship between the 
Coase Theorem and the NLRA consists of two arguments. The first 
argument parries efforts by some of Coase’s disciples to vindicate the 
Coase Theorem by attempting to show that it explains everything in the 
law.5 This Article reconsiders one Coasean analysis of an early, important, 
and notorious interpretation of the NLRA—NLRB v. Mackay Radio 
Corp.6—and challenges its conclusion that the rule of law which emerged 
from Mackay Radio is efficient. Mackay Radio held that employers may 
lawfully hire permanent replacement workers when their incumbent 
employees strike.7 This Article will show that the Mackay Radio doctrine 
does not satisfy the efficiency standards that scholars have derived from 
Ronald Coase’s seminal 1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost.”8 If 
demonstrating that the Coase Theorem explains a great deal supports its 
validity, then it stands to reason that one way to criticize the alleged 
affinity between the Coase Theorem and the NLRA is to show that the 
theorem cannot explain a very important rule in American labor law. 
Decided only three years after Congress enacted the NLRA, Mackay 
 
 
 3. Admittedly, this is not a universally held view. Law and economics scholars were slow to 
examine labor law prior to the 1980s, primarily because they view the National Labor Relations Act as 
rent-seeking legislation that cannot satisfy any efficiency standard. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some 
Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 989 (1984) [hereinafter Posner, Some Economics]. 
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349-61 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (setting forth the “cartelization” argument regarding unions and the 
NLRA); James B. Zimarowski et al., An Institutionalist Perspective on Law and Economics (Chicago 
Style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 417 (1993) (describing the 
influence of law and economics scholars on labor law as “unspectacular”).  
 4. See, e.g., Schwab, Collective Bargaining, supra note 2, at 254 (“[A] system in which private 
parties write their own contracts in accordance with their private interests will also promote the free 
flow of resources to those who value them most highly. Putting resources to their most valued use is 
the essence of an efficient economy. It thus seems natural to equate the [NLRA’s goal of industrial 
peace] with the goal of an efficient economy where capital and labor flow freely.”). 
 5. See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost: A 
View From the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919, 922, 943 (1986). 
 6. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1. 
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Radio carved a large, looming exception into Congress’ expansive and 
express protection of workers’ right to strike in the NLRA.9 The decision 
arose out of an economic strike to which the employer responded by 
bringing replacement workers from its offices in other parts of the country 
to San Francisco to fill the strikers’ jobs. The employer promised eleven 
replacement workers that they could remain in San Francisco. Only five 
replacements ultimately chose to remain.10 When the strike ended, the 
employer reinstated some striking workers but refused reinstatement to 
five strikers who were prominent union leaders. The employer defended 
its action as necessary to fulfilling its promise to the five replacement 
workers eager to remain in the San Francisco office.11 The Supreme Court 
upheld the conclusion of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
the Board) that the employer had committed unfair labor practices by 
discriminating against the union activists.12 
 
 
 9. Section 7 of the NLRA defines the set of rights conferred on workers by the statute, including 
the right to engage in concerted activities such as strikes. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2001) (“Employees 
shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”). Section 8(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7],” 
or “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1), (3) (2001). Section 13 establishes an interpretive rule designed to give further protection 
to the right to strike. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2001) (“Nothing in this [Act], except as specifically 
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way 
the right to strike, or to affect the limitation of qualifications on that right.”). 
 Michael LeRoy, a leading expert on strikes involving permanent replacement workers, has argued 
that Mackay Radio merely confirmed pre-NLRA law. See Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in 
the Public Policy of Striker Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert and Cartelization, 34 
B.C. L. REV. 257, 268-71, 283 n.157 (1993) [hereinafter LeRoy, Changing Paradigms]. So, declaring 
that the Court created something new in this decision may overstate Mackay Radio’s role; that is, it 
may have merely codified existing law. This interpretation of Mackay Radio finds some support in the 
fact that the brief submitted to the Supreme Court by the NLRB’s General Counsel assumed that 
Mackay Radio was entitled to hire permanent replacement workers. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND 
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 23-24 (1983). 
 On the other hand, the Mackay Radio Court had only recently and reluctantly acknowledged the 
authority of Congress to legislate in restraint of employers’ and workers’ purported freedom of 
contract, perhaps in response to President Roosevelt’s ill-fated and ill-conceived court-packing plan. 
See Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 19, 69-99 (2000) (discussing this period in the Court’s history). Mackay Radio may be better 
understood as a last death gasp of the pro-Lochner majority that decided the case. See Karl E. Klare, 
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-
1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301 (1978); Eileen Silverstein, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Learn to Lose, 
But Never Join Them, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1371, 1373-74 (1998) (citing PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW 
DEAL LAWYERS (1982)). 
 10. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 337-39, 346. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 346-47. 
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In oft-criticized dicta,13 however, the Mackay Radio Court declared that 
replacing the striking workers and refusing to “discharge those hired to fill 
the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their 
employment, in order to create places for them,” did not violate the Act.14 
More precisely, “[t]he assurance by [the employer] to those who accepted 
employment during the strike that if they so desired their places might be 
permanent was not an unfair labor practice . . . .”15 
The rule of Mackay Radio, as elaborated upon by later Supreme Court 
decisions, turns on fine distinctions between “firing a striker” (an unfair 
labor practice16), “permanently replacing a striker” (not an unfair labor 
practice), and “temporarily replacing a striker” (also not an unfair labor 
practice).17 Replacement workers are “permanent” if, and only if, the 
employer has given assurances that the replacements will have job security 
after the strike concludes.18 If the employer fails to make the requisite 
assurances to the replacement workers, they are “temporary” and the 
striking workers are entitled to reinstatement in their former jobs when 
they make an unconditional offer to return to work.19 
“Permanent” does not mean eternal. Permanently replaced strikers are 
entitled to reinstatement to their former jobs if the jobs become “vacant” 
or the employer expands its business, but only if the employer does not 
have legitimate and substantial business reasons supporting a refusal to 
offer full reinstatement.20 This purported “right” to reinstatement often 
 
 
 13. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 388 (1990) [hereinafter WEILER, 
GOVERNING] (“seemingly casual dicta”); Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. LAW. 
897, 899 (1987) (“The statement about the right to hire permanent replacements is classic obiter 
dictum . . . .”).  
 14. See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46. 
 15. Id. at 346. 
 16. See NLRB v. Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1972); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. 
Chem. Servs., Inc., 700 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
 17. Only economic strikers may be permanently replaced. Strikers protesting an unfair labor 
practice may not be permanently replaced. See infra notes 172 and 173. Also, an employer may not 
permanently replace workers it has locked out. Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Re-Shaping of Labor Law 
for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 202 (2001) [hereinafter Weiler, A 
Principled Re-shaping of Labor Law]. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 176-77.  
 19. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368-69 (1968), enf’d, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969) cert. 
denied 397 U.S. 920 (1970). See also Medite of N.M., Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1148 (1994), enf’d 72 
F.3d 780 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement in vacant 
positions that are substantially equivalent to their former jobs); but see Rose Printing Co., 304 
N.L.R.B. 1076, 1078 (1991) (holding that economic strikers are not entitled to reinstatement in vacant 
positions for which they are qualified if the positions are not substantially equivalent to their former 
jobs). 
 20. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (holding that reinstatement entitlement 
triggered by poststrike expansion of business); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enf’d 414 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/3
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proves illusory, however. A striker surrenders her status as an “employee,” 
and thereby her protections under the Act, if she secures a substantially 
equivalent job.21 Further, few strikers awaiting a “vacancy” can subsist 
supported only by their union’s strike fund. Permanently replaced strikers 
may be forced to effectively abandon their reinstatement entitlement by 
seeking an equivalent job in another city or changing careers.22 
Coase’s “Social Cost” was concerned with reorienting lawyers’ and 
economists’ perspective on the problem of “externalities”; that is, the costs 
of one party’s production that fall on other parties.23 The hiring of 
permanent replacement workers pursuant to Mackay Radio creates a fairly 
typical externalities problem for the Coasean analyst.24 Employers hire 
 
 
F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (holding that reinstatement entitlement 
triggered by replacement worker leaving her job). The job is “vacant” if the replacement worker has 
finally quit or been discharged by the employer. Medite of N.M., Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 788 
(10th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Delta-Macon Brick & Tile Co., Inc., 943 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
A temporary layoff does not constitute a “vacancy” and, therefore, does not trigger the striker’s 
entitlement to reinstatement. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1988), enf’d 910 F.2d 1487 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1982).  
 21. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . whose 
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute . . . and who has 
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . .”); Laidlaw Corp., 171 
N.L.R.B. at 1369. 
 22. Some distinguished commentators have correctly noted that the slimness of the odds that a 
“vacancy” in the striker’s former job will occur both soon enough for the reinstatement entitlement to 
be meaningful and at a time when the striker is not substantially and equivalently employed renders 
these definitions of “firing” and “permanently replacing” distinct but not different. See, e.g., George 
Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—‘Protected’ Concerted 
Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 383 (1969); Weiler, A Principled Re-Shaping of Labor Law, supra 
note 17, at 201. Labor law students express their views on the plausibility of the distinction between 
“firing” and “permanent replacement” with unbelieving guffaws when the subject is raised in class 
discussion. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES REP. NO. 103-10 at 4-5 (1993) 
(on S. 55, The Workplace Fairness Act) (quoting testimony by Professors Paul Weiler and William 
Gould that discussions of the fine distinctions drawn by the Mackay Radio doctrine cause students to 
burst out laughing every year); see also Silverstein, supra note 9, at 1373. (“[E]ven the most 
conservative students have wondered at a result that honors, on the one hand, the prohibition against 
discharging employees because they strike, but allows, on the other hand, replacement of strikers and 
retention of strikebreakers once the dispute has ended.”) An empirical study by Cynthia Gramm and 
John Schnell lends support to this skepticism, although within limits imposed by estimation based on a 
small sample. Gramm and Schnell found that hiring permanent replacement workers reduces the 
proportion of striking bargaining unit members who are reinstated after a strike, holding all other 
factors constant, to about the same level as workers whose employers have permanently shut down 
some or all of their operations. See Cynthia Gramm & John Schnell, Empirical Effects of Using 
Permanent Strike Replacements, 3 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 122, 128, 130 (1994). 
 23. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 1-2. See Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A 
Primer on the Coase Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL BUS. 
L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (defining “externalities”). See also COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 24 (defining 
“externality” to be “the effect of one person’s decision on someone who is not a party to that 
decision”). 
 24. The one noteworthy difference with the classic examples of externalities offered by Coase is 
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permanent replacement workers as one method of continuing production 
during a strike.25 Among other consequences of this decision, the strikers 
are idled and their wages and production largely lost, at least for some 
period of time. In the language of externalities, the strikers bear the cost of 
the employer’s hiring of permanent replacement workers. 
Coase set efficiency, or maximization of social product, as the goal 
when addressing externalities. He sought to persuade his readers that the 
approach to externalities he associated with the Pigouvian tradition would 
not maximize social product.26 According to Coase, Pigou would have 
required the producing party to internalize the externalities’ costs that the 
market would not otherwise require them to bear, perhaps by 
compensating injured parties through damages.27 The self-interested 
decisions of the producer would thereby better serve the social good.28 
Coase rejected this calculus on the grounds that it failed to take into 
account all of the relevant costs and benefits and, therefore, did not offer 
an accurate assessment of social product.29  
Coase challenged the idea that one of two conflicting activities must be 
the “cause” of an externality and, therefore, required to internalize the 
externality’s costs. Coase argued that externalities arise out of the parties’ 
reciprocal demands for limited resources.30 A railroad cannot incinerate a 
farmer’s crops unless the farmer grows her crops on land where the 
railroad’s trains will throw sparks.31 Similarly, strikes are the reciprocal 
products of unions’ and employers’ failure to reach an agreement at the 
 
 
that the Mackay Radio doctrine implicates three parties rather than two: the employer, the striking 
workers (and their union), and the replacement workers. This difference is relevant only to the 
calculation of the social product. 
 25. See infra text accompanying note 46. 
 26. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 28-42 (citing A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE (4th ed. 1932)). So, if a business polluted causing injury to its neighbors, Pigou would have 
required the business to pay a tax or damages equal to the costs the business imposed on its neighbors. 
Keith N. Hylton & Steve E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers’ Compensation, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 111-15 (1992); Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou, and Environmental Rights, in 
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 119-20 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998). There is some 
controversy as to whether Coase’s rendering of Pigou’s theory fairly represented the older economist’s 
views. See A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Re-examined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 63-79 (1996). 
See also COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 20 (acknowledging that his interpretation of Pigou has 
been controversial). 
 27. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 28-42. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 13. 
 31. This is one of several hypothetical examples Coase employed in Social Cost. Coase used this 
example because Pigou had used it in his analysis of externalities. For the same reason, I will 
reconsider the railroad-farmer example in Part IV of this Article. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/3
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bargaining table. In Stewart Schwab’s pithy phrase: “it takes two to tort.”32 
Thus, any calculation of social product must take into account not only the 
producer’s costs and benefits, but also costs and benefits to the other party 
to the externality. 
Coase also argued that the social product calculation must include 
transaction costs. To illustrate his point, he posited a hypothetical world in 
which no transaction costs exist and suggested what came to be known as 
the Coase Theorem: if the parties to an externality can costlessly exchange 
their legal entitlements, they will redress any externality by negotiating an 
agreement that maximizes social product regardless of which party’s 
activity is legally protected.33 Coase’s purpose was to demonstrate that, if 
the parties do not bargain to an efficient result, excessive transaction costs 
probably interfered with their bargaining.34 A railway and a farmer will 
not negotiate a solution to $50 worth of burnt crops if the bargaining 
process costs $60. A union and an employer will not negotiate a collective 
 
 
 32. Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (1989) [hereinafter Schwab, Coase Defends]. I agree with suggestions by 
Pierre Schlag and Bruce Ackerman that Coase’s insight regarding the reciprocal nature of externalities 
can be a powerful deconstructive tool for progressive lawyers and scholars. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 54-55 (1984); Schlag, supra note 5, at 950. For example, Martha 
Minow used a related argument to deconstruct the notion of “difference” that is central to employment 
discrimination law and other fields. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990) 
[hereinafter MINOW, MAKING]; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice 
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, The Supreme Court]. 
 33. COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 13-14. Scholars debate two versions of the Coase 
Theorem: the weaker or “efficiency” version, which asserts that the parties will reach an efficient 
result through costless bargaining regardless of the assignment of legal entitlements; and the stronger 
or “invariant” version, which asserts that the parties will always reach the same efficient result under 
the same conditions. See, e.g., Posin, supra note 1, at 804-05; Schwab, Coase Defends, supra note 32, 
at 1174. Since the invariance proposition does not play a role in this Article’s analysis, I have stated 
the weaker “efficiency” version. It is sufficient for these purposes. For the same reasons, any debate 
about the adequacy of either version is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 There are several possible renderings of the Coase Theorem. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 5, at 
922; Schwab, Coase Defends, supra note 32, at 1174; Swygert & Yanes, supra note 23, at 2, 5 n.9. For 
example, there is no consensus as to whether Coase required perfect information. See Schwab, 
Collective Bargaining, supra note 2, at 278-80 and n.124, n.125 (discussing the role of information in 
bargaining and citing articles that disagree on how it should be addressed). This Article assumes that 
perfect information is not required, but that information availability is relevant to strategic bargaining 
behavior. 
 34. Coase’s views probably could have been stated more definitively if the 1960 version of 
Social Cost were the only point of reference. However, Coase’s later comments on his article, after 
substantial criticism on this point, suggest that this weaker version is more appropriate. See COASE, 
THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 161 (“It is certainly true that we cannot rule out [a non-Pareto optimal] 
outcome if the parties are unable to agree on the terms of exchange, and it is therefore impossible to 
argue that two individuals negotiating an exchange must end up on the contract curve, even in a world 
of zero transaction costs in which the parties have, in effect, an eternity in which to bargain. However, 
there is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be 
small.”). 
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bargaining agreement if one party engages in costly strategic bargaining 
for its own exclusive benefit.35 In sum, it is not possible to assess whether 
a response to an externality is efficient without knowing the costs 
associated with arriving at and implementing that response.36 
Coase’s insights about transaction costs and the efficacy of bargaining 
were intended to pose an important question: since we do not live in a 
world free of transaction costs,37 how should efficiency-minded lawmakers 
 
 
 35. Coase did not expressly define transaction costs to include “opportunistic” or “strategic” 
behavior; rather, he offered the following definition:  
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is one wishes to deal 
with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading 
up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. 
Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15. See also COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Carl. J. 
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 148 (1979)) (describing “transaction costs” as 
“search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.”); 
Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against ‘Coaseanism’, 99 YALE L.J. 611, 615-16 (1989) 
(defining “transaction costs” as including “get-together costs,” “decision and execution costs,” and 
“information costs”); Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the 
Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 405 (1997) (“measurable costs of entering into transactions”). 
See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20-22 (1985) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] for a fuller discussion of transaction costs. 
Nonetheless, some of Coase’s interpreters, including George Cohen and Michael Wachter, whose 
work is the central focus of this Article’s first argument, have included opportunistic behavior among 
those transaction costs that erect barriers to efficient bargains. Compare, e.g., Wachter & Cohen, supra 
note 2, at 1358-61 (including strategic behavior in the definition of transaction costs); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 
233, 234 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Contractual Relations] (“[O]pportunism is a central concept 
in the study of transaction costs . . . .”); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 68-69 (same); 
and Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 473 (same); with Schwab, Coase Defends, supra note 32, at 1176 
n.13 (arguing that strategic bargaining and transaction costs should be treated separately because their 
remedies are different). See generally Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-24 
(1982) (arguing that strategic bargaining is a more important barrier to efficient bargains than 
transaction costs to the extent that efficient bargains may become impossible even in a world of zero 
transaction costs). See also generally Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 442-50 (discussing and illustrating 
the role that strategic bargaining behavior plays in collective bargaining). 
 Other important “transaction-cost” economists have noted the danger associated with ambiguity in 
the concept of transaction costs given the centrality of the concept to Coase’s enterprise. See, e.g., 
Oliver E. Williamson, Book Review: ‘The Firm, the Market and the Law’, 77 CAL. L. REV. 223, 229 
(1989) (“A chronic problem with Coase’s work has been that the concept of transaction costs is vague. 
Being very elastic, transaction costs can be—and sometimes are—used to rationalize any outcome 
whatsoever.”) (footnote omitted). 
 36. See COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 12 (“[T]he increase in the value of the outcome which 
a new constellation of rights allows has to be matched against the costs of carrying out the transactions 
needed to achieve that new constellation, and such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken if 
the cost of the transactions needed to achieve it is less than the increase in value which such a 
rearrangement makes possible.”). See also Ellickson, supra note 35, at 613 (“[P]eople tend to arrange 
their affairs so as to minimize the sum of their . . . transaction costs . . . .”). According to Coase, the 
same analysis must be undertaken when government intervention, rather than bargaining between the 
parties, is the proposed solution to an externality. COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 25. 
 37. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15; COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 26 (citing J. 
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respond to externalities when transaction costs or strategic bargaining 
prevent an efficient bargain between the parties associated with an 
externality?38 While his article’s meta-argument is that government 
intervention is not required every time an externality develops, Coase 
acknowledged that governmental intervention may lead to increased social 
product in certain circumstances.39 But where the boundary between 
efficient and inefficient government intervention lies and where the 
parties’ bargaining and government intervention should begin and end 
depends upon the circumstances.40  
Coase’s interpreters have suggested two ways in which legal rules can 
improve efficiency. First, legal rules may be designed to assign initial 
legal entitlements so that transaction costs are minimized (the 
“transaction-cost reduction” approach). This approach assists bargaining 
parties in reaching the efficient agreement of their choice.41 For example, 
if a legal rule could reduce the railway’s and the farmer’s transaction costs 
associated with redressing $50 worth of burnt crops from $60 to $10, then 
the parties should be able to bargain to an efficient result if their bargain 
 
 
Wallis & D. North, Measuring of the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970, in 
LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95-148 (S. Engerman & R. Gallman eds., 
Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 1986)). 
 38.  
In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with 
which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value 
of production than any other. But unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal 
system, the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through the market 
may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which 
it would bring, may never be achieved. 
Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 16. 
 39. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 18 (“[T]here is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. . . . 
It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the 
advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if justified, does not do 
more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed.”). One commentator suggested that 
Coase’s Social Cost betrayed a “deep skepticism as to the desirability of government intervention.” 
Simpson, supra note 26, at 58. Coase responded sharply and directly that Simpson was wrong. R. H. 
Coase, Law and Economics and A.W. Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 106-08 (1996) 
[hereinafter Coase, Law and Economics]. 
 40. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 18; COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 25. Coase 
concluded that some externalities should not be remedied because total social product will decline as a 
result of the high transaction costs associated with the remedy. See id. at 26-27. 
 41. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 5, at 928, 930, and nn.34-36, 43, 54 (describing these two 
options and how they have been developed by leading law and economics proponents like Richard 
Posner and Frank Easterbrook). I acknowledge that treating Coase’s interpreters as though they were a 
cohesive and unanimous group is not fully accurate. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost 
Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993) 
[hereinafter Williamson, Posnerian Economics] (harshly criticizing Posner in response to Posner’s 
criticism of Williamson). 
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increases social product by $30, for example. Second, if transaction costs 
are high, Coase’s interpreters hold that legal rules may impose a solution 
on the parties if that solution would approximate the efficient agreement 
the parties would reach in costless bargaining (the “dictated solution” 
approach).42 So, if no legal rule can be found to reduce transaction costs 
between the railway and the farmer below $60, the Coasean lawmaker 
would dictate an efficient solution that achieves the result that the parties 
would have reached through bargaining absent transaction costs. 
The Coasean analyst assessing the efficiency of Mackay Radio, 
therefore, must judge whether it either reduces transaction costs or dictates 
a solution that efficiently redresses the associated externalities. The 
Coasean lawmaker’s choice between the transaction-cost reduction 
approach and the dictated solution approach matters a great deal to our 
normative vision of government’s role in addressing externalities. As this 
Article will show, it also matters a great deal to the suggestion that the 
Coase Theorem and the NLRA are compatible. In comparison to the 
transaction-cost reduction approach, the dictated solution approach 
represents the opposite pole among normative visions of the appropriate 
role for government decision makers in dispute resolution. The 
transaction-cost reduction approach trusts the parties and the market while 
positioning the government as a market perfecter. The dictated solution 
approach supplants the market and the parties in favor of a government-
selected solution. 
Mackay Radio is among the most derided judicial interpretations of the 
National Labor Relations Act.43 While the legal argument over Mackay 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., Williamson, Posnerian Economics, supra note 44. See also Posin, supra note 1, at 
806; Farber, supra note 1, at 419. Stewart Schwab properly warns against conflating “the positive 
Coase Theorem of zero transaction costs with the normative ‘mimic the market’ policy prescription for 
high transaction costs.” Schwab, Coase Defends, supra note 32, at 1195. Accord Guido Calabresi, 
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 
(1968). See generally Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 
1662-63 (attacking the “market mimicking” approach to efficiency as inconsistent with a proper focus 
on transaction costs). A third approach is also possible. If transaction costs associated with the other 
two approaches are prohibitive, it might be best to leave the externality unaddressed. See, e.g., Farber, 
supra note 1, at 419. 
 43. Paul Weiler called Mackay Radio “the worst contribution that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
made to the current shape of labor law in this country.” Weiler, supra note 17, at 201. See also, e.g., 
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 19-34 (1983); JULIUS 
GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS & PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS 
(1998) [hereinafter GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14]; WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR 
REFORM 185-86 (1993); Bierman & Gely, Striker Replacements, supra note 2, at 363-66; Charles B. 
Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 
ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 406-08, 420-23 (1992); Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. 
LAW. 897, 899-900 (1987); Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic 
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Radio is over,44 the policy argument is not. The Mackay Radio doctrine 
has long been a rule in search of a rationale.45 Critics have argued 
 
 
Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 551-52 [hereinafter Finkin, Labor Policy]; Julius G. Getman & F. 
Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 
1877-82 (1993) [hereinafter Getman & Marshall, Industrial Relations]; Julius G. Getman & F. Ray 
Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 716-17 (2001) 
[hereinafter Getman & Marshall, Right to Strike]; Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic 
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1203-05 (1967) 
[hereinafter Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure]; Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization 
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
265, 301-02 (1978); Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker 
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L. REV. 257, 261-68 
(1993); Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of Permanently Replaced Strikers, 1935-1991: Public 
Policy Implications, 13 Yale L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5-6 (1995) [hereinafter LeRoy, Employer 
Treatment]; Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and 
the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 MINN. L. REV. 843, 845-46 (1993) 
[hereinafter LeRoy, Picket Line Peace]; Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 
U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 298-305 (1991); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions 
Concerning a Misnomer—‘Protected’ Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 382-92 (1969).  
 44. Congress has effectively ratified the decision in two amendments to the NLRA. See 29 
U.S.C. § 159(c) (2001) (addressing the voting rights of economic strikers not entitled to 
reinstatement); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001) (stating that permanently replaced strikers remain 
“employees” protected by the NLRB unless they accept substantially equivalent employment). See 
also Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 532, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (noting that Congress was 
aware of the Mackay Doctrine when it added these sections to the law); TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 
1449 (1992) (same). Also, more recent Supreme Court decisions have endorsed and modified Mackay 
Radio. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 790-92 (1990); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 433-39 (1989); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 
463 U.S. 491 (1983); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 232 (1963). 
 45. Before the efficiency analysis critiqued in this Article debuted, Samuel Estreicher asserted 
that stare decisis and apparent congressional ratification of the Mackay Radio doctrine may have been 
the only justifications for its continuing vitality. Estreicher, supra note 13, at 900. Of course, stare 
decisis is applied independent of the policy merits of the legal rule it supports and, as a result, 
occasionally defends rules of law that later courts would certainly reject. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258, 278-79, 284 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (upholding 
baseball’s antitrust exemption on stare decisis grounds established in Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), despite radically 
changed factual circumstances that made the original decision moot). Similarly, the preemption 
doctrine that has protected Mackay Radio from presidential and state legislative attacks guards 
Congress’ primacy in deciding which economic weapons should be preserved for use by the parties to 
a collective bargaining relationship. It does not otherwise endorse the wisdom of those choices. See, 
e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (striking down 
Executive Order No. 12,954 prohibiting federal agencies from doing business with employers who 
used permanent strike replacements on preemption grounds); Employers Ass’n Inc. v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., 32 F.3d 1297, 1310 (8th Cir. 1994) (striking down a Minnesota law on 
permanent strike replacements as preempted by the NLRA). See also Charlesgate Nursing Ctr. v. 
Rhode Island, 723 F. Supp. 859, 864-67 (D.R.I. 1989) (striking down a similar statute in Rhode 
Island); Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, 445 A.2d 353, 358-65 (N.J. 1982) (striking down a 
similar statute in New Jersey); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. 
C.M. Smillie Co., 362 N.W.2d 780, 782-83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (striking down a similar statute in 
Michigan); City of Columbus v. Guay, 577 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (striking down a 
municipal ordinance relating to permanent strike replacements in Columbus, Ohio); Maine Governor 
Vetoes Bill to Curb Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, 99 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) May 22, 
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persuasively for many years that Mackay Radio lacked any legitimate 
foundation when decided46 and directly contradicted important provisions 
of the NLRA.47 In 1990, George Cohen and Michael Wachter jumped into 
 
 
2001), at A-4 (quoting Maine Governor Angus King as explaining that he vetoed the legislation, in 
part, because of an earlier state Attorney General’s opinion that an effective ban on permanent 
replacements would violate the NLRA).  
 46. Commentators have interpreted the decision as relying upon some unidentified, preexisting 
“right” of employers to continue operating their businesses during strikes that is for some unspoken 
reason superior to the statutory right of workers to strike. See ATLESON, supra note 9, at 24 (“No 
explanation was given, no policy justification enunciated, no legislative history asserted to support the 
conclusion reached.”). See id. at 33 (“[T]he language of the Court indicates that the right preexisted 
and was unaffected by the NLRA.”). See generally Klare, supra note 9, at 302 (discussing Supreme 
Court decisions on the NLRA during this period and concluding that “the Court merely assumed its 
conclusion, presenting it as compelled by the words of the Act, or by Reason, or simply as a priori 
true, judgment involving debatable choices from among competing economic and political values”). 
Yet, hiring permanent replacement workers is not necessary to continuing an employer’s operations 
during many, if not most, strikes. Firms may legally operate during strikes without hiring permanent 
replacement workers by using managerial or supervisory personnel, temporary replacements, or 
incumbent workers outside the bargaining unit or even the struck facility to perform the striking 
workers’ jobs, or by contracting out the work or stockpiling inventory before the strike begins. 
ATLESON, supra note 9, at 30; Estreicher, supra note 13, at 899-900. The employer’s willingness to 
rely on contracting out might be limited by the duty to bargain over that issue imposed by Section 
8(a)(5) of the Act. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1964). But see 
First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686-88 (1981) (holding that an employer’s decision 
to close part of its business is not subject to the duty to bargain in good faith). Some employers and 
courts have suggested that struck employers must offer prospective employees a poststrike job-security 
guarantee if they are to be able to recruit enough workers to operate their facility. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n 
of Machinists v. J.L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1972) (court adopts argument); NLRB v. 
Transp. Co. of Tx., 438 F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1971) (employer’s argument); Midwest Motor Express, 
Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. App. 1993) (employer’s 
argument); Butterworth-Manning-Ashmore Mortuary, 270 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1014 (1984) (adopting 
ALJ’s finding). Even Justice Brennan, dissenting in Belknap, accepted this argument. See Belknap, 
Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 537 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Empirical work by Cynthia Gramm 
and John Schnell undermines the premise of this argument. Employers hiring permanent replacement 
workers operate at a lesser production capacity than employers who use only temporary replacement 
workers. See Gramm & Schnell, supra note 22, at 124. Regardless, the Mackay Radio doctrine does 
not require employers to make a showing of economic necessity before offers of “permanent” 
employment may be made to prospective replacement workers. As James Atleson put it, “the language 
in Mackay [Radio] and the current understanding of its scope is that permanent replacements can be 
hired even if the failure to do so would not lead to business destruction or even serious economic loss.” 
ATLESON, supra note 9, at 25. See also Craver, supra note 43, at 423; Getman, The Protection of 
Economic Pressure, supra note 43, at 1203; Schatzki, supra note 22, at 385, 390-91; Weiler, supra 
note 17, at 390-91. Atleson also concluded, with good reason, that it is not possible to reconcile an 
“economic necessity” justification for Mackay Radio with NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 
(1963), which prohibited an employer from offering superseniority as an inducement to prospective 
replacement workers even though the employer believed that the workers would not accept its 
employment offers absent some premium. See ATLESON, supra note 9, at 26.  
 47. Most important, it contravenes a clear command in Section 13 that “[n]othing in this Act 
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” 
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, sec. 13, 49 Stat. 457 (original version of Section 13 in effect at the time 
Mackay Radio was decided). As Weiler wrote: “The bleak prospect of permanently losing his job is 
obviously likely to chill an employee’s willingness to exercise his statutory right to engage in 
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the breach to offer an efficiency argument rooted in the Coase Theorem 
that supported Mackay Radio.48 Specifically, Cohen and Wachter 
presented Mackay Radio as a classic illustration of the transaction-cost 
reduction approach to externalities. They argued that the Mackay Radio 
doctrine prevents opportunistic behavior that can scuttle efficient bargains 
between unions and employers.49 
The Cohen and Wachter analysis relied upon internal labor market 
theory.50 Part II gives a fuller explanation of internal labor market theory. 
In brief, employers and their incumbent employees together invest in the 
employees’ acquisition of firm-specific skills and knowledge that make 
the employees both more productive with their current employer than they 
 
 
‘concerted activities.’” Weiler, supra note 17, at 390; accord LeRoy, Employer Treatment, supra note 
43, at 5-6. The Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments to Section 13 do not alter this conclusion. See 29 
U.S.C. § 163 (2001). Mackay Radio has also been properly assailed as irreconcilable with the 
jurisprudence interpreting NLRA Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Section 8(a)(1) defines “unfair labor 
practice” to include employer interference with, or restraint or coercion of, employees in the exercise 
of their Section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2001). Section 8(a)(3) defines “unfair labor practice” 
to include “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 
(2001). As Samuel Estreicher reasoned about the hiring of permanent replacement workers, “there is a 
basis for inferring improper motive from the employer’s use of a bargaining tactic entailing such a 
negative impact on [S]ection 7 rights, when other approaches with less adverse impact are readily 
available.” Estreicher, supra note 13, at 900. The proof of illicit motivation is not necessary to show a 
violation of Section 8(a)(3) when the employer’s action is found to be “inherently destructive” of 
important worker protections in the Act, such as the right to strike. See Erie Resistor, 228 U.S. at 227. 
Other distinguished commentators have been less subtle: “As a practical matter, in almost all cases the 
Mackay [Radio] doctrine . . . is an invitation to the employer, if he is able, to rid himself of union 
adherents and the union.” Schatzki, supra note 22, at 383. Accord Getman, The Protection of 
Economic Pressure, supra note 43, at 1204-05. LeRoy found that more than 20% of strikes involving 
replacement workers involved an effort by the employer to sever its collective bargaining relationship 
either by seeking a decertification of the union or by unilaterally withdrawing recognition from the 
union. Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During Permanent Replacement 
Strikes and Union Decertifications: An Empirical Analysis and Proposal to Amend Section 9(c)(3) of 
the NLRA, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1019, 1021, 1062-63 (1996) [hereinafter Le Roy, Severance of 
Bargaining Relationships]. 
 48. Unlike others in the law and economics movement, Cohen and Wachter did not offer their 
efficiency analysis as a normative basis for judging the Mackay Radio doctrine independent of a 
genuine inquiry into the intent of Congress. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 124 (“Even if the 
efficiency model has greater explanatory powers than the alternative models, its can have no normative 
force unless it is at least consistent with the statutory intent of Congress.”). 
 49. See infra text accompanying note 199. 
 50. The Cohen and Wachter analysis of permanent strike replacements built on their earlier work 
regarding labor law’s role in encouraging efficient relations between employees and employers made 
possible by internal labor markets. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2; Cohen & Wachter, supra note 
2, at 113 (“The distinction recognized in the economics literature between the external and the internal 
labor markets is critical to our analysis.”). The larger project for Cohen and Wachter is to establish that 
“the efficiency model offers the most solid theoretical foundation on which to rest past decisions and 
to build future interpretations of the NLRA,” without claiming “to provide a single, comprehensive 
explanation of all aspects of the law . . . .” Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 111. 
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would be with another employer and more productive than other workers 
the employer might hire. As a result, long-term maintenance of this 
productive relationship between incumbent employees and their employers 
through implicit contracts (this Article dubs them “sunk 
investments/delayed dividends” contracts) is Pareto optimal; that is, 
employees earn higher wages and employers secure higher profits. Any 
opportunistic behavior that interferes with these long-term relationships, 
particularly if one party attempts to steal the other party’s dividends, is 
inefficient.  
Part III explains the argument advanced by Cohen and Wachter that the 
Mackay Radio doctrine prevents opportunistic behavior which interferes 
with efficient sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts between 
unions and employers. Simply, Cohen and Wachter purported to show that 
Mackay Radio prevented unions from enforcing monopolistic wage 
demands against employers that would redirect employers’ dividends to 
employees. They also argued that Mackay Radio prevented employers 
from undercutting employees’ wages and thereby appropriating 
employees’ dividends. 
After repeating the Cohen and Wachter argument, Part III challenges 
its conclusion that Mackay Radio is efficient.51 This Article’s analysis of 
the Mackay Radio doctrine employs internal labor market theory as Cohen 
and Wachter, and other prominent proponents of the theory, have 
articulated it.52 But this Article does not accept the implication by Cohen 
and Wachter that the Mackay Radio doctrine illustrates the transaction-
cost reduction approach.53 Rather, Part III argues that the Mackay Radio 
 
 
 51. Other commentators have also criticized the Cohen and Wachter efficiency argument. See, 
e.g., Bierman & Gely, supra note 2; Matthew W. Finkin, Reflections on Labor Law Scholarship and 
Its Discontents: The Reveries of Monsieur Verog, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1101, 1119-22 (1992) 
[hereinafter Finkin, Reflections]. But see William R. Corbett, Taking the Employer’s Gun and 
Bargaining About Returning It: A Reply to ‘A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach’ to Striker 
Replacement Law, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1511 (1995) (criticizing Bierman and Gely). See also Leonard 
Bierman & Rafael Gely, ‘Let’s Call it A Draw’: Striker Replacements and the Mackay Doctrine, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1003 (1997) [hereinafter Bierman & Gely, Let’s Call It a Draw] (responding to Corbett). 
 52. In other words, this Article does not challenge the myriad assumptions that underlie internal 
labor market theory, including those relating to unions’ and employers’ propensity for rational 
behavior and the availability and scope of knowledge in collective bargaining. It merely accepts them 
as Cohen and Wachter apparently did. Only those assumptions specifically identified are subject to 
challenge herein. 
 53. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 118 (“The line drawn by Mackay Radio is consistent with 
the efficiency model . . . because the rule helps deter opportunistic behavior by both sides in the 
[internal labor market].”). Since the Mackay Radio doctrine constrains workers’ right to strike, Cohen 
and Wachter should have considered whether the Mackay Radio doctrine is a more effective means of 
reducing transaction costs/strategic behavior in collective bargaining than strikes. Strikes are more 
than “a means of resolving economic disputes where the parties are unable to come to agreement.” 
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doctrine actually exemplifies the dictated-solution approach because it 
does not merely authorize threats to hire permanent replacement workers 
calibrated to fend off unions’ monopolistic wage demands. Mackay Radio 
authorizes the hiring of permanent replacement workers. The threats and 
the practice are inseparable.  
Using internal labor market theory and empirical evidence,54 Part III 
demonstrates that the practice of hiring permanent replacements for 
strikers is inefficient; therefore, the Mackay Radio doctrine dictates an 
inefficient solution inconsistent with the Coase Theorem. In particular, the 
Mackay Radio doctrine cannot satisfy the definition of Pareto efficiency 
that Cohen and Wachter adopted: a legal rule must “jointly maximize the 
firm’s profits and the workers’ net compensation.”55 Part III argues that 
either the striking employees, the replacement workers, or the employer 
suffer losses when an employer hires permanent replacement workers. 
Further, Part III explains that the Mackay Radio doctrine actually protects 
 
 
Estreicher, supra note 13, at 898. See also HARRY C. KATZ & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 74 (2d ed. 2000) (“The 
simplest measure of bargaining power is the amount of strike leverage each party holds.”). Stikes are 
an essential tool in the reduction of costs associated with collective bargaining. In the words of Harry 
Wellington, the threat that workers will strike “is the major force moving an employer toward 
settlement. And it is the occasional strike that legitimates the strike threat.” HARRY WELLINGTON, 
LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 272 (1968), quoted in Finkin, supra note 43. See also KATZ & 
KOCHAN, supra at 190-91, 193-95; Getman & Marshall, Right to Strike, supra note 43, at 703-04 (“To 
motivate the parties to reach agreement, the NLRA relies on the strike weapon. The strike plays the 
same role in labor negotiations that warfare plays in diplomatic negotiations.”). See generally NLRB v. 
Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) (“The presence of economic weapons in reserve, 
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner 
and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.”). The approach of a strike deadline forces the parties to 
abandon delaying tactics and seriously address the contractual issues stalling final agreement. See 
DEREK BOK & JOHN DUNLOP, LABOR & THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 229 (1970). See also NLRB v. 
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963) (“[R]epeated solicitude for the right to strike is 
predicated upon the conclusion that a strike . . . is an economic weapon which in great measure 
implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.”). Accord Pollitt, supra 
note 43, at 296 (“[S]trikes and the threat of a strike are the ‘go power’ of successful collective 
bargaining.”). Thus, any rule that weakens workers’ right to strike bears a heavy burden of showing 
that it offers a superior means of facilitating efficient agreements between unions and employers. The 
Mackay Radio doctrine cannot bear that burden. 
 54. The empirical data cited in this Article were developed in the decade after Cohen and 
Wachter first presented their efficiency analysis of the Mackay Radio doctrine; so, those scholars did 
not have the benefit of this recent research before performing their analysis. 
 55. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1355. Any fair treatment of the Cohen and Wachter 
analysis must acknowledge that these scholars set a very high standard with their version of Pareto 
optimality. The best reading of Coase is that he also defined efficiency as Pareto optimality. See, e.g., 
Schwab, Collective Bargaining, supra note 2, at 259 n.55. Nonetheless, other Coasean analysts of the 
NLRA have adopted the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 2, at 471 
n.1. Briefly, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency “allows changes in which there are both gainers and losers but 
requires that the gainers gain more than the losers lose.” ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & 
ECONOMICS 44 (3d ed. 2000). 
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and encourages opportunistic behavior by employers, rather than 
preventing it. In sum, Part III demonstrates that the Cohen and Wachter 
analysis fails by its own measure.  
Cohen and Wachter may have offered the only legitimate policy 
rationale still supporting the Mackay Radio doctrine. Thus, if the Cohen 
and Wachter analysis falls away, Mackay Radio will stand as naked as the 
emperor and, at a minimum, require a new cloak of legitimacy. It is 
important to note, however, that this Article does not seek to prove the 
obverse of the conclusion that the Mackay Radio doctrine is inefficient; 
that is, that a rule banning permanent strike replacements is efficient. 
Reaching that conclusion would require a further analysis, perhaps relying 
on some of the information contained herein, that is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Further, this Article does not address whether the Mackay 
Radio rule might be efficient according to the Kaldor-Hicks definition of 
efficiency. Specifically, it does not examine a possible argument that the 
inefficiency of hiring permanent replacement workers in an individual 
case effects greater efficiencies in other workplaces wherein the employer 
and union respond to the Mackay Radio doctrine by reinforcing their 
commitments to efficient internal labor market arrangements.56 Rather, 
this Article addresses the Cohen and Wachter analysis and its definition of 
efficiency as Pareto optimality because their analysis is a leading 
application of the Coase Theorem to interpretations of the NLRA. Doubts 
about the Coase Theorem’s usefulness to judging the NLRA justifiably 
arise if the theorem and its proponents cannot explain the Mackay Radio 
doctrine.  
B. Mackay Radio and Coase’s Paradox 
This Article also issues a second challenge to the purported relationship 
between the Coase Theorem and the NLRA that more directly addresses 
the theorem. Coase’s insights about the reciprocal nature of externalities 
and the essential role of transaction costs can be viewed as expanding the 
list of factors that should be considered in the calculation of social product 
and, therefore, efficiency.57 Acknowledging that externalities are 
reciprocal requires including the costs and benefits of both parties to the 
 
 
 56. For the same reasons, this Article is not an argument about whether there is a “better” rule 
available than the Mackay Radio doctrine. This Article rebuts an economic analysis that drew 
conclusions about efficiency. 
 57. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 34 (“When an economist is comparing 
alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by 
these different arrangements.”). 
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externality in any calculation of social product. The transaction costs of 
addressing an externality must also be a part of the calculation of social 
product. 
But Coase defined social product even more broadly than is suggested 
by his reciprocity and transaction costs arguments. Most commentators 
properly emphasize Coase’s insistence that the calculation of social 
product also include opportunity costs.58 Coase defined “opportunity cost,” 
which he also called “social cost,” to be “the greatest value that factors of 
production would yield in an alternative use.”59 For example, if a farmer 
stops growing crops in an effort to avoid the fires sparked by passing 
trains, then the factors of production that had been occupied in crop 
production can be employed elsewhere to benefit the farmer and, 
therefore, increase total social product. Similarly, if strikers are idled by 
the hiring of permanent replacements, then their labor can be employed in 
another business. These benefits, said Coase, must be included in the 
calculation of social product.  
Part IV will argue that Coase’s broad definition of social product 
should be applied more broadly still:  
It would seem desirable . . . to compare the total product yielded by 
alternative social arrangements. In this article, the analysis has been 
confined, as is usual in this part of economics, to comparisons of the 
value of production, as measured by the market. But it is, of course, 
desirable that the choice between different social arrangements for 
the solution of economic problems should be carried out in broader 
terms than this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all 
spheres of life should be taken into account.60 
This definition of social product, offered in service of Coase’s opportunity 
cost argument, extends to adding new parties to the calculus. At a minimum, 
Coase suggested that the parties associated with an externality and their costs 
and benefits are not the only relevant factors in the calculation of social 
product. Without stretching his definition, social product can also include 
something more than the mere aggregation of inputs to and outputs from 
those parties’ production. There are potential contributors to social product 
beyond the parties at Coase’s bargaining table.61  
 
 
 58. Id. at 40. 
 59. COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 1, at 158. 
 60. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 43. 
 61. Admittedly, this reading might appear to be difficult to reconcile with the examples Coase 
offered. He did not consider parties or issues beyond the bargaining table in the examples he offered in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1185 Harris book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:33 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1202 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1185 
 
 
 
 
The breadth of Coase’s view of social product opens the door to a 
paradox. I will call it “Coase’s Paradox.” Coase suggested bargaining 
could be a socially optimal way to redress an externality. But Coase’s 
definition of social product implicitly acknowledges that some bargains 
struck between the parties to an externality may, in turn, produce new 
externalities, or “secondary externalities,” that affect parties beyond the 
bargaining table. Coase’s Paradox arises from his dialectical view that 
externalities produce new relationships with new parties that must also be 
included in the calculus of social product. Part IV will consider two 
examples of secondary externalities arising out of the Mackay Radio 
doctrine that could require reconsideration of any efficiency analysis of 
that rule of law. 
New research by Alan Krueger and Alexandre Mas into 
Bridgestone/Firestone Corporation’s hiring of permanent replacement 
workers during a strike in the middle 1990s suggests another factor that 
must be taken into account in the calculation of social product. Krueger 
and Mas have shown that Bridgestone/Firestone’s use of permanent 
replacement workers during a 1995 strike at its now-defunct Decatur, 
Illinois, facility was associated with the production of defective tires that 
harmed consumers.62 These costs imposed on consumers, as opposed to 
the union and employer involved in the strike, should be included in a 
Coasean analysis of the Mackay Radio doctrine’s efficiency.  
Taking into account the costs of the Mackay Radio doctrine to 
consumers and other parties beyond the bargaining table is not a mere 
mathematical enterprise, however. It is essential to understanding the 
irreconcilability of the Coase Theorem and the NLRA. Part IV explains 
the following syllogism in greater detail. If the transaction costs associated 
with redressing a primary externality must be part of an efficiency 
analysis, as Coase argued they must, then the transaction costs associated 
 
 
Social Cost. See, e.g., id. at 2-8 (cattle rancher and farmer); id. at 32-34 (railroad and farmer). We 
should avoid reading too much into Coase’s silence on this issue. Looking beyond the bargaining table 
in these examples was not necessary to Coase’s argument. It is not necessary to draw an inference that 
he intended his examples to limit his very broad definition of social product. See, e.g., Schlag, supra 
note 5, at 945 (noting the dialectical nature of Coase’s inquiry in that changes in the content of a legal 
rule will “yield changes not only with respect to the matter covered by the rule, but also with respect to 
matter extrinsic to the purported operation of the rule”); Simpson, supra note 26, at 60 (“There is a 
tendency to discuss the reciprocal character of the problem of social cost in terms of just two activities 
. . . . This can mislead; once the reciprocal nature of the problem is conceded, there is just no end to the 
possibilities . . . .”). 
 62. See Alan B. Krueger & Alexander Mas, Strikes, Scabs and Tread Separations: Labor Strife 
and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Tires, Princeton Univ. Ind. Rels. Sec. Working 
Paper No. 461 (Jan. 2002), available at www.irs.Princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/461revised.pdf. 
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with redressing a secondary externality must also be taken into account. 
Part IV will argue that including secondary externalities in social product 
calculations necessarily results in higher transaction costs. In turn, higher 
transaction costs mean that the Coasean lawmaker will be more likely to 
select the dictated-solution approach instead of the transaction-cost 
reduction approach to externalities. It is in these circumstances that the 
Coase Theorem collides unavoidably with the NLRA.  
The NLRA has erected a nearly impenetrable wall that prohibits 
governmental intervention in the substance of collective bargaining 
agreements. The NLRB and courts regulate the process of bargaining. 
Substantial precedent holds that the substance of bargaining must be left to 
the parties.63 A Coasean lawmaker seeking to implement the dictated-
solution approach to redressing an externality would necessarily violate 
this fundamental labor law principle. For this reason, Part IV concludes 
that the Coase Theorem and the NLRA, in certain circumstances and with 
respect to the Mackay Radio doctrine in particular, are irreconcilable. 
II. INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Internal Labor Markets and the “Sunk Investments/Delayed 
Dividends” Contract 
Over the last five decades, labor economists have arrived at the 
conclusion that employers and workers form contracts in two discrete 
labor markets.64 Employers recruit prospective employees from among 
workers seeking new jobs across firms in the “external labor market.” 
These job-seeking workers are mobile and put on the market general skills 
that may benefit many employers. Employers buy those skills according to 
terms determined, in part, by supply and demand. Neither party makes a 
substantial investment in their relationship because alternatives abound. 
As a result, there are few transaction costs if an employer chooses one 
worker over another or a worker chooses one employer instead of 
another.65  
An employer’s incumbent employees, however, constitute its “internal 
labor market.” These incumbent employees differ from prospective 
 
 
 63. See infra notes 340-48. 
 64. See Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 87 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmoud A. Zaidi 
eds., 1990) (discussing the development of internal labor market theory). 
 65. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 113-14; Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 89. See also 
Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 361 (1984). 
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employees because they have gained firm-specific skills and knowledge 
that make them more productive with their present employer than 
otherwise qualified workers who could be hired from the external labor 
market.66 The parties’ “sunk investments” in an employee’s firm-specific 
skills and knowledge generate productivity dividends that the employee 
and employer may share, if the relationship lasts long enough.67 The 
employer benefits from greater profits attending the employee’s increased 
productivity. The employee benefits when her wages increase along with 
her greater productivity.68 As a result, the internal labor market should 
increase efficiency.  
As a general matter, the long-term relationship that characterizes the 
internal labor market is self-enforcing. The employer does not discharge 
the employee because that discharge would deprive the employer of the 
dividends from its investments in the employee’s skills and knowledge. 
 
 
 66. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, 155 (7th ed., 2000); Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 114-15; Wachter & Wright, 
supra note 2, at 90. Some legal scholars and labor economists refer to this phenomenon as types of 
“asset specificity,” see Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 13 (1993) [hereinafter Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice] (citing, 
among others, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 52 (1985)), or 
“first-mover advantages.” See Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: 
The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 251 (1985). However, Ehrenberg and 
Smith believe that the pay structure that is characteristic of the internal labor market—“underpayment” 
early in workers’ careers and “overpayment” later in their careers—itself enhances productivity by 
incentivizing good conduct and longevity. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra, at 400-01. Cf. Williamson 
et al., supra, at 257 (“The success of on-the-job training is plainly conditional on the information 
disclosure attitudes of incumbent employees. Both individually and as a group, incumbents are in 
possession of a valuable resource (knowledge) and can be expected to reveal it fully and candidly only 
in exchange for value.”). 
 67. These investments are not limited to formal training which increases the worker’s skill level. 
They may  
reflect a wide range of acquired competencies—familiarity with firm procedures; knowing whom 
to call upon—and who not—when the unexpected happens; an appreciation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of close associates in the firm; gradually acquired knowledge about the idiosyncrasies 
of firm customers; and so on down the line. 
Charles L. Schultze, Has Job Security Eroded for American Workers, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: 
HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 49-50 (Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan 
eds., 2000). They may include on-the-job training or superior screening during the hiring process that 
improve the “match” between job and worker. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 90-91. They 
may also include proficiency in the firm’s process of team-based production. See Leslie, supra note 
65, at 367. See also Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 253, 257. Gary Becker is widely credited with 
suggesting that the costs of job-specific training and monitoring are shared by employers and workers 
rather than assumed by one party. See, e.g., Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 115 (citing GARY 
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964)). 
 68. Empirical evidence supports the view that wages in internal labor markets are set according 
to different standards than those typically considered relevant to the external labor market. See, e.g., 
George Baker & Bengt Holmstrom, Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts, 85 
AM. ECON. REV. 255, 258-59 (1995). 
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Similarly, the employer avoids behavior that might cause the employee to 
quit. The employee would not otherwise quit because no other employer 
would compensate her at a level equal to that paid by her current 
employer. In sum, the benefits derived by the parties from continuing their 
relationship create an implicit contract that assures the longevity of the 
relationship.69 
The parties’ sunk investments create a bilateral monopoly attended by 
transaction costs, however.70 Both the employer’s labor supply pool and 
the employee’s opportunities for alternative employment shrink. Only 
incumbent employees have the requisite job-specific skills to increase the 
employer’s productivity, so these workers represent the employer’s most 
efficient supply of labor. Absent the competitive forces of the labor 
market, the employer must “monitor” these employees to assure that they 
do not “shirk” and thereby deprive the employer of the benefits of its 
investments.71 On the other hand, firm-specific skills reduce employees’ 
mobility because their skills are not transferable to other employers.72 An 
efficient relationship seeks to minimize any inefficiencies associated with 
this bilateral monopoly, in part, by maximizing the shared dividends made 
possible by the parties’ extended relationship. 
Cohen and Wachter offered the following graph to demonstrate how 
the parties should benefit from this “sunk investments/delayed dividends” 
contract: 
 
 
 69. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 168-70, 381-82. See also H. Lorne Carmichael, Self-
Enforcing Contracts, Shirking and Lifecycle Incentives, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. No. 4 at 65, 67-68 (Fall 
1989); Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 15. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02 for 
a discussion of the nature of contracts entered into in the internal labor market. 
 70. See Williamson, Contractual Relations, supra note 35, at 241. 
 71. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1358. “Shirking,” when used in labor economics circles, 
is best defined as the employee’s failure to contribute actively to improving firm productivity. Thus, 
the term can include both slothfulness, a refusal to assist the employer with problem-solving, or any 
omission or commission that deprives the employer of the productivity benefits of the worker’s firm-
specific skills. See Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 21-22 and n.49 (quoting Alan Hyde, 
In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 183 (1991)). 
 72. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1356-58. 
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Figure 1 
On this graph, W (wage) represents the wage paid by the firm to its 
employee.73 MP (marginal productivity) represents the productivity of the 
worker in her current job. OW (opportunity wage) represents the wage and 
productivity of the worker in the external labor market, or the best wage 
the worker could obtain in the external labor market. Age A represents the 
worker’s entry into the internal labor market. Age F represents the 
employee’s retirement from her career with the employer.74 
The employee makes sunk investments between Age A and Age D 
 
 
 73. While Wachter and Cohen use the term “wage,” they must mean the worker’s “total 
employment costs,” including both cash outlays like wages and deferred compensation (e.g., 
pensions), and noncash costs like hiring, monitoring, and training. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra 
note 66, at 144-77. Accordingly, I will use the term “wage” to refer to this same panoply of 
employment costs. 
 74. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1362-63. Wachter and Cohen premise their graphic 
representation of the sunk investments/delayed dividends contract on several plausible assumptions. 
First, the incumbent worker’s wage will rise over the course of her career. Second, her marginal 
productivity (and therefore her opportunity wage, which is assumed to match her productivity because 
of the external labor market’s presumed competitiveness) will decline with age because of increasing 
physical limitations and skills obsolescence. Third, marginal productivity will be lower than the 
opportunity wage in the early part of the worker’s career while she acquires job-specific training and 
exceed the opportunity wage in the latter part of her career when her enhanced skills generate greater 
productivity. Id. at 1363. See also EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 409 (discussing the reasons 
for an upward wage stream over the course of a worker’s career and its relationship to marginal 
productivity). 
OW 
 W 
 MP 
 A   C   B   D  E    F 
OW
MP
 W 
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when her opportunity wage exceeds the wage she receives from her 
employer; that is, the employee accepts a lower wage in return for firm-
specific training, among other things, during this period. After Age D, the 
worker recoups her investment and earns dividends until she retires at Age 
F because her wage exceeds both her opportunity wage and, at times, her 
marginal productivity.75 As long as the present value of the difference 
between the employee’s wage and her opportunity wage after Age D 
exceeds the present value of the difference between the opportunity wage 
and the wage prior to Age D, the employee will reap a net dividend from 
her sunk investments.  
The employer’s sunk investments are made between Age A and Age B 
and again between Age E and Age F. During both periods, the worker’s 
wage exceeds her productivity. The employer recoups its investment and 
earns its dividends between Age B and Age E when the worker’s marginal 
productivity, higher because of her firm-specific skills and knowledge, 
exceeds her wage.76 As long as the present value of the difference between 
marginal productivity and the worker’s wage from Age B to Age E 
exceeds the difference between the wage and marginal productivity from 
Ages A to B and the present value of the difference between Ages E to F, 
the employer will reap a net dividend. Thus, if the parties are able to 
sustain their relationship until the employee retires at Age F, then it should 
be mutually beneficial.  
The sunk investments/delayed dividends contract is not always self-
enforcing, however. Both parties face the danger that their sunk 
investments will be lost, or transformed into “sunk cost losses,” in the 
Cohen and Wachter lexicon, if the other party behaves opportunistically so 
as to expropriate more than its share of the investment dividends.77 The 
employee faces the greatest risk of sunk cost losses between Age E and 
Age F when she awaits her dividend and perhaps a portion of her recouped 
investment after the employer has already recouped its investment. During 
this period, the employer pays the employee a wage in excess of her 
 
 
 75. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1362-63. “In practice, these higher post-training wages 
take the form of seniority-based wages and late-vesting pensions, which induce workers to stay with 
the firm after training.” Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 15. For a good explanation of 
why it is that workers and employers share the costs of specific training, see EHRENBERG & SMITH, 
supra note 66, at 167-68, and the sources cited therein. 
 76. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1363-64. 
 77. Id. at 1360; EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 402. Opportunism may best be defined 
as “an effort to realize individual gains through a lack of candor or honesty in transactions. . . . 
[O]pportunism is self-interest seeking with guile.” Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 258-59. It might 
also be defined as “any activity undertaken by one party to an agreement to increase its benefit from 
the agreement at the expense of the other party to the agreement.” Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 442. 
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productivity.78 The opportunistic employer might cut the employee’s 
wages to a level closer to her productivity in an effort to usurp some of the 
employee’s dividend. The employer faces its greatest risk of employee 
opportunism between Age B and Age E when the employee’s productivity 
exceeds her wage. If the employee “shirks,” thereby reducing her 
productivity and increasing the employer’s monitoring costs, the employer 
may lose the benefit of the bargain.79 Opportunistic behavior may increase 
the worker’s or the employer’s benefit, but it decreases the total expected 
value of the agreement; therefore, “the individual interests of the parties in 
pursuing strategic behavior diverge from their collective interest in 
avoiding it . . . .”80 
B. Asymmetric Information and Competition in the External Labor Market 
The danger that opportunistic behavior will produce sunk cost losses is 
heightened by two aspects of the environment in which the parties 
negotiate sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts: asymmetric 
information and the incomplete nature of the sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract. 
1. Asymmetric Information 
Workers and employers do not have access to the same information. 
For example, employees are assumed to know their own effort level. The 
firm must monitor its employees to collect that information.81 By contrast, 
employers have better information about other factors determining 
employees’ productivity: product demand, available technology, the 
ability to substitute capital for labor, and the resulting demand for labor.82 
 
 
 78. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1364. Accord Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, 
at 19. 
 79. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1364. Accord Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, 
at 11, 32-33 n.89 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
947, 979 (1984)). Ehrenberg and Smith pose a slightly different problem of worker opportunism; that 
is, workers may extend the date of their retirement to continue receiving wages in excess of their 
productivity. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 402. In an at-will relationship, even 
modified by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the employer has tools available to protect 
itself from this kind of opportunism.  
 80. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 443. 
 81. Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 94. While Wachter and Wright assume that this 
information advantage and workers’ presumed preference for leisure create an incentive to shirk, 
Schwab responds that workers’ self-respect and desire for approbation creates an opposite incentive. 
Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 22-24. 
 82. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 37-41;Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 94; 
Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1359. 
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When material information is private and there are insufficient incentives 
to reveal it, the risk arises that “some individuals may find it in their 
interest to manipulate these mechanisms in their favor by lying.”83 
Over time, these asymmetries adjust, but they do not disappear entirely. 
For example, employers learn more about each employee’s effort level as 
they gain more experience with the worker.84 The employee also gains 
information as her job tenure increases. She learns about her level of 
productivity, the productivity of her coworkers, and the employer’s 
monitoring systems. She learns more about her coworkers’ wages.85 She 
also gains enough experience to develop a firm plan regarding the duration 
of her career with the employer, while she may have merely harbored a 
vague intent at the time of the original negotiation. Finally, she learns 
from her coworkers whether the employer can be trusted to live up to its 
contracts.86 
Workers have the least information while they are bargaining with the 
employer in the external labor market (i.e., Age A on Figure 1).87 This 
does not mean that workers are wholly ignorant of the factors entering into 
the sunk investments/delayed dividends contract or that, in some 
idiosyncratic cases, informal channels may provide some information.88 
But workers’ information in the external labor market is limited and 
comparatively less substantial than the information they will gain later in 
their relationships with the employer. Yet, this initial negotiation is a 
critical stage in the relationship. The worker chooses an employer, in large 
part, based on a comparison of the present values of the compensation 
packages she will receive from prespective employers.89 The worker is 
 
 
 83. Costas Azariadis, Employment with Asymmetric Information, 98 Q.J. ECON., Supp. 1983, at 
157. 
 84. See Schultze, supra note 67, at 50. See also EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 174 
(discussing the limitations of credentials in hiring and the need for employers to observe workers to 
assess their productivity levels). 
 85. See KATZ & KOCHAN, supra note 53, at 168. 
 86. See id. at 75-76 (“The information gap [between employer and prospective worker] is likely 
to be much less a problem for incumbent employees than for new hires.”). 
 87. See LLOYD G. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 108 (5th ed. 1970). 
See also WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 73 and n.51 (suggesting that while the worker is 
assumed to know her opportunity wage and certainly knows the wage being offered by the employer, 
she does not know a great deal about the wages being paid to incumbent workers); Carmichael, supra 
note 69, at 715. See generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 380-81 (discussing the role of 
“signalling,” rather than complete information, in the initial employment contract). 
 88. For example, workers may have social relationships with employees of the employer with 
whom the workers are negotiating. These social relationships, even acquaintanceships, may provide 
sources of useful information. 
 89. Employers “make a multiperiod ‘package’ of wage offers that is competitive with the offers 
being made by other employers in the market,” EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 161, because 
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presumed to be protected from employer opportunism at this stage by the 
competitive nature of the external labor market.90 But the nature of the 
sunk investments/delayed dividends contract complicates this presumption 
substantially.91 
Contracts formed in the external labor market are typically 
characterized by a lack of investment by the parties, thus freeing either 
party to abandon their relationship at low cost if a more efficient 
opportunity arises.92 The sunk investments/delayed dividends contract, on 
the other hand, presupposes substantial investments by both parties early 
in their relationship as both parties share the cost of the worker’s 
acquisition of firm-specific skills at the beginning of the worker’s career 
(i.e., the employer pays a wage greater than productivity from Age A to 
Age B, and the worker accepts a wage below her opportunity wage from 
Age A to Age D).93 Thus, abandoning this relationship, even at a relatively 
early stage, imposes sunk cost losses on each party. 
2. Incomplete Contracts 
The nature and expected duration of the sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract makes avoiding these sunk cost losses even more 
difficult. The worker in the external labor market negotiates an agreement 
that covers not merely the short term but the long term, and perhaps her 
entire career. Detailed, long-term contracts are impractical and 
uncommon, however.94 A formal contract seeking to codify a complete 
 
 
“[a]pplicants to, and employees of, employers with internal labor markets are concerned with the 
present value of their career compensation.” Id. at 400. See generally Oliver D. Hart, Optimal Labour 
Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 3, 5 (1983) 
(assuming that there is a competitive market for sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts in the 
external labor market). 
 90. Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 259. 
 91. Asymmetric information is a lesser problem in unionized workplaces. Unionized employees 
get more and better information earlier in their careers. Unions have institutional memories consisting 
of the collective knowledge of their members. See Leslie, supra note 65, at 369-70. Unions also gain 
substantial information about productivity and monitoring through the collective bargaining process. 
See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that union is entitled to employer’s 
financial records when employer has claimed that it cannot afford wage increases). See also KATZ & 
KOCHAN, supra note 53, at 187-88. Most important, the union, not the prospective worker in the 
external labor market, negotiates the new worker’s wages, hours, and employment conditions. So, 
regardless of whether the new worker actually benefits from the union’s substantial body of 
knowledge, the contract into which she enters will be informed and shaped by the union’s knowledge. 
 92. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 96 (complex long-term contracts are uncommon in 
the nonunion sector); Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 271-72 (quoting Archibald Cox, The Legal 
Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 (1958)). See also NLRB v. F & 
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sunk investments/delayed dividends agreement would necessarily specify 
both its term (i.e., the worker’s guarantee of job security throughout her 
career) and the worker’s wages and productivity levels from the time the 
worker enters her employment until the time she retires. It would also 
provide for many or all of the contingencies that could arise during the 
course of the worker’s career and affect the parties’ investments and 
dividends.95  
Parties considering such an agreement face two intractable problems. 
First, efficiency-maximizing parties are expected to reduce transaction 
costs to the lowest level possible. Negotiating a formal, detailed, complex, 
and contingent contract is an expensive and time-consuming proposition, 
if it is possible at all.96 Second, greater specificity regarding future 
behaviors (i.e., amount of work, amount of pay) subjects the parties to the 
risks associated with changing circumstances. For example, productivity 
is, at least in part, derivative of the demand for the employer’s goods and 
the availability of new production technologies. Few rational actors would 
gamble that they could accurately predict technological advances and 
consumer demand years into the future.97 Of course, the likelihood of 
change increases as the parties attempt to project further and further into 
the future. “Bounded rationality”—the parties’ inability to conceive of all 
the contingencies that may arise—thereby causes the parties to construct a 
contract that permits adaptability to changing circumstances.98 For these 
 
 
A Food Sales, Inc., 202 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that under NLRB’s contract bar 
rule, if employer and union have a collective bargaining agreement, then the agreement constitutes a 
bar to a representation election for the term of agreement up to a maximum of three years); S. 1052, 
107th Cong., 1st Sess., TEMP. REC. S-7131 (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/rva/ 
1071/1071211.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) (stating that 66% of collective bargaining agreements 
involving one thousand employees or more have terms of three to five years; 28% have terms of five 
to six years; and 7% have terms of six to eight years). 
 95. See Leslie, supra note 65, at 366, 368 (“The contract would have to be very complex because 
it would need to provide for a host of contingencies, such as the nature of managerial orders the 
employee would be bound to obey, the conditions of discharge and layoff, and standards of promotions 
and demotions, all under conditions of considerable uncertainty.”). Accord Williamson et al., supra 
note 66, at 262-63. See also WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 75. 
 96. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, at 97 (“If the parties inside the firm attempt to 
maximize the coalition’s surplus, they must obviously attempt to reduce transaction costs as much as 
possible (or, more accurately, as much as it is efficient to do so). Since negotiating, writing, and 
enforcing contracts often incur high transaction costs, complex state-contingent contracts might not be 
joint profit maximizing.”) 
 97. See Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 257-58. 
 98. See Hart, supra note 89, at 23. See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 66, at 30-32 (discussing the 
role of bounded rationality in contracting). 
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reasons, sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts err in favor of 
ambiguity or “incompleteness.”99 
On the other hand, less specificity and greater flexibility in the contract 
render the agreement difficult to enforce. For example, the employer 
cannot fully defend against “shirking” if it fails to specify precisely the 
employee’s required productivity levels. The employee cannot fully 
defend against an opportunistic discharge unless the grounds for 
discharge, including her production levels, are specified in great detail in 
the contract.100 As a result, while sunk investments/delayed dividends 
contracts may be partially self-enforcing, they are not self-executing.  
For example, the initial agreement between the parties will not specify 
the employee’s wages at every stage of the worker’s career, although it 
may include vague commitments to rising wages commensurate with 
performance and position.101 The employer offers only enough information 
about wages to permit the employee to choose between competitive offers, 
but not enough to put the employer at risk if conditions change. After the 
wage agreement specified in the initial negotiation has run its course (i.e., 
from Age A to Age B on Figure 1), the parties must reach a new agreement 
regarding the worker’s pay for the next period of her employment (i.e., 
from Age B to Age C). Similarly, an employer seeking to remain 
competitive in the external labor market would make employment offers 
implying an assurance of career-long job security through retirement (i.e., 
 
 
 99. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 379. See also Leslie, supra note 65, at 368 
(“[C]omplete, contingent contract exists only in theory because the firm and the worker would have to 
anticipate, bargain out, and reduce to writing a vast array of potential future events and conditions 
. . . .”). Williamson goes so far as to say that “all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete.” 
Williamson, Posnerian Law and Economics, supra note 41, at 102 (emphasis added). 
 100. See Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 19-20. See also Wachter & Wright, supra 
note 64, at 91-92, 103. It is not literally impossible to enforce ambiguous contracts; rather, enforcing 
these contracts requires substantial transaction costs. For example, litigation may be required in which 
a third-party fact-finder attempts to glean what occurred from little available evidence. See 
Carmichael, supra note 69, at 67. 
 101. Empirical studies have shown that increases in workers’ post-entry wages are determined, at 
least in part, by whether they receive promotions. See ROBERT GIBBONS & MICHAEL WALDMAN, A 
THEORY OF WAGE AND PROMOTION DYNAMICS IN INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper Series No. 6454, 1998) (collecting several studies). Promotions are 
not typically events planned at the time of the worker’s hiring. Rather, they depend upon a number of 
variables—including the worker’s productivity in a lower-level job—that are unknown at the time of 
hiring, although seniority appears to play a substantial role in many promotions. See generally 
Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 273-74 (discussing the role of promotions in the internal labor 
market). See also Katharine G. Abraham & James Medoff, Length of Service and the Operation of 
Internal Labor Markets, 1983 PROCEEDINGS 35TH ANN. MEETING, INDUS. REL. RES. ASS’N, 308, 312-
14 (discussing the role of seniority and productivity in promotions). Thus, promotions and the wage 
increases that attend them are contingencies that require and reflect renegotiation of the sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contract. 
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through Age F), but sufficiently vague to assure itself the desired level of 
flexibility to discharge unproductive, expensive employees (i.e., at Age E). 
The prospective worker’s calculation of the present value of her career 
compensation would take into account the assurance of long-term 
employment, but subsequent negotiations would reinterpret that job-
security commitment and thereby determine the assurance’s effectiveness.  
In sum, after the worker becomes employed in the internal labor 
market, the parties must reinterpret the nonspecific and often unwritten 
terms of the deal they struck in the external labor market. To accomplish 
this task, they engage in rolling renegotiations at various stages of their 
relationship to recalibrate the distribution of investments and dividends.102 
So, even if competition in the external labor market protects the worker 
from opportunism in the initial negotiation, the sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract formed in the external labor market does not protect the 
employee from employer opportunism arising out of information 
asymmetries during later renegotiations.103 The so-called “enforcement” 
problem—that is, the inability to protect against opportunistic behavior—
remains.104 As we will see, asymmetric information and the enforcement 
 
 
 102. See Hart, supra note 89, at 23 (“In reality, there exist few contracts between firms and 
workers containing the amount of detail which [may be] appropriate. . . . [C]ontracts tend to be in 
force for limited periods of time, and are then renegotiated.”); Williamson, Contractual Relations, 
supra note 35, at 240 (recognizing that long-term contracts are “successively adapted to unfolding 
events and as periodic contract-renewal agreements are reached.”). See also Williamson et al., supra 
note 66, at 268 (describing a model of an incomplete employment contract in which the parties do not 
agree to all terms ex ante, but agree to decide specific terms at a later stage in their relationship). 
Accord Erich Schanze, Failure of Long Term Contracts and the Duty to Re-Negotiate, in FAILURE OF 
CONTRACTS: CONTRACTUAL, RESTITUTIONARY AND PROPRIETARY CONSEQUENCES 155 (Francis 
Rose ed., 1997); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 29. My use of 
“renegotiations” may leave the inaccurate impression that the parties enter into formal discussions 
attended by high transaction costs. The negotiations may be quite informal and need not produce a 
written contract. The negotiation may amount to nothing more than an essentially costless offer and 
acceptance of a promotion and an attendant pay increase. See supra note 101. Since efficiency requires 
the minimization of transaction costs, the parties’ willingness to enter into an agreement that 
presupposes serial renegotiations may depend upon their calculation of whether the transaction costs 
attending these negotiations exceed the costs associated with specifying terms in the initial negotiation 
that may be made obsolete, or excessively expensive, by changing circumstances. 
 103. Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 259-60. See also Carmichael, supra note 69, at 67 
(suggesting that promises made in the external labor market will be kept only if it is in each party’s 
interest to keep its promises). See also generally Hart, supra note 89, at 7-15, 20-21 (discussing the 
incentives to lie arising out of asymmetric information after the initial contract is made and how those 
incentives operate, including in multiperiod contracts like the sunk investments/delayed dividends 
contract). 
 104. H. Lorne Carmichael goes so far as to say that promises made in the external labor market 
are not legally enforceable and that opportunistic behavior by employers “can be prevented only if the 
benefits the firm expects to get from a continuation of the contract are at least as great as what it can 
get by firing the worker.” Carmichael, supra note 69, at 68. He may be overstating the case. Some 
parties may legally bind themselves to particular promises made in the external labor market. See infra 
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problem become important players in a Coasean efficiency analysis of the 
Mackay Radio doctrine. 
III. MACKAY RADIO, THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET, AND THE EXTERNAL 
LABOR MARKET  
A. Mackay Radio: Unmasking Underlying Assumptions 
Cohen and Wachter relied on the external labor market to prevent 
opportunistic behavior that might undermine the sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract.105 First, Cohen and Wachter posited that the 
availability of permanent strike replacements in the external labor market 
would deter a union from using its monopoly power to bargain for wages 
that expropriate the employer’s share of the dividend from the sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contract. The external labor market is 
presumed to operate competitively; therefore, if an employer’s wages 
increase due to the union’s monopolistic wage demands, the supply of 
labor should also increase: “the higher the premium, the greater the 
attractiveness of those jobs to replacement workers. Replacements would 
find such jobs better than those they could obtain elsewhere . . . .”106 In 
sum, the hoard of prospective replacement workers gathering outside the 
employer’s place of business waiting to take the union members’ jobs at 
monopoly wages inhibits the union’s opportunistic behavior, according to 
Cohen and Wachter.107 
Second, Cohen and Wachter argued that the external labor market 
deters the employer from an opportunistic use of permanent replacement 
workers to deprive workers of their investment dividend. If the employer 
seeks to use its monopsony power in the internal labor market to bargain 
for lower wages in incumbent workers’ later years (i.e., from Age E to 
Age F), argued Cohen and Wachter, striking workers would have little to 
fear from replacement workers, because these replacements would not 
 
 
notes 176-77 and accompanying text. Carmichael’s point may be better narrowed to state that sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contracts need not necessarily include legally enforceable promises. 
 105. Bierman and Gely argued that this reliance on the purported disciplining power of the 
external labor market’s competitive forces is conceptually “troubling . . . when it is the inability of the 
external labor market to deal with firm specificity that is the main factor underlying the creation of 
internal labor markets. Were it not for the need for firm-specific training, firms would be better off 
making all employment transactions in the external labor market.” Bierman & Gely, Striker 
Replacements, supra note 2, at 375 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 106. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 119. See also EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 53-
54. 
 107. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 119. 
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accept jobs that offer a stream of future wages below competitive levels. 
Alternatively, any replacement workers who accepted jobs would be 
reluctant to make sunk investments in a firm that had developed a 
reputation for opportunistic behavior.108 Thus, according to Cohen and 
Wachter, the external labor market will not permit employers to hire 
permanent replacement workers efficiently at a subcompetitive wage, so 
these employers will not act opportunistically. 
Before critiquing the Cohen and Wachter analysis, it is necessary to 
expose and examine three important assumptions underlying the analysis. 
The first assumption is actually a distinction that Cohen and Wachter 
implied between the threat to hire permanent replacement workers and the 
practice of hiring permanent replacement workers. Cohen and Wachter 
premised their efficiency analysis on a theory of prevention. Disincentives 
arising from the external labor market, they suggested, would prevent 
opportunistic behavior by unions and employers; therefore, employers 
should never find it necessary to hire permanent replacement workers.109 
The threat of hiring permanent replacements should be sufficient to deter 
unions’ opportunism, while the threat of inefficiency should deter 
employers’ opportunism.110 In other words, Cohen and Wachter 
represented the Mackay Radio doctrine as an example of the transaction-
cost reduction approach to the problem of permanent strike replacements. 
The Mackay Radio doctrine effectively prohibits the parties from engaging 
in opportunistic behavior. Absent other disabling transaction costs, 
therefore, it facilitates bargaining between the union and the employer to 
reach an efficient agreement that preserves the efficiencies of the internal 
labor market, or so goes the Cohen and Wachter argument. 
Although we will shortly see that this argument misrepresents the 
Mackay Radio doctrine’s role in collective bargaining, it is worth noting 
briefly that threats to hire permanent replacement workers may be 
inefficient, without more, even if they deter opportunistic behavior in the 
manner suggested by Cohen and Wachter. Threats require investments of 
resources that detract from employer profitability and worker 
productivity.111 Even more important, these particular threats may bring 
costs by altering the tenor of a collective bargaining relationship. 
Unionized employees angered by an employer’s threat to hire permanent 
 
 
 108. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 118. 
 109. Id. at 118-19. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See generally Schwab, Collective Bargaining, supra note 2, at 269-72 (discussing threats as a 
potentially costly form of strategic behavior). 
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replacement workers may engage, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
in preemptive shirking. If so, the employer will suffer sunk cost losses. 
Monitoring costs will increase. Productivity will decline, perhaps 
substantially. The dividends to be earned from the internal labor market’s 
efficiencies may be undermined by the very threats that are supposed to 
preserve them.  
Research performed by Alan Krueger and Alexandre Mas on the 
Bridgestone/Firestone strike, to be discussed more fully in Part IV, 
discloses one important case in which this outcome apparently resulted. 
Krueger and Mas found a dramatic increase in the number of defective 
tires produced by unionized employees at Bridgestone/Firestone’s 
Decatur, Illinois, plant between January 1994, when the employer’s 
collective bargaining agreement with the United Rubber Workers (URW) 
expired, and July 1994, when the URW commenced its strike against 
Bridgestone/Firestone.112 It may not be possible to disaggregate the effects 
of Bridgestone/Firestone’s threats to hire permanent replacement workers 
from the effects of other aspects of the contentious bargaining relationship 
between the parties. Nonetheless, the conclusion reached by Krueger and 
Mas that contentious labor relations have negative productivity effects 
plainly encompasses the potential, and probably real, consequences of 
threats to displace unionized employees with permanent replacement 
workers.113 
But this discussion need not delay us for long. The Mackay Radio 
doctrine does not merely facilitate efficient bargaining by deterring 
opportunistic behavior in the manner of the transaction-cost reduction 
approach. Like threats to strike, threats to hire permanent replacement 
workers are meaningless unless occasionally carried out.114 Imagine a 
different rule emerging from Mackay Radio that permitted employers to 
threaten that they would hire permanent replacement workers, but did not 
authorize the actual hiring of permanent replacements. Common sense 
dictates that no union would change its bargaining behavior to avoid an 
 
 
 112. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 29. 
 113. See infra text accompanying note 331. 
 114. “Weapons grow rusty if unused . . . . The most able Trade Union leadership will embark on 
strikes occasionally, not so much to secure greater gain upon that occasion . . . but in order to keep 
their weapon burnished for future use, and to keep employers thoroughly conscious of the Union’s 
power.” J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 146 (2d ed. 1963), quoted in Schwab, Collective 
Bargaining, supra note 2, at 269 n.93. Accord Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost 
Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429 (1972) (“[T]hreats will be ineffective if they are not believed, and 
it is unlikely that threats will be generally believed unless they are occasionally carried out.”). See also 
supra note 53 and accompanying text (Harry Wellington making a similar argument about the need to 
carry a strike to make the strike threats effective). 
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employer’s empty posturing.  
Unions that have a collective bargaining history with an employer 
know a great deal about the employer’s wage rates and its levels of 
productivity.115 The union can calculate, at least roughly, the inefficiencies 
resulting from the employer hiring permanent replacement workers at a 
premium wage. Should the employer respond to a union’s monopolistic 
wage demand by pleading poverty, then the employer is legally obligated 
to disclose even more information to support the legitimacy of its plea.116 
In sum, unions generally know that hiring permanent replacement workers 
at a premium wage is inefficient for the employer. The mere threat to hire 
permanent replacement workers alone should be ineffective in preventing 
unions’ opportunism. It is the employer’s willingness to engage in the 
practice, perhaps at the expense of its own efficiency, that would change 
the union’s behavior. 
Hiring permanent replacement workers has been a regular and 
longstanding practice among struck employers, albeit an alternative not 
frequently chosen. Strikes involving permanent replacement workers have 
occurred continuously since the NLRA was enacted.117 The incidence of 
strikes involving permanent replacements increased beginning in 1975 to 
the point where strikes in which employers hired permanent replacement 
workers represented a substantial minority of all strikes.118 In sum, a fair 
assessment of the Mackay Radio doctrine’s efficiency cannot stop with the 
employer’s threat. The Mackay Radio doctrine dictates a result to the 
employer and the union. The employer may hire permanent replacement 
workers, with a few restrictions, and the workers retain limited 
 
 
 115. See supra note 91. 
 116. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
 117. Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empirical 
Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169, 185 (1995) 
[hereinafter LeRoy, Regulating Employer]. 
 118. Id. at 189-91 (establishing the existence of a historically large number of permanent 
replacement strikes during the period from 1975 to 1991). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN 
THE 1970S AND 1980S, GAO/HRD-91-2 (1991) (reporting that 16% to 17% of all strikes in the time 
period studied involved the hiring of permanent replacement workers); Cynthia Gramm, Employers’ 
Decisions to Operate During Strikes: Consequences and Policy Implications, in EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN 
A CHANGING ECONOMY (William Spriggs ed., Economic Policy Institute, 1991) (reporting that 20% of 
strikes in a sample involved the hiring of permanent strike replacements); Peter Cramton & Joseph 
Tracy, The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-
89, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 667, 674 (1998) (reporting that 14% of all strikes involving employers with 
1,000 or more workers during the 1980s involved the hiring of permanent replacement workers); 
Gramm & Schnell, supra note 22 (confirming the 20% calculation); John F. Schnell & Cynthia L. 
Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between Employers’ Striker Replacement Strategies and Strike 
Duration, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189 (1994) (same). 
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entitlements to reinstatement, among other things.119 The Mackay Radio 
doctrine is a straightforward application of the dictated solution approach.  
Since the Mackay Radio doctrine dictates a bargaining outcome to the 
parties, the Coasean lawmaker’s burden is to establish the dictated 
solution’s efficiency. According to Cohen and Wachter’s own standard, 
proponents of the Mackay Radio doctrine must prove that benefits accrue 
to one or more parties—that is, the employer, the replacement workers, 
and the strikers—while the other parties either benefit or are left no worse 
off. This part will argue that this standard cannot be satisfied. 
The second assumption underlying the Cohen and Wachter analysis is 
that permanent replacement workers are hired from the external labor 
market. This assumption is true in some circumstances. It is certainly not 
true in all circumstances. Permanent replacement workers have been 
recruited from struck employers’ internal labor markets. Employers use 
two means to recruit these incumbent employees. First, employees 
working in another part of the employer’s operation may be invited to 
change locations and work in a struck location. Mackay Radio illustrates 
this point, as the employer moved employees from offices around the 
country to help operate its San Francisco office.120 International Paper 
used a similar tactic in 1987.121 Second, employers may lure striking 
incumbent employees across the picket line. Trans World Airlines used 
this tactic successfully in the mid-1980s.122 Using incumbent employees as 
permanent strike replacements solves important problems for the 
employer, as this part explains.123 
Unlike the first assumption, however, it would not be appropriate to 
abandon this second assumption completely because it can be true with 
respect to some employers and some permanent replacement workers. 
Accordingly, this part will analyze the efficiency of hiring permanent 
replacement workers from both the internal labor market and the external 
labor market. 
The third assumption is most important. Cohen and Wachter argued 
that a union’s monopoly wage demands—that is, those to be prevented by 
the Mackay Radio doctrine—would raise the struck employer’s wages 
 
 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 9-22 (discussing the basics of the Mackay Radio 
doctrine). 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 121. See, e.g., GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 72-73; Harris v. Int’l Paper 
Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D.Me. 1991). 
 122. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1989). 
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81. 
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above the wages paid by other employers in the same labor market.124 This 
argument appears to presuppose that the Mackay Radio doctrine operates 
in an environment where struck unionized employers pay the same wages 
as other employers in the labor market.125 Again, this assumption may be 
true in some cases. It is not true in all cases. Employers often pay premium 
wages to their unionized workers as a product of collective bargaining. 
This is the “union wage effect.”  
The leading studies estimate that the union wage effect accounts for ten 
to fifteen percent-higher wages for unionized workers compared with 
similarly situated unorganized workers.126 The union wage is itself a 
premium wage when compared with nonunion firms hiring in the same 
external labor market. Thus, one response to Cohen and Wachter could be 
that the hoard of prospective replacement workers they expect to seek 
employment because of the union’s monopoly wage demands may already 
be encamped outside the unionized plant’s gates because of the union 
wage effect.  
This response has its limits, however. First, the union wage effect may 
be accompanied by a substantial union productivity effect.127 Unions 
facilitate the internal labor market’s efficiencies.128 In part, this is a 
consequence of the lower level of turnover in unionized workplaces. Other 
causes include changed managerial structures as a result of the union’s 
role in giving voice to workers’ grievances and greater selectivity in hiring 
to justify the higher wages generally paid to unionized workers.129 So, the 
union wage effect may not reflect a premium but a return to increased 
productivity.130 Second, the union wage effect is most important when the 
struck employer is the sole unionized employer hiring in the external labor 
 
 
 124. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 119. 
 125. Cohen and Wachter also appear to assume that the wage stream negotiated by the parties 
prior to the union’s monopolistic wage demand—that is, through earlier collective bargaining—is an 
efficient wage stream. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 118-19. For simplicity’s sake, this Article 
accepts this assumption as true. 
 126. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 426 (collecting studies). 
 127. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 162-69 (1984). See 
also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 472-73 (collecting additional studies, some of which show the 
same results).  
 128. See Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 277. 
 129. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 127, at 174-80 (citing ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, 
VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1971)). See also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 431-34. 
 130. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has suggested nonproductivity-related rents that might also be sources 
for union wage and benefit increases. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 426-31. These rents would 
become sources of profits if collective bargaining did not require the employer to pay them as wages, 
so Dau-Schmidt’s suggestions do not undermine this argument. See generally FREEMAN & MEDOFF, 
supra note 127, at 181-84.  
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market or when other unionized firms are not hiring any workers from the 
external labor market. Otherwise, unionized firms other than the struck 
employer would offer wages similarly enhanced by a union wage effect. 
Since the union wage effect is greatest in those industries where unions 
have organized the largest proportion of the workers or where unions 
bargain for an entire industry sector, the union wage effect will be relevant 
to some, but not all, employers who might seek to hire permanent 
replacement workers.131 
Nonetheless, like their second assumption, the assumption by Cohen 
and Wachter regarding the comparative wages of unionized and nonunion 
employers cannot be wholly rejected. This part will first analyze the 
efficiency of hiring permanent replacement workers assuming, like Cohen 
and Wachter, that the Mackay Radio doctrine operates in an environment 
where there is no union wage effect and will later change this assumption 
to take the union wage effect into account. 
This part will offer two arguments. The first argument assumes, as 
Cohen and Wachter did, that permanent replacement workers are hired 
from an external labor market where there is no union wage effect. 
Inefficiencies arise in these circumstances because strikes involving 
permanent replacement workers make the struck employer substantially 
less desirable to prospective employees than its competitors in the external 
labor market. As a result, struck employers must offer some premium to 
prospective replacement workers to lure them across a picket line. This 
part will argue that bribing workers to become permanent replacement 
workers cannot be accomplished in a Pareto optimal manner. This part 
will then introduce the union wage effect into the equation and, as a result, 
temporarily abandon the conclusion that employers must pay an additional 
premium, in addition to the union wage, to recruit permanent replacement 
workers. This part will show that the conclusion that hiring permanent 
replacement workers is inefficient does not change with the assumption 
about the union wage effect. 
After reinstating the premium premise, this part will explain that the 
Mackay Radio doctrine effectively prohibits employers from offering most 
types of premiums to prospective replacement workers. As a result, struck 
employers recruit replacement workers without offering a true premium; 
rather, they opportunistically exploit information asymmetries by luring 
prospective replacement workers with a “false premium” made possible by 
Mackay Radio. Ironically, the Mackay Radio doctrine facilitates 
 
 
 131. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 127, at 51. 
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opportunistic behavior, rather than preventing it. 
The second argument dispenses with the assumption that all permanent 
replacement workers are recruited from the external labor market. This 
part will argue that, as with the external labor market, recruiting 
permanent replacements from within the struck employer’s internal labor 
market cannot be undertaken in a Pareto optimal manner. 
B. An Inefficient Premium for Replacement Workers in the External Labor 
Market 
Cohen and Wachter’s conclusion about the efficiency of the Mackay 
Radio doctrine begins with two assumptions: (1) permanent replacement 
workers are hired in the external labor market, and (2) there is no union 
wage effect. For the time being, we will accept these assumptions. The 
struck employer’s job offers to replacement workers must, therefore, 
satisfy the competitive conditions of the external labor market.132 In 
addition, the efficiency-minded employer would seek to preserve the 
benefits of the internal labor market by offering replacement workers a 
sunk investments/delayed dividends contract. Thus, the prospective 
replacement workers would make their employment decisions by 
comparing the sunk investments/delayed dividends contract offered by the 
struck employer with similar contracts offered by other employers.133 
1. The Need for a Premium 
Struck employers seeking to hire permanent replacement workers are 
not similarly situated with their competitors in the external labor market, 
however. They are more akin to the employer who offers dangerous and 
unpleasant work to wary prospective employees. Strikes involving 
permanent replacement workers tend to be ugly, emotional affairs. Deep 
and long-lasting cleavages in personal lives and communities can result. 
Permanent replacement workers can face substantial social and physical 
risk. 
Throughout the 1991 strike against Caterpillar Corp., for example, the 
citizens of Decatur, Illinois, isolated themselves: “They avoided the local 
diner, the bowling alley, the hardware store, the church parking lot, the 
 
 
 132. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. See also Wachter & Wright, supra note 64, 
at 91 (“[T]he ILM is disciplined ex ante by the usual market forces . . . .”). 
 133. See supra note 89 (explaining that employers make a multiperiod package of wage offers that 
is competitive with the offers being made by other employers in the market because applicants from 
the external labor market are concerned with the present value of their career compensation). 
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traditional picnics. They stayed out of town, they simply withdrew.”134 
Jay, Maine, suffered a similar experience during the International Paper 
strike: “The strike inevitably changed the Jay-Livermore Falls community. 
It brought some people closer together, but it also created sharp, angry 
divisions, financial insecurity, and a dizzying feeling of change to a 
community once defined by connectedness, continuity, and general well-
being.”135 The International Paper strike affected everyone. Town 
businesses were categorized as prounion or procompany.136 
Schoolchildren identified themselves either as a striker or a scab.137 When 
asked how the community had changed, Town Manager Charles Noonan 
stated: “[T]he strike has torn the community apart. Friendships that existed 
for lifetimes are gone; people who went to high school together and grew 
up together will not speak to each other.”138 According to scholar Julius 
Getman,  
[i]t is not, however, financial loss that Jay and Livermore Falls 
residents mention most when they discuss the strike’s impact on the 
community. Most speak instead of the transformation of 
relationships. A former striker wrote to [Getman] “It has put brother 
against brother, friend against friend, and neighbor versus neighbor. 
It will take many generations before the hurt and anger will heal.” 
Another striker stated, “This generation will never see a complete 
healing.”139 
Hiring permanent replacement workers can represent a fundamental 
attack on strikers’ economic security and lifestyles. As a result, some 
strikers suffer acute physical and mental health problems,140 marriages 
dissolve, friendships end, and communities are split.141 Others turn to 
 
 
 134. STEPHEN FRANKLIN, THREE STRIKES: LABOR’S HEARTLAND LOSSES AND WHAT THEY 
MEAN FOR WORKING AMERICA 173 (2001). 
 135. GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 113. 
 136. Id. at 118. 
 137. Id. at 120. 
 138. Id. at 211. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Stephen Franklin, For Caterpillar Workers, Scars Are Deep Within, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 
1996, at 1 (Bob Griffin had two heart attacks, one in 1992, a few months after the strike began, the 
second on his sixth day back at work, January 1996; he “hit a button to start a machine, stepped back 
and blacked out . . . his heart had failed again . . . . ‘Maybe I was due for another heart attack,’ ‘[b]ut I 
think things at the plant sure helped it along’”). See also FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 244-45; 
GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 214. 
 141. Franklin, For Caterpillar Workers, supra 140 (At Caterpillar, “[t]hough the human toll will 
likely never be totaled, it’s clear that marriages collapsed or foundered, friendships tore apart, workers 
lost faith in one another, lives took troubling turns and, in a few instances, they ended in despair”); 
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violence against the replacement workers and line crossers, commonly 
known to strikers as “scabs.” Incidents have ranged from death threats to 
physical confrontations, and even gunshots have been fired at the 
replacement workers’ homes or cars. The International Paper strike again 
offers one example. When the company hired permanent replacements, the 
strikers made crossing the line as uncomfortable as possible; “[t]hey 
cursed, threatened, shoved, sometimes punched, and often threw rocks. 
They placed on the road ‘super striker nails’ that were drilled and tack 
welded to a washer.”142 Replacement workers would add fuel to the fire by 
driving across the picket lines, waving their checks, and making obscene 
gestures at the strikers.143 The most violent night of the strike was August 
12, 1987, when the strikers filled the road during a shift change at the 
plant.144 The strikers were chanting slogans, beeping their horns, and 
shouting insults at the replacement workers.145 Several confrontations 
occurred, including threats, property attacks, and physical assaults.146 In 
one case, the strikers grabbed a replacement worker out of his car and 
began kicking him.147 
Reports of violence also arose during the Caterpillar strike when the 
company began hiring permanent replacement workers and union 
members began to cross the line. Within days, several of the workers who 
crossed the union’s picket lines claimed that dead animals were left on 
their doorsteps, death threats were made over the phone, and tire tracks 
were left in their yards, right to their front doors.148 One replacement 
worker reported being shot at as he drove by the picket lines.149 Some line 
crossers filed lawsuits alleging that they were stalked after work and at 
 
 
Donald W. Nauss, Who Will Strike Out?: Detroit Newspaper Walkout Has Become a Test of Wills, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at D1 (“The [Detroit newspaper] dispute has become a subject of Sunday 
sermons and an issue in local elections. It has divided friends and families. Subscribers have posted 
signs in their front yards: ‘No Free Press or News wanted here.’ “Subscriber on strike.’”); Jacques 
Steinberg, Nurses’ Strike Leaves a Town in Need of Healing; Relatives Aren’t Speaking, Hospital 
Workers Are Taunted and Patients Go Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994, at B1 (“The strike has 
divided this working-class community on a far more intimate level than it would in a big city, with 
family members and longtime friends in opposing camps. ‘You get people who worked together for 
years and now they’re fighting each other,’ said Carman Prisco, a retired carpenter who has lived in 
Orange County most of his life.”). See also FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 1; GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF 
LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 215. 
 142. GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 47-48. 
 143. Id. at 50. 
 144. Id. at 49. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 128-29. 
 149. Id. 
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their homes, gunshots were fired at their homes, and their trucks and cars 
were vandalized.150  
Also in Decatur during that period, replacement workers at A.E. Staley 
and Bridgestone/Firestone reported experiencing the same kind of 
treatment:  
Shots had been fired through the windows of the homes of union 
workers who had deserted their unions. Pipes had been thrown . . . . 
Rocks and sharp objects and planks of wood with nails driven 
through them were laid down on the driveways of company 
officials, strikebreakers, and the union deserters, and in front of the 
factories.151  
Several homemade bombs were allegedly “tossed onto Staley’s 
grounds.”152 
The Detroit News strike began on July 13, 1995, and lasted until 
February 1997.153 There were reports by some newspaper delivery carriers 
that newspapers were stolen off their trucks, while others reported that 
their cars were vandalized.154 At least one carrier filed a report for assault 
and others reported that the strikers were calling their homes and 
threatening them and their families.155 Eventually the violence spread into 
the community, newspapers were stolen from businesses, and clerks in 
stores were cursed at for selling the newspapers.156  
The Greyhound Bus Line strike offers another unfortunate example. In 
the first four months of the strike, fifty-two sniper attacks on buses 
carrying passengers were reported.157 One Greyhound striker was killed 
when the rear wheels of a bus driven by a trainee crushed him.158 
The hiring of permanent replacement workers can affect the 
community, the strikers, the replacement workers, and the employer for 
years after the strike has been resolved. Within the workplace, returning 
 
 
 150. Id. at 131-32. 
 151. Id. at 171. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 144 (Mar. 13, 2000). 
 154. Strike, DETROIT NEWS, July 17, 1995, at 1A. See also Doug Durfee & Tim Weller, Paper 
Carriers Are Innocents Caught in Strike’s Cross Fire; Trying to Earn a Living, They Are Taunted as 
Scabs. Threats Make Delivering Papers Risky Business, DETROIT NEWS, July 18, 1995, at 1A. 
 155. See Durfree & Weller, supra note 154. 
 156. Id. 
 157. David Gonzalez & James C. McKinley Jr., Violence and the News Strike: Anger, Blame and 
Distrust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, § 1, at 1. 
 158. The Associated Press, Greyhound Strikers Accept Pact; Immediate Return to Work Urged, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1983, at A1. 
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strikers can be forced to work with permanent replacements and line 
crossers,159 even though powerful tensions remain between them.160 
Distrust of the union and the employer may abound.161 Anger and 
animosity can build up among the workers.162 Years after the Caterpillar 
strike ended, reporter Stephen Franklin returned to Decatur, Illinois, to 
speak with the former strikers. He found that “[b]eing back at work 
changed nothing. The Caterpillar workers were still miserable, still angry. 
They didn’t like being losers, didn’t like facing continued uncertainty, 
didn’t like the feeling of always being watched by their bosses, didn’t like 
working next to scabs.”163 Franklin described workers still living in fear: 
a fear fed by the recent labor disputes, a fear that the good times are 
over for some, a fear that not everyone clearly shares the same 
vision, a fear that not everyone benefits from the same payoff. Some 
workers are uneasy, unsure, and unnerved about the scenarios they 
see. They sense that long-term stability may no longer be an asset. It 
has turned into a burden, a mark of a lack of flexibility. They see 
how pensions have been curtailed, how benefits have been trimmed 
back. They watched as layoffs are no longer synchronous with the 
bad times, but come and go as their companies change directions or 
need to bleed themselves to keep profits up. They watch as older 
workers are pared from the payrolls through massive cutback 
schemes.164  
Franklin found the community in Decatur had changed and seemed to be 
split forever.165  
 
 
 159. See, e.g., Steven Franklin et al., Back on job, strikers wonder: Was it all worth it?, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 10, 1992 (Where Jan Firmand, a Caterpillar striker, tells how she was forced to work with 
the “number one line crosser,” Dick Owens). See also FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 248. 
 160. See e.g., Steven Franklin et al., at 1 (“To Jimmie Toothman, [another Caterpillar striker] 
bygones are not bygones. He still feels personally betrayed by those who crossed, and he makes his 
feelings clear.”). See also GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 184. 
 161. See e.g., Franklin et al., supra note 159, at 1 (“[The strikers] were angry with the union for a 
failed strike that cost some of them $20,000 in wages. They were angry with their union brothers and 
sisters who had bowed to Caterpillar’s threat rather than honor their own picket line. They were angry 
at those in the Peoria community who stood not with them but with Caterpillar as the company vowed 
to replace the striking workers. But most of all they were angry with Caterpillar itself for moving to 
hire outsiders to take their jobs . . . .”). See also FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 263. 
 162. See, e.g., Franklin et al., supra note 159, at 1. See also, GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, 
supra note 43, at 185-87. 
 163. FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 248. 
 164. Id. at 263. 
 165. See also Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F.3d 485, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(finding that strike was marked by violence such that the employer placed returning strikers in lower 
and highly visible positions to avoid any violence between the returning strikers and the replacement 
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The labor economics literature explains that employers offering 
undesirably dangerous jobs must provide a premium if they are to recruit 
successfully in the external labor market.166 For the same reason, 
employers seeking to hire permanent replacement workers may also be 
required to offer a premium in some form.167 Otherwise, the employers’ 
recruitment efforts will necessarily fail in the competitive conditions of the 
external labor market. Inducing a replacement worker to voluntarily insert 
herself into the potentially violent eye of a protracted storm requires some 
additional, perhaps substantial, compensation. 
As this part explains, “premium” need not be synonymous with a 
higher nominal wage than the employer pays to its incumbent, unionized 
employees. In fact, pursuant to internal labor market theory, it would be 
surprising if a prospective permanent replacement worker were offered a 
nominal wage higher than that paid to incumbent employees. New entrants 
into sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts (i.e., workers at Age A 
on Figure 1) should be paid substantially less than incumbent employees 
with anything more than zero job tenure (i.e., any age above Age A).168 
 
 
workers); Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 159 (D. Me. 1991) (finding hostile work environment 
where the African-American permanent replacement workers were repeatedly subjected to racist 
statements by co-workers and supervisors); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 586, 590 (1990) 
(citing two large demonstrations in which people were injured and property was damaged and 
incidents in which some replacement workers were harassed at their homes and assaulted where they 
met to car pool); Gloversville Embossing Corp., 297 N.L.R.B. 182, 194 (1989) (“[N]onstriking 
employees and replacement workers must be prepared to contend with some unpleasantries in a strike 
situation . . . . A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human 
beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to 
blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in 
the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight.”); Illinois v. Fed. Tool & 
Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 556 (Ill. 1975) (striking down Illinois statute requiring employer to state when 
advertising for replacement workers that there is an ongoing strike, “[a]lthough it was probably 
motivated by a desire to protect prospective employees from unwittingly becoming involved in a 
potentially hostile situation . . .”); LeRoy, Employer Treatment, supra note 43, at 25-26 (describing 
violent conditions associated with the strike at Pittston Coal Group); LeRoy, Picket Line Peace, supra 
note 43, at 844, 854-56 (describing almost identical violent and emotionally and economically 
wrenching conditions arising out of the permanent replacement strike by United Food and Commercial 
Workers’ Local P-9 against Geo. A. Hormel & Co. in Austin, Minnesota). 
 166. See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 43-44; Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, 
Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (Oct. 1998); 
Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Workplace Risks and Wages: Canadian Evidence from 
Alternative Models, 34 CAN. J. ECON. 377 (2001) (collecting studies); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of 
Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (Dec. 1993). 
 167. It is possible, at least in theory, that some strikes involving permanent replacement workers 
would not result in the kinds of unpleasantness described in this part. If so, the struck employer would 
not be required to pay a premium to recruit permanent replacement workers in the external labor 
market. Those struck employers’ situation would be analyzed in the same manner as that described 
infra in Part III.B.3. 
 168. See, e.g., infra note 256 (permanent replacement workers at Bridgestone/Firestone offered 
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The relevant concept when considering whether a premium has been 
offered is the present value of the prospective replacement worker’s career 
compensation. As noted above, workers in the external labor market make 
their choices between prospective employers, in part, by comparing the 
present value of career compensation offered by each employer. The 
struck employer must measure up against this yardstick. 
2. Legal and Economic Risks of Paying a Premium 
Mackay Radio’s progeny limit struck employers’ ability to offer 
premiums to prospective replacement workers. An employer that pays 
permanent replacement workers more than it has offered to unionized 
workers at the bargaining table commits an unfair labor practice under 
Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.169 An employer providing 
permanent replacement workers with additional vacation days also 
commits an unfair labor practice.170 Employers cannot offer permanent 
replacement workers many types of superseniority without committing an 
unfair labor practice.171  
 
 
30% less than wages paid to striking incumbent employees). 
 169. See, e.g., Burlington Homes, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1032 (1979); Soule Glass & Glazing 
Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792, 806 (1979), enf’d in part and denied in part, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981); 
Glazers Wholesale Drug Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1060 (1974), enf’d 523 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1975). 
See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1983) (noting that NLRB’s Regional Director 
issued a complaint against employer on the grounds that a unilateral wage increase for permanent 
replacement workers violates Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)). A premise of the decision resting on 
Section 8(a)(5) is that the employer imposed the wage increases unilaterally rather than through 
bargaining with the union. Since it is virtually certain that a union would not agree to higher wages for 
replacement workers than for incumbent unionized workers, a failure to bargain in good faith must be 
subsumed in any wage premium paid to replacement workers. An employer may unilaterally change 
existing terms and conditions of employment if, and only if, the “changes [are] reasonably 
comprehended within [its] final proposal . . . .” Brady-Stannard Motor Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1435 
(1985). 
 170. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (holding that employer may not 
provide vacation benefits to replacement workers that it did not provide to strikers simply on the 
grounds that the replacement workers were employed on the date when the vacation benefits became 
available). 
 171. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989) [hereinafter TWA v. IFFA] appears 
to limit the holding in Erie Resistor by concluding that an employer may apply the existing seniority 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement to allow “crossover” replacement workers (i.e., 
incumbent workers who cross the picket line to return to work before the end of the strike) to retain the 
jobs they filled during the strike, even though strikers’ seniority would have otherwise entitled the 
strikers to those jobs. It is important to note, however, that TWA v. IFFA was decided pursuant to the 
Railway Labor Act (RLA) rather than the NLRA. The TWA Court reminded that courts “have read the 
RLA to provide greater avenues of self-help to parties that have exhausted the statute’s ‘virtually 
endless’ dispute resolution mechanisms than would be available under the NLRA.” Id. at 439 (citation 
omitted). 
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The risks are greater than any penalties associated with the instant 
unfair labor practice. Economic strikes can be transformed into unfair 
labor practice strikes. If so, the employer sacrifices its ability to hire 
permanent replacement workers at all. Employers may not permanently 
replace strikers protesting an unfair labor practice.172 Since unfair labor 
practice cases can take years to adjudicate, employers illegally hiring 
permanent replacement workers may expose themselves to substantial 
back pay liability.173 Thus, employers face powerful disincentives to 
launching recruitment efforts that include offering prospective permanent 
replacement workers wage premiums or many kinds of superseniority.  
Even for employers willing to bear the risk of the legal remedies that 
attend an unfair labor practice, actually paying permanent replacement 
workers a premium wage is not efficient. Figure 2 illustrates this point. W 
represents the wage path agreed upon by the parties that maximizes their 
shared benefits from the sunk investments/delayed dividends contract. W1 
represents the monopoly wage demanded by a union seeking to 
expropriate the employer’s dividend.174 
 
 
 172. Refusing to reinstate an unfair labor practice striker violates Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the 
Act. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 
U.S. 270, 286 (1956); United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 
NLRB v. Charles D. Bonnanno Linen Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that 
conversion from an economic strike to an unfair labor practice strike gives the strikers the ability to 
secure reinstatement). 
 173. NLRB v. Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51 (1972); Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 278. 
See Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 
363, 372-81 (1992). Ray suggested that this looming penalty creates a powerful incentive for 
employers eager to preserve the permanent replacement weapon to avoid committing unfair labor 
practices. See id. at 365-66 (“Eliminating the employer’s ability to hire permanent replacements when 
its unfair labor practices cause or prolong the strike is currently a more effective deterrent to bad faith 
bargaining than other Board remedies. Legally questionable behavior will either reduce the employer’s 
bargaining leverage by possibly disallowing the option of hiring permanent replacements or expose it 
to years of uncertainty and risk of substantial back pay liability to unreinstated strikers as the issue is 
litigated.”). 
 174. W1 need not be set at this high level in order for this analysis to prove true. If W1 were set at a 
level closer to W, the employer would recoup some of its investment and the worker would experience 
a lesser windfall, but the difference is quantitative, not qualitative. 
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Figure 2 
If the employer were to promise and actually pay permanent 
replacement workers wages tracking W1, the employer could not recoup its 
investments. There would be no time during the worker’s career at which 
marginal productivity would exceed W1. On the other hand, the permanent 
replacement worker would invest less and for a shorter period in return for 
a far greater dividend. Figure 2 nicely illustrates the source of the 
employer’s unwillingness to agree to the union’s monopolistic wage 
demand. The employer does not derive its portion of the dividends from 
the internal labor market’s efficiencies if it employs permanent strike 
replacements at a premium wage. Since hiring permanent replacement 
workers at a premium wage causes the employer to lose returns on its 
investments, it is not Pareto optimal. 
The employer might try to recoup its investment by breaching its wage 
deal with the permanent replacement workers. For example, the employer 
might offer the prospective replacement worker a wage premium and, 
consistent with that offer, pay the replacement worker a higher wage at the 
start of their relationship. At some point, the employer would stop 
increasing the replacement’s pay. Productivity would rise and, at some 
point thereafter, exceed the wage. The employer would recoup its 
investment. A shrewd employer seeking to keep that replacement worker 
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in its employ would assure that the postbreach wage exceeded the 
employee’s opportunity wage so that the employee derived some benefit, 
albeit a smaller benefit than expected, from remaining in her job. This 
small benefit might be sufficient to keep the replacement worker from 
quitting, or so the employer would hope. 
 
Figure 3 
Figure 3 illustrates this breach-of-contract strategy. W2 represents the 
monopoly wage demanded by the union. The replacement worker receives 
a premium wage from Age A to Age X. At Age X, the employer halts all 
wage increases and holds wages constant through Age F rather than 
paying the promised wage stream W1. Compared with the Pareto-optimal 
sunk investments/delayed dividends contract that produces wage stream 
W, the replacement worker makes a smaller investment from Age A to Age 
X in order to reap a smaller dividend from Age D until Age F. The 
employer makes a larger investment from Age A to Age C but reaps a 
larger dividend beginning at Age C and continuing to Age F or thereabout. 
Thus, the breach-of-contract strategy is not Pareto optimal because the 
employer’s profits increase at the expense of the replacement workers’ 
compensation. 
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Mackay Radio’s progeny have further complicated the breach-of-
contract strategy. After Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,175 an employer that does not 
fulfill its promises to replacement workers may be liable under state law 
for breach of contract or fraudulent misrepresentation.176 An employer 
found liable may be required, at a minimum, to reimburse the replacement 
worker for the difference between the wage promised (W1) and the wage 
paid (W2). The employer would be returned to the non-Pareto-optimal 
conditions graphed in Figure 2.  
Sunk cost losses await even the employer who is able to evade state 
contract or tort liability after breaking its promises to the replacement 
workers.177 When compared with wage stream W, wage stream W2 
substantially increases the likelihood that the replacement workers would 
quit at some point after Age X. As the level of the employee’s investment 
in its relationship with the employer declines and the amount of deferred 
dividend from that investment shrinks, the employee’s commitment to a 
long-term relationship with the employer justifiably fades. Replacement 
workers are particularly likely to quit early in their careers when their real 
wage approximates their opportunity wage (i.e., from Age X to about Age 
D). Of course, the premature departure of the employee transforms both 
the employee’s investment in firm-specific skills and the employer’s 
investment in the employee into sunk cost losses. In sum, an employer’s 
decision to offer a wage premium to permanent replacement workers, even 
if the employer attempts an efficient breach of its contract with the 
workers, is not efficient. 
Superficially, it might appear that rapid turnover of permanent 
replacement workers would generate productivity benefits. Strikers may, 
at least in theory, return to work when the permanent replacement workers 
 
 
 175. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). 
 176. See id. at 512 (holding that the NLRA did not preempt replacement workers’ state law 
breach-of-contract and misrepresentation claims against an employer who assured the replacements 
that it would not terminate them to reinstate strikers and later did exactly that). This issue may arise, 
for example, when the employer settles the strike with the union and agrees to reinstate the striking 
workers. Reinstating strikers by breaching an agreement with permanent replacement workers does not 
constitute an unfair labor practice. See Michael D. Moberly, Striking Bargains: The At-Will 
Employment of Permanent Strike Replacements, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167, 185-91 (2000). 
 177. While some replacement workers have found success bringing state law contract claims 
against employers who breach their agreements for “permanent” employment, the record is decidedly 
mixed. Compare Moberly, supra note 176, at 204-16 (collecting cases in which workers’ claims were 
successful) with id. at 192-98, 218-22 (collecting cases in which workers’ claims were unsuccessful). 
These results are not surprising given the wide latitude employers have to condition their employment 
offers to replacement workers without threatening the workers’ status as “permanent” replacements. 
See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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quit.178 These striking incumbent workers already possess the firm-specific 
skills necessary to achieve the internal labor market’s promise of 
heightened productivity. If the strikers return quickly, then the employer’s 
production losses and the strikers’ loss of wages will be limited. But 
evidence suggests that strikes involving the hiring of permanent 
replacement workers last longer than other strikes.179 Thus, even if an 
employer breaches its contracts with the “permanent” replacement workers 
and avoids incurring any contract or tort liability from the resulting 
lawsuits, the striking workers would return to work more quickly if the 
employer hired temporary replacements or used only managers, 
supervisors, and incumbent workers employed outside the bargaining unit. 
The seeming efficiencies of the Mackay Radio doctrine are illusory in this 
instance, as well. 
3. The Premium Premise Abandoned 
At this point, we will abandon the premise that the struck employer 
must offer prospective permanent replacement workers a premium to 
recruit them from the competitive environs of the external labor market. 
Abandoning the premium premise serves two purposes. First, it allows for 
the existence of a union wage effect in the labor market in which the 
struck employer is seeking to recruit permanent replacement workers. In 
the presence of a union wage effect, the struck employer may not need to 
offer an additional premium because the union wage is itself a premium. 
Second, it leaves open the possibility, slim given the evidence, that a strike 
involving permanent replacement workers does not devolve into 
unpleasant and dangerous conditions for the prospective permanent 
 
 
 178. There is excellent reason for skepticism that this theory plays out in practice. See supra note 
22. 
 179. See, e.g., Schnell & Gramm, supra note 117, at 189 (offering one study and collecting others 
showing that the hiring of permanent strike replacements is associated with longer strike duration). 
Studies analyzing Canadian provincial legislation have shown that legislative bans on replacement 
workers increase the duration and incidence of strikes. See, e.g., John W. Budd, Canadian Strike 
Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining: Lessons for the United States, 35 INDUS. REL. 
245 (1996); Peter Cramton et al., Impacts of Strike Replacement Bans in Canada, 50 LAB. L.J. 173 
(1999); Morley Gunderson et al., The Effects of Canadian Labour Relations Legislation on Strike 
Incidence and Duration, 40 LAB. L.J. 512 (1990) (summarizing studies); however, most Canadian 
legislation on this subject effectively prohibits employers’ use of all replacement workers, not merely 
permanent replacement workers. See John W. Budd & Yijang Wang, The Ambiguity of Strike 
Replacement Legislation and Wages: A Sequential Investment-Bargaining Model, in David Lewin & 
Bruce E. Kaufman, 9 ADV. INDUS. LAB. REL. 239 (1999) (collecting the relevant Canadian provincial 
statutes). Struck Canadian employers in provinces governed by this kind of law may be effectively 
prohibited from operating at all during a strike. As a result, unions are empowered and employers are 
disempowered to a far greater degree than they would be if the Mackay Radio doctrine were reversed. 
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replacement workers. It is theoretically possible that no premium would be 
required in these circumstances, as well. 
Assume that the struck employer can recruit permanent replacement 
workers in sufficient numbers by offering prospective employees either 
the same prestrike wage it pays to its unionized workforce or its last wage 
offer at the bargaining table. In Figure 1, this is wage stream W. By 
definition, workers newly hired from the external labor market have not 
yet acquired any firm-specific skills and knowledge. Internal labor market 
theory teaches that the striking workers have already acquired these skills 
and, as a result, are more productive than their replacements.180  
Figure 1 illustrates that this proposition should be true regardless of the 
job tenure of the strikers, as long as the strikers have job tenure greater 
than zero. Incumbent workers’ marginal productivity never falls below the 
marginal productivity of workers newly hired from the external labor 
market. The average job tenure of the striking workers merely discloses 
the size of the productivity differential between the strikers and their 
replacements. Since unionized workers enjoy a long job tenure, on 
average, compared with nonunion workers,181 the productivity differential 
between unionized workers and their replacements should typically be 
very substantial, even though the replacement workers’ wages track wage 
stream W. So, the employer is worse off after hiring permanent 
replacement workers from the external labor market because its aggregate 
 
 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (discussing the productivity advantage of workers 
in the internal labor market). 
 181. John T. Addison & Albert C. Castro, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between 
Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 393, 402 (1987). See also Marleen A. 
O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907 n.21 (1993) (supporting Addison and 
Castro’s findings that the union workers’ higher tenure might be due to an informational advantage 
over nonunion workers); Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 12 n.15 (supporting Addison 
and Castro’s findings regarding higher tenure for union workers over nonunion workers, but also 
recognizing that nonunion workers also “enjoy considerable lifetime tenure after the job shopping 
years”). See Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage 
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1210 n.305 (1991) (using Addison and Castro’s findings regarding 
increased job tenure to support her own assertion that women benefit from union organization); Martin 
H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate Over Employment-At-Will: 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 136 (1992) (positing that unionized workers 
find “career-length” employment earlier than nonunionized workers); Marleen A. O’Connor, 
Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect 
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1204 n.89 (1991) (also supporting Addison and Castro’s 
findings that the union workers’ higher tenure might be due to an informational advantage over 
nonunion workers). This proposition is true for two principal reasons: (1) workers are better able to 
exercise “voice” through grievance and arbitration systems than “exit” as a strategy for redressing their 
employment-related concerns; and (2) collective bargaining agreements generally contain seniority 
provisions. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 127, at 94-101, 103-07. 
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productivity declines substantially. The premium premise, while a 
reasonable assumption, is not necessary to the conclusion that hiring 
permanent replacement workers is inefficient. 
4. Opportunity Costs 
Coase warned that efficiency analyses must include consideration of 
opportunity costs.182 In the case of the Mackay Radio doctrine, striking 
employees are idled by the hiring of permanent replacement workers; 
therefore, the relevant opportunity cost is the strikers’ productivity and 
wages in new jobs.183 If the strikers were more productive at new jobs than 
in the jobs they lost to permanent replacement workers, and the strikers 
thereby earned higher wages in the new jobs, then opportunity costs might 
transform an otherwise negative social product resulting from the hiring of 
permanent replacement workers into a positive social product. 
Internal labor market theory teaches, however, that strikers will be less 
productive and earn lower career compensation if they seek jobs in the 
external labor market rather than remaining with their current employer; in 
fact, this is the premise for internal labor markets’ efficiency.184 Referring 
back to Figure 1, incumbent employees older than Age D would suffer a 
nominal wage and productivity cut if they sought jobs in the external labor 
market. Incumbent employees younger than Age D have a higher nominal 
opportunity wage than their present wage, but the present value of all 
workers’ career compensation with their present employer far exceeds the 
present value of their opportunity wage stream. Similarly, the present 
value of incumbent employees’ marginal productivity in their current jobs 
exceeds the present value of their opportunity wage. 
Some empirical evidence supports the conclusion drawn from internal 
labor market theory that strikers would not benefit or become more 
productive in new jobs. Charles Schultze has shown that workers with 
long job tenures suffer a substantial loss of earnings—in the vicinity of 
25% of former earnings—after being displaced from a job for an extended 
period after the displacement occurs.185 An employee might be more 
 
 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. 
 183. This scenario assumes the employer carries out a decision to hire permanent replacement 
workers. A struck employer who has not made such a decision may choose from several responses to a 
strike. See supra text accompanying note 118. Several of these responses may also entail opportunity 
costs. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (explaining why internal labor markets are more 
efficient for workers and employers). 
 185. Schultze, supra note 67, at 52-59. 
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productive and earn less in a new job; however, these conditions would 
not satisfy the Cohen and Wachter definition of Pareto optimality since the 
worker would suffer a loss. In addition to these wage problems, Paul 
Weiler correctly explained that  
a new job is not fungible with an old job even if the jobs are 
virtually the same in type, pay, and conditions. An employee who 
has worked his way up the seniority ladder with one firm and now 
enjoys all the perquisites that long service provides loses this major 
advantage when he leaves his current job.186  
So, adding opportunity costs to the efficiency calculus for permanent 
replacement of striking workers does not require changing the conclusion 
that the Mackay Radio doctrine is inefficient. In fact, it strengthens that 
conclusion. 
C. The External Labor Market and the “False Premium” 
Because some empirical evidence supports it, I will reinstate the 
premise that struck employers must offer some premium to prospective 
replacement workers to lure them into employment.187 Mackay Radio is 
best understood as the first of several Supreme Court decisions defining 
the permissible contents of agreements reached between struck employers 
and replacement workers in the external labor market.188 In essence, 
Mackay Radio authorized employers to offer prospective replacement 
workers a premium consisting of a promise that they would have job 
security after the conclusion of the strike that inspired their hiring.189 Since 
employers cannot efficiently or legally pay a wage premium to permanent 
 
 
 186. WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 66. See also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 127, 
at 122-31 (discussing the effects of seniority provisions). 
 187. LeRoy found circumstantial evidence that supports the premium premise. Employers offered 
prospective replacement workers illegal employment preferences in 33.6% of the strikes involving 
permanent replacement workers that occurred between 1935 and 1963. Even after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. prohibited employers from offering these inducements, 
employers still illegally offered the employment preferences in almost 25% of the permanent 
replacement strikes that occurred between 1964 and 1991. LeRoy, Employer Treatment, supra note 43, 
at 19. This evidence suggests that employers felt they needed to offer prospective recruits some 
premium, even an illegal premium that put the employers’ legal position at risk, before the recruits 
would cross into unpleasant and potentially dangerous work as permanent replacement workers. See 
also supra note 169 (listing cases in which employers made this argument). 
 188. Among the other decisions are TWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 
U.S. 491 (1983); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 223 (1963). 
 189. These promises of poststrike job security secure the replacement workers’ legal status as 
“permanent.” See supra note 15. 
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replacement workers, the question remains whether the job-security 
premium sanctioned by Mackay Radio is efficient, or even genuine. 
Answering this question requires an understanding of how the Mackay 
Radio doctrine helps employers induce workers in the external labor 
market to enter into sunk investments/delayed dividends contracts that 
include replacing striking workers. Prospective replacement workers have 
even less information about their prospective employer when negotiating 
an employment contract than do other job seekers in the external labor 
market, as otherwise available informal channels of information are likely 
to be closed to them.190 In particular, they have the least information about 
the factors that enter into a sunk investments/delayed dividends contract: 
their productivity in their prospective jobs, the wages they will earn 
beyond an initial period and a generally stated promise regarding 
subsequent wages, and the duration of their employment. In a typical 
negotiation over a sunk investments/delayed dividends contract, the 
employer would not reveal its knowledge regarding these factors.191  
The employer would prefer not to reveal its specific intentions 
regarding the duration of the worker’s employment with the firm. During 
the initial negotiation, the employer seeks to preserve flexibility so that it 
may discharge unproductive workers. The employer would prefer to keep 
this information private until it knows more about the worker’s 
productivity level, propensity for shirking, and, therefore, its monitoring 
costs.192 For example, the employer might be willing to give a specific 
assurance of a term of employment during a renegotiation that occurs at 
Age B in Figure 1 if it has concluded from the experience gained between 
Age A and Age B that the worker will sustain the required level of 
productivity (MP). 
An employer’s invocation of Mackay Radio (or a promise inspired by 
Mackay Radio) appears to the prospective employee to constitute a 
revelation of otherwise private information: that is, the employer’s 
assurance that employment will extend beyond the end of the strike. This 
is material information to the worker in her calculation of the employment 
offer’s value. The present value of career compensation is the discounted 
product of tenure and wages. A seemingly firm commitment on the part of 
the employer to long-term employment increases the value of that 
employer’s offer of career compensation. Thus, the Mackay Radio 
doctrine authorizes struck employers to offer an apparent career-
 
 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. See also infra text accompanying note 262. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02. 
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compensation premium to workers if they agree to serve as permanent 
replacements for striking workers. 
This apparent premium delivers substantially less than it promises, 
however, for two reasons. First, internal labor market theory presupposes 
that the profit-maximizing employer will seek and assure a long-lasting, 
even career-long, relationship with a productive worker.193 Productive 
permanent replacement workers who enter into a sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contract are no better off if they receive the 
promise of poststrike job security authorized by the Mackay Radio 
doctrine than they would have been after accepting another employer’s 
offer. Their job security comes not from Mackay Radio and its progeny, 
but from the employer’s self-interest in deriving the sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contract’s benefits. Productive workers 
should not fear a pink slip, at least until the latter stages of their careers.194 
Workers whose productivity is so low that retaining them would deprive 
the employer of its investment dividends might benefit from Mackay 
Radio’s job-security promise, if it can be enforced. For productive 
workers, the Mackay Radio doctrine creates a fiction. The employer 
appears to offer replacement workers a substantial premium when it 
actually offers no premium at all.  
Second, workers who have been promised a Mackay Radio premium 
face the same enforcement problem that generally attends sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contracts. The magical incantation that 
transforms a replacement worker into a “permanent” replacement worker 
has been the subject of some controversy.195 It is clear, nonetheless, that 
Mackay Radio’s progeny do not require an employer to pledge career-long 
fealty to a “permanent” replacement. In fact, replacement worker-litigants 
have found it difficult to enforce even very specific employer promises of 
“permanent” employment for two reasons: inability to show adequate 
consideration and the wide latitude given employers to condition their 
offers of “permanent” employment.196  
Merely revising Belknap, Inc. v. Hale to provide for the strict 
enforcement of employers’ job-security promises would not solve the 
 
 
 193. See supra note 69. 
 194. See supra note 78.  
 195. See Finkin, supra note 43, at 552; Moberly, supra note 176, 216-18. 
 196. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. at 505-06 n.9, permitted employers to qualify their offers of 
“permanent” employment to replacement workers, within certain broadly defined boundaries, without 
threatening the workers’ legal status under the NLRA. See Moberly, supra note 176, at 226-42 
(discussing cases in which conditions placed on offers of “permanent” employment have not affected 
workers’ status under the NLRA). See also Finkin, supra note 43, at 552-53. 
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efficiency problem that lurks behind the Mackay Radio false premium, 
however. At Age A (in Figure 1), the employer makes an offer to the 
worker in the external labor market that includes a promise of job security. 
The worker accepts. Like most aspects of the sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract, the promise is sufficiently ambiguous and incomplete 
as to be unenforceable by legal means. At Age B or thereabouts, the 
replacement worker and the employer enter into a renegotiation to 
recalibrate the employer’s promise regarding job security. In this 
renegotiation, the employer possesses private information: specifically, the 
status of the employer’s collective bargaining with the striking union on 
the question of whether the employer will agree to reinstate the striking 
workers. As a consequence of this asymmetric information, the 
replacement worker is at risk of employer opportunism against which the 
sunk investments/delayed dividends contract, including the Mackay Radio 
premium, offers no protection. 
The question of whether the employer will live up to its promise to the 
replacement workers of “permanent” employment will be answered not by 
Mackay Radio, but by the employer’s calculus of its most profitable 
option.197 From the employer’s perspective, permitting the striking 
workers to return to work recaptures most of the sunk cost losses 
associated with the unavailability of the strikers’ firm-specific skills and 
knowledge and their resulting greater productivity. On the other hand, 
discharging the permanent replacement workers to make room for the 
strikers incurs the sunk cost loss of the employer’s investment in the 
replacement workers’ firm-specific skills and knowledge. There may also 
be costs associated with the occasionally successful state law breach-of-
contract or tortious misrepresentation claim brought by a replacement 
worker. 
The third, and perhaps most important, factor in the employer’s 
calculus is the compensation agreement it reaches with the union in return 
for the strikers’ return to work. The profitability of the firm’s decision to 
allow the strikers to return to work increases if the employer is able to 
drive down the aggregate cost of its compensation agreement with the 
union. Any reduction in the compensation paid to returning strikers offsets 
the sunk cost losses associated with discharging the permanent 
replacement workers and the work days lost by the striking workers. As a 
result, there is a substantial incentive for the employer to adjust its use of 
 
 
 197. See supra note 103 (Carmichael explaining that parties to a sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract live up to their promises because it is in their self-interest, not because they are 
bound to do so). 
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permanent replacement workers in a manner that will cause the union to 
agree to the lowest wages possible.198 If the compensation “saved” by the 
employer is greater than the sunk cost losses, then the use of permanent 
replacement workers will have been profitable for the employer. 
This result is not Pareto optimal, however. The employer’s increased 
profits are made possible only by the replacement workers’ and the 
striking workers’ losses. The replacement workers suffer the sunk cost loss 
of their investment in the acquisition of firm-specific skills and knowledge 
with this employer. The striking workers suffer the loss of wages during 
the time of the strike and the portion of their expected wages that the 
union has been forced to give back in its negotiation with the employer in 
return for the strikers’ reinstatement. By the terms of the Cohen and 
Wachter gloss on Pareto optimality, which holds that efficiency requires 
greater profits for the employer and higher compensation for workers, the 
use of permanent strike replacements is inefficient. The Mackay Radio 
doctrine, because it facilitates the hiring of permanent replacements by 
authorizing a false premium and thereby employer opportunism, is also 
inefficient. 
D. Reputation as an Ineffective Deterrent to Opportunism 
Cohen and Wachter argued that reputation in the labor market would 
prevent employers from exploiting any advantage given them by 
asymmetric information in the manner described in the preceding part. 
Specifically, Cohen and Wachter predicted that an employer’s reputation 
among prospective employees would be affected by its opportunistic use 
of permanent strike replacements. Prospective employees would learn of 
the employer’s reputation for opportunism, and, as a result, they would 
refuse any job the struck employer might offer.199 The struck employer 
would not use permanent replacement workers for opportunistic reasons 
because they would want to avoid rejection by prospective employees in 
the external labor market, according to Cohen and Wachter.200 
In the best of labor market conditions, reputation is a weak 
disincentive, if any at all. Workers newly hired from the external labor 
market, sometimes called “marginal workers,” tend to be younger than 
incumbent or “inframarginal” workers. Perhaps because they have not 
 
 
 198. The Bridgestone/Firestone strike offers one apparent example of this type of opportunistic 
behavior by the employer. See infra text accompanying notes 318-20. 
 199. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 118. 
 200. Id. 
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finally decided whether they will commit their remaining careers to their 
next employer, marginal workers are less concerned with job security and 
less likely to value or recognize a firm’s reputation.201 Prospective 
replacement workers also may conclude that the employer’s current 
treatment of unionized workers does not accurately predict how newly 
hired nonunion workers may be treated, perhaps decades down the road.202  
All of these problems arise in the best market conditions where 
information flows freely. The heated struggles that characterize strikes 
involving permanent replacement workers block otherwise open 
information channels.203 First, the incumbent union will not bargain for the 
replacement workers as it would for other new employees.204 Although 
permanent replacement workers’ “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment” would otherwise be mandatory subjects of 
bargaining pursuant to Section 8(d) of the Act, the NLRB has held that 
unions are not legally compelled to bargain on behalf of permanent 
replacement workers.205 The striking union is thereby freed from the 
irreconcilable conflict of interest inherent in a duty to represent both the 
striking workers, who would like to return to their jobs, and the 
replacement workers who have taken those jobs.206 Absent a legal mandate 
to represent the replacement workers, politically sensitive union leaders 
surely will not volunteer any assistance to them. The union membership—
read, the union leadership’s electorate—simply would not permit it.207  
Second, and for the same reason, the prospective replacement worker 
cannot turn to otherwise available sources of information about the 
Mackay Radio “false premium” and other workplace conditions. Any 
informal advice new recruits might ordinarily get from incumbent 
employees would not be available when the incumbent workers are 
striking and the new recruits are considering filling their jobs. As a result, 
the prospective replacement worker cannot turn to the union or prospective 
 
 
 201. See Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 32. Accord WEILER, GOVERNING, supra 
note 13, at 74-75 and n.53. 
 202. See Bierman & Gely, Striker Replacements, supra note 2, at 377. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 134-66 (discussing the dangerous and unpleasant 
conditions associated with strikes involving permanent replacement workers). 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 205. See Serv. Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 633, 637 (1986); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2001). 
 206. The question of whether a union would face an irreconcilable conflict if asked to represent 
both strikers and their replacements is qualitatively different from the question of whether replacement 
workers are necessarily opposed to the union. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 
775, 791 (1990) (upholding the NLRB’s conclusion that replacement workers are not necessarily 
opposed to the union and may agree to cross the picket line for unrelated reasons). 
 207. See generally KATZ & KOCHAN, supra note 53, at 131-32 (discussing the political nature of 
local unions’ leadership). 
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coworkers for the truth about the employer.  
Third, and most important, struck employers work hard to avoid any 
effects that their labor relations strategies might have on their reputations. 
They typically undertake substantial propaganda efforts to justify their 
collective bargaining position to the community, to stockholders, to 
politicians, and even to workers they hope will replace the strikers. At 
most, an opportunistic employer’s reputation would be muddled in the 
mind of the prospective replacement worker. The strikes against 
International Paper, Greyhound, the Detroit News, Diamond Walnut, and 
Bridgestone/Firestone nicely illustrate how employers seek to protect their 
reputations in the context of a labor dispute involving permanent 
replacement workers.  
1. International Paper 
The International Paper (IP) strike began in June 1987 in the 
Androscoggin mill in Jay, Maine, when Local 14 of the United 
Paperworkers International Union would not agree to the company’s 
requests for lower wages, job reductions, and increased managerial 
flexibility.208 Throughout the seventeen-month strike, IP campaigned 
extensively through television and newspaper advertising to convince the 
public that the union and its members were irresponsible.209 It also 
engaged in a direct mail campaign to the strikers to convince them that 
their cause was hopeless.210 According to a leading analyst of this strike, 
IP’s advertisements and statements to the press convinced “many people 
in the area that the strike was caused by the desire of highly paid 
employees to obtain even higher wages and benefits.”211 This caused a 
split within the community between the strikers’ families and the families 
of permanent strike replacements hired by the company.212 
When IP began hiring replacement workers, the disgruntled strikers 
began resorting to violence.213 The newspapers and other media sources 
highlighted the violence, thereby further tilting public opinion in IP’s 
favor.214 IP used this press coverage to its advantage and continuously 
 
 
 208. GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at xi. 
 209. Id. at 65. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 65. 
 212. Id. at 117-18. 
 213. GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 47-54. 
 214. Id. at 65. 
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blamed the union for vandalism on its property.215 Ultimately, IP’s media 
strategy was successful in helping bring the company a successful end to 
the strike and an apparent victory in the public relations arena.216 
2. Greyhound 
The Greyhound Corp. strike began November 3, 1983, when the 
Amalgamated Council of Greyhound Local Unions would not agree to 
Greyhound CEO John W. Teets’s proposal for wage cuts.217 Throughout 
the seven-week strike, Teets issued statements to the public detailing why 
wage cuts for unionized employees were necessary: “Greyhound must pay 
employees less for the same work if it is to beat the competition from 
upstart bus lines and discount air carriers”218 because Greyhound’s 
“current wages are 30 to 50 percent above those of competitors and . . . 
Greyhound no longer can compete with other bus companies and discount 
airlines that have lower labor costs.”219 According to Teets, “[e]ven with 
cuts . . . Greyhound will have to pay higher wages than some rival 
carriers.”220 Teets hired permanent replacement workers and succeeded in 
operating the bus line throughout the strike. Wall Street analysts took 
favorable notice of both the company’s continued operation during the 
strike and its extensive advertising campaign regarding the strike.221 On 
December 21, 1984, the strike ended with workers voting to accept a 
contract that cut wages by 7.8% and initiated a 4% employee contribution 
to the pension plan.222  
3. Detroit News 
Perhaps the most extensive campaign to influence public opinion 
during a strike involving permanent replacement workers was launched by 
the Detroit News, in part because the employer was able to use its 
newspaper to promote its viewpoint. On July 13, 1995, the International 
 
 
 215. See id. at 66. 
 216. Id. at 65-66, 76. 
 217. Greyhound Shuts Down as Bus Workers Strike, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1983, at A7. 
 218. Eleanor Johnson Tracy et al., Greyhound Confronts Its Union, FORTUNE, Dec. 26, 1983, at 8. 
 219. Greyhound Shuts Down, supra note 217, at A7. See also Greyhound Collides Head On with 
Its Union, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 1983, at 47; Strike Over Pay Cuts Halts Intercity Buses of Greyhound 
Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1983, at A1; Leslie Wayne, Steering Greyhound Through the Strike, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1983, § 3, at 6. 
 220. Greyhound Collides Head On with Its Union, supra note 219, at 47. 
 221. Wayne, supra note 219, at 6. 
 222. The Associated Press, supra note 158, at A1. 
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Brotherhood of Teamsters struck when the company failed to agree to the 
union’s demands for wage increases.223 Instead, the company sought to cut 
seventy-five Teamsters jobs and use the savings for pay increases and 
employee severance payments. The employer stated that its proposal 
would generate an $11 million savings over three years. The employer 
announced that it had refused the Teamsters’ offer because it “would put 
the company back into the red after two years of profits.”224 
On the first day of the strike, the employer published in the Detroit 
News several statements by company officials. President and Chief 
Executive Officer Frank Vega proclaimed: “I am deeply saddened by this 
turn of events. We felt we made one of the best offers that’s been made to 
any union around the country.”225 Labor Relations Vice-President Tim 
Kelleher argued that the strike occurred because “[t]he union 
misrepresented [the Company’s] position. [The Company is] very willing 
to give the unions their share in exchange for the job reductions and work-
rule changes. But they wanted more. And [management] is not going to 
put this company back in a money losing position.”226 The company also 
publicized its offer to share the savings achieved from job reductions and 
work-rules changes with Teamsters members.227 In the weeks after the 
strike began, the Detroit News regularly published articles informing the 
public about additional benefits the employer offered to its unionized 
employees: paid medical leave extended beyond contract provisions, paid 
leaves of six to twelve months to write books, time off for family 
emergencies, college tuition reimbursements, and bonuses for exceptional 
work, for example.228  
The Detroit News also published articles offering personal stories told 
from the perspective of workers allegedly victimized by the union’s 
intransigence. One article was written by a union employee who refused to 
strike.229 Other articles offered the viewpoint of delivery workers allegedly 
 
 
 223. Nolan Finley, Newspaper Workers Strike: Talks with Archer Fail to Restart Bargaining, 
DETROIT NEWS, July 14, 1995, at 1. 
 224. David A. Markiewicz, Newspapers, Unions Meet with Archer; Both Sides Far Apart as 
Negotiators Continue in Bod to Reach Agreement and Avert a Strike Tonight, DETROIT NEWS, July 13, 
1995, at 1. 
 225. Finley, supra note 223, at 1. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Newspaper Strike Is a Battle for Control, Company Seeks Efficiencies; Unions Want Jobs 
and Past Practices, DETROIT NEWS, July 16, 1995, at 1. 
 228. See, e.g., id. 
 229. Nickie McWherter, A Veteran of ’60s Strikes Knows: Workers and Papers Both Lose, 
DETROIT NEWS, July 16, 1995, at 1A. 
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caught in the crossfire of strikers’ violence.230 Still others told the 
heroicized story of workers and management struggling side-by-side to get 
the news out to the public.231 
The company also accused the union of blocking its efforts to achieve 
diversity in the workforce: “Those jobs get filled by friends, neighbors, 
and relatives of union leaders, regardless of whether they are suited for the 
job,” said Vega.232 The Detroit News strike ended in victory for the 
employer after nineteen months on February 19, 1997.233 A six-month 
legal battle followed over the striking workers’ reinstatement rights. In 
August 1997, Judge John Corbett ruled that Detroit Newspapers Inc. 
would not be forced to rehire the striking workers.234 
4. Diamond Walnut 
The strike against Diamond Walnut began on September 4, 1994, when 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Diamond Walnut 
executives could not come to terms on a new collective bargaining 
agreement. Diamond Walnut reported that it had been in financial trouble 
for several years.235 In 1985, its employees had agreed to cut their wages 
in order to save the company.236 Diamond Walnut’s success grew after 
1985. When the collective bargaining agreement expired, the Teamsters 
sought to have the workers’ pre-1985 wages reinstated.237 Diamond 
Walnut countered that it would restore some, but not all, of the pre-1985 
wages and asked the workers to contribute twelve dollars per month to 
their health plan.238 The workers struck instead, and Diamond Walnut 
hired permanent replacements for the strikers.239 
Sandra McBride, a spokeswoman for Diamond Walnut, made several 
 
 
 230. See, e.g., Strike, supra note 154, at 1A; Durfee & Weller, supra note 154. 
 231. George Bullard, Amid the Name-Calling and Worse, We’re Just Getting the News Out, 
DETROIT NEWS, July 17, 1995; Editors, Managers Must Pitch In to Get the Newspaper Out, DETROIT 
NEWS, July 17, 1995. 
 232. John Wilson, Union Cronyism Thwarts Efforts to Diversify Papers’ Workforce, DETROIT 
NEWS, July 18, 1995. 
 233. Iver Peterson, Detroit Papers’ Rehiring Policy Angers Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at 
A16. 
 234. Digest, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1997, at D01. 
 235. Mark Arax, Strikers Reap Harvest of Bitterness; Labor: In Tough Times Walnut-Plant 
Workers Took Pay Cuts. But When Profits Grew, They Wanted Their Old Wages Back. The Firm Said 
No, Sparking a Long, Rancorous Walkout, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at A3. 
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public statements to justify the employer’s bargaining position: “More and 
more workers are asking for employee participation in the face of rising 
health costs.”240 “But it was a brand-new concept for our workers, and 
they rejected it.”241 McBride also explained that the workers’ high 
compensation interfered with the employer’s competitiveness: “This was a 
restructuring that was long overdue, and even with the cuts we were still 
paying 35% more in wages than our competitors were paying.”242 The 
employer, which operated as a cooperative for California walnut growers, 
also justified hiring permanent replacement workers with reference to its 
obligation to the “2,000 walnut growers up and down the San Joaquin 
Valley who make up the 82-year-old cooperative[, and g]rowers would 
have lost millions of dollars if the crop had failed to get to market.”243 The 
permanent replacement workers labored “under the worst possible 
circumstances and saved the 1991 harvest,” she said.244 “Our commitment 
is to the new work force.”245 McBride said hiring permanent replacement 
workers was a necessity: “These farmers and their families work all year 
and depend upon this income from this harvest, this one-time window of 
opportunity that comes in, and we had no choice but to hire workers to 
process that crop.”246 
5. Bridgestone/Firestone 
The strike by United Rubber Workers Local 138 (URW) against 
Bridgestone/Firestone began in July 1994.247 The URW sought a contract 
based on the pattern it had set with other tire manufacturers.248 
Bridgestone/Firestone refused to engage in pattern bargaining and 
countered with a new system of twelve-hour shifts, hourly wage cuts for 
new hires, fewer vacation days, employee copayments for health 
insurance, and cost-of-living increases linked to plant productivity.249 In 
the words of company spokesman Trevor Hoskins: “A Goodyear-style 
 
 
 240. Rose DeWolf, Diamond Tough Nut for Boycott to Crack, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1992, at 8. 
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 242. See Arax, supra note 235. 
 243. Id. 
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 245. Id. 
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 247. FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 117. 
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contract would not allow us to be competitive.”250 On January 4, 1995, 
Hoskins offered the following justification for Bridgestone/Firestone’s 
decision to hire permanent replacement workers: “We never imagined we 
would have had a strike for six months. . . . There was no alternative after 
this length of time. The whole organization was threatened. We would 
have lost customers.”251 When a URW spokesman claimed publicly that 
the employer had spent months preparing for a strike, a company 
representative dismissed the claims as baseless:  
We found it very sad that so much time was spent issuing emotional 
rhetoric that does not address the issues. The fact remains that 
Bridgestone/Firestone made its last, best, and final offer to the 
URW, which refused to accept it and went on strike. Justifying their 
action by pointing fingers at our company ownership doesn’t 
achieve anything except to incite emotions.252 
Throughout the seven-month strike, company spokesmen issued 
statements supporting their position in the bargaining and their reasoning 
for hiring permanent replacements. Bridgestone/Firestone Chief Executive 
Officer Masatoshi Ono conducted several press interviews to explain the 
company’s objectives.253 Among other things, this public relations effort 
highlighted several facts relating to competitiveness. For example, the 
company claimed that it spent five dollars more than competitors to make 
each tire.254 Bridgestone/Firestone also alleged that similar rules and 
compensation changes had been made in competitors’ plants.255 
Bridgestone/Firestone hired replacement workers for about 30% less than 
the wage that had been paid to unionized workers before the strike.256 The 
strike ended on May 8, 1995, with another victory for the employer. The 
URW made an unconditional offer for its members to return to work under 
the contract that Bridgestone/Firestone had implemented in July.257 
 
 
 250. Bill Koenig, Replacement-Worker Hirings Reopen Union Wounds; Bitter Firestone Feud 
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 251. See id. 
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 253. See Yoshinori Omura, Tire Maker Defends Strike-Busting Action, Bridgestone Presses U.S. 
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 254. Zachary Schiller, Skid Marks at Bridgestone, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 1994, at 30. See also 
Chappell, supra note 248. 
 255. See Schiller, supra note 254, at 30. 
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It is not necessary to conclude that all of these propaganda efforts by 
struck employers persuaded workers in the external labor market that the 
employers were faultless in their decisions to permit (or even force) a 
strike and replace the strikers. Rather, it is sufficient to conclude that these 
employers’ efforts balanced any derogatory information workers obtained 
about the causes of the strikes and the employers’ reasons for hiring 
permanent replacement workers.  
A worker, whether or not she is able to counter the employer’s 
propaganda efforts with alternative information sources, is by no means 
certain to refuse any offer of employment from that employer, as Cohen 
and Wachter posited. Instead, the uncertain prospective replacement 
worker might require a premium in the form of a higher wage or some 
assurance of job security to protect her from the employer’s purported 
penchant for premature dismissal of incumbent employees.258 In these 
circumstances, the Mackay Radio doctrine serves as a cleanser for the 
employer’s muddied reputation. The employer can point to the job-
security protections guaranteed by the Supreme Court as a means to 
persuade recruits that their jobs will be secure if they become permanent 
replacement workers. The Mackay Radio doctrine thereby aids the 
inefficient plans of the opportunistic employer, rather than defending the 
sunk investments/delayed dividends contract. 
E. The “False Premium” and the Internal Labor Market 
It now becomes necessary to put aside the assumption by Cohen and 
Wachter that permanent replacement workers are hired exclusively from 
the external labor market. Using incumbent employees as permanent strike 
replacements solves important problems for the employer. The employer 
is freed from the sunk investments of training and monitoring new workers 
hired from the external labor market. The employer also avoids the sunk 
cost losses attending these incumbent employees’ separation from 
employment.259 Depending upon the duration of the employees’ prestrike 
 
 
 258. See Carmichael, supra note 69, at 69 (“[I]f a firm has a reputation for firing a lot of workers, 
it may find it has to pay workers more in order to attract them away from their alternative jobs.”). See 
also EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 66, at 382 (suggesting that firms that lose their good reputation 
might be required to pay more for a good quality worker or accept lower quality workers if they pay 
the same wage as other employers). 
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tenure, the employer may have been in the process of recouping its 
investments from these employees when the strike commenced.260 A rapid 
return of these striking employees to their jobs makes further dividends 
possible. Since incumbent replacement employees already possess the 
firm-specific skills that enhance the firm’s productivity, recruiting these 
employees to cross the picket line also permits the employer to minimize 
the production losses associated with the replacement workers’ lower 
productivity.261 More incumbent employees with firm-specific skills 
means more and better outputs.  
The difficult question is, why do incumbent employees agree to 
become permanent strike replacements? Unlike prospective replacement 
workers in the external labor market, employees in the internal labor 
market have good information about wages, productivity, and other 
matters relevant to the sunk investments/delayed dividends contract.262 
They should not be susceptible to the employer’s opportunistic use of the 
Mackay Radio false premium. They also know of the employer’s 
propensity to abide by or abrogate its contracts. Unionized employees 
have the additional resource of the union’s institutional memory. In fact, 
when they are on strike, incumbent employees face substantial pressure 
from their fellow strikers and the union not to “scab.”263 
Two economic factors may drive employees in the internal labor 
market to become permanent strike replacements. First, a point is reached 
in the career of an employee who is party to a sunk investments/delayed 
dividends contract when the dividends the employer will recoup from its 
investment equal the loss it will suffer because the employee will be paid a 
wage in excess of her productivity at the very end of her career.264 The 
employer faces a choice during this period. It can fulfill its obligations and 
continue its relationship with the worker, or it can engage in opportunistic 
behavior that assures the employer a more profitable outcome.  
On Figure 4, the point at which the employer faces this choice, Age O, 
could be reached beginning any time after Age D, but certainly not later 
than Age E. 
 
 
labor market. New workers are presumed to subsidize a portion of their training costs in the form of 
the investment that occurs at the beginning of her career. 
 260. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 261. See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the productivity differential between 
striking workers and replacement workers). 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89. 
 263. See, e.g., GETMAN, BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, supra note 43, at 51-54, 89-96; FRANKLIN, 
supra note 134, at 127-32. 
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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Figure 4 
Once the employee has reached Age O, the employer might 
opportunistically cut the employee’s wage in an effort to expropriate a 
portion of the worker’s investment dividend.265 For example, as illustrated 
on Figure 4, the employer might impose wage stream W4 beginning at Age 
O such that the employee’s productivity exceeds the worker’s wage stream 
almost to the end of the worker’s career. This strategy yields substantially 
greater returns on the employer’s investment at the expense of the 
employee.  
The employee’s options at this stage are limited and undesirable in 
contrast to the employer’s alternatives. The employer’s decision to cut 
wages for workers older than Age O will yield increased dividends derived 
from either the worker’s lower wages or the worker quitting in protest 
over the wage cut. If the lesser wage stream imposed by the employer 
exceeds the older employee’s opportunity wage stream, however, the 
employee faces a Hobson’s choice. She can accept the lower wage stream, 
or she can quit. If she quits, she must seek employment in the external 
labor market and accept a job from a different employer that pays less, 
probably substantially less, than the job with the employee’s current 
 
 
 265. I note that this strategy might violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if applied 
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employer.266 This condition exists from Age O through the end of the 
employee’s career. 
The same analysis that applies to an individual employee can be 
generalized to a group of strikers. If the strikers’ average job tenure 
exceeds Age O—that is, the point at which the employer’s remaining 
dividends equal its coming losses—then the employer has little incentive 
to secure an early return of these employees to their jobs.267 Rather, the 
employer will benefit most if the older employees either do not return to 
work or agree to lower wages. The opportunistic employer might structure 
its bargaining proposals to inspire a strike and to decrease the likelihood 
that older incumbent employees will cross the picket line. For example, 
the employer might insist on a flatter wage stream resembling W4 for 
employees older than Age O. As with the individual employee, the 
employer reaps a larger dividend and the union faces the Hobson’s choice 
of accepting the lesser wage stream or forcing its older members to seek 
even lower wages in the external labor market. In sum, older incumbent 
employees are left with lower wages regardless of the choice they make. 
Under the same circumstances, some older incumbent employees may 
agree to move from another of the employer’s facilities to work in the 
struck location. The struck employer’s hard bargaining with the union may 
signal to older employees throughout the employer’s enterprise that they 
face a great risk of effective discharge and the unappealing alternative of a 
substantially lower wage after they reach Age O.268 If these older 
employees are able to obtain some promise of post-strike job security 
pursuant to the Mackay Radio doctrine, then they may be willing to make 
the move. As long as the employer’s offer to the union, and therefore the 
wage it can pay to its replacement workers, exceeds the older employees’ 
opportunity wage stream, the employees have an incentive to move to a 
new facility and become permanent replacement workers even if they will 
not secure all of the promised dividends from the sunk 
investments/delayed dividends contract. Nonetheless, since the employer 
 
 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86 (discussing the striking worker’s alternatives in 
the external labor market). 
 267. It is likely that the average age of workers in a unionized workplace will far exceed this 
hypothetical average compared with the average age in a nonunion environment See supra text 
accompanying note 181 (discussing job tenure of unionized workers). This is an unsurprising result 
since seniority protections, while present in some nonunion workplaces, predominate in union 
workplaces. See WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 65-66.  
 268. See generally Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 
(1965) (acknowledging that some antiunion employer behavior directed to one group of workers is 
designed to instill fear in employees working in other parts of the employer’s operation). 
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benefits only because the older employees lose wages, these circumstances 
are not Pareto optimal. 
The efficiency-minded employer would prefer that some employees 
younger than Age O return to work quickly. Many of these employees’ 
productivity exceeds their wages (i.e., employees between Ages B to E), 
so the employer would continue to recoup its investments from these 
incumbent employees if they returned to their jobs. Some struck 
employers would be willing to bear the sunk cost losses associated with 
these employees’ separation from employment if the losses did not exceed 
the aggregate dividends of avoiding older workers’ high wages. Rather 
than bearing the losses associated with idled younger incumbent workers, 
however, other employers might recruit these employees to become 
permanent replacements with the promise of promotional opportunities, as 
the Mackay Radio doctrine permits.269 The employer can use the same 
tactics to lure younger employees to move to the struck location. The 
employer’s decision would differ depending upon the circumstances.  
Promoting younger incumbent employees who serve as permanent 
replacement workers can, but does not necessarily, produce an efficient 
result for these employees and the struck employer. Katharine Abraham 
and James Medoff demonstrated that promotions are largely, although not 
exclusively, based on seniority rather than productivity.270 The opportunity 
to serve as permanent replacements may allow younger employees to 
break this cycle and advance their careers regardless of seniority. These 
employees receive higher wages as a result.271 The employer benefits by 
retaining productive employees in an efficient relationship, but only if the 
employees it lures across the picket line are highly productive and deserve 
promotion. If the employer invites all strikers to cross the picket line 
regardless of productivity, then the employer may reduce the dividend it 
earns between Ages B and E by paying wages in excess of wage stream W 
 
 
 269. See, e.g., TWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1989). 
 270. See Abraham & Medoff, supra note 101, at 308, 312-14. 
 271. The strength of the incentive for younger workers increases with the length of the period 
during which the worker has received only strike benefits well below her wage level. See WEILER, 
GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 129 (“[Strikes are] a two-edged sword. A strike inflicts reciprocal 
economic costs on the union members, which they can avoid only by having the union representatives 
moderate their wage demands at the bargaining table. Although individual employees are always free 
to look for jobs in other firms, it is rare that any significant proportion of a sizable bargaining unit will 
be able to find temporary jobs elsewhere during a strike of their regular employer.”). See generally 
KATZ & KOCHAN, supra note 53, at 75-80 (discussing the parties’ comparative leverage reflected in 
their ability to undertake or withstand a strike). As a general matter, unions cannot discipline members 
who cross the union’s picket line to become permanent replacement workers. See Pattern Makers’ 
League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104-09 (1985). 
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in return for productivity below MP. There is no assurance that selecting 
employees for promotion based on their willingness to cross the picket line 
better rewards productivity than a seniority-based system. 
Regardless, the older employees who remain on the picket line do not 
increase their wages if younger employees cross the picket lines in return 
for promotions. Instead, they suffer the sunk cost loss of their investments 
in firm-specific skills and lower wages over an extended period of time, 
perhaps extending for the remainder of their work lives.272 Further, this 
group of strikers grows larger if the employer uses selective criteria, such 
as productivity, to reduce the number of employees who will be invited to 
return to work. In sum, luring younger striking employees across the 
picket line to serve as permanent replacement workers with promises of 
promotions does not satisfy the Cohen and Wachter gloss on Pareto 
optimality if the condition of all striking workers is taken into account. 
IV. REPLACEMENT WORKERS AND COASE’S PARADOX 
The preceding part argues that Mackay Radio’s dictated solution to the 
externalities associated with hiring permanent replacements for striking 
workers is not Pareto optimal. This argument does not constitute, and is 
not intended to be, a full frontal assault on the Coase Theorem. It does not 
purport to disprove the Coase Theorem or any of its moving parts. Rather, 
it suggests that the Coase Theorem, as interpreted by Cohen and Wachter, 
cannot explain or justify the Mackay Radio doctrine. Specifically, it argues 
that the Mackay Radio doctrine does not maximize social product as Coase 
indicated that efficient legal rules should. 
The Mackay Radio doctrine also informs our understanding of the 
concept of social product that lies at the heart of the Coase Theorem. In 
particular, it permits an examination of the role that Coase’s Paradox plays 
in defining social product. Pierre Schlag argued that Coase’s approach to 
externalities exposed a dialectical relationship between legal rules and the 
conditions surrounding those rules: “A change in the specific content of a 
legal rule could, according to Coase, be expected to yield changes not only 
with respect to matters covered by the rule, but also with respect to matters 
extrinsic to the purported operation of the rule.”273 It is this dialectic that 
produces Coase’s Paradox.  
Coase’s interpreters would address externalities either through 
 
 
 272. See generally supra text accompanying note 185 (discussing empirical evidence regarding 
the effects of displacement on experienced workers). 
 273. Schlag, supra note 5, at 945. Cf. Regan, supra note 114, at 435-36. 
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bargaining between the parties, if transaction costs can be reduced to zero, 
or, if transaction costs are irreduceable, a dictated, efficient solution that 
mimics the deal that would be negotiated absent transaction costs. The 
paradox is that these methods of redressing externalities produce new 
costs and benefits, and even externalities, that must be included in any 
calculation of efficiency. Any Coasean lawmaker who has dictated a 
solution to one externality involving one set of parties may have also 
created secondary externalities imposing new costs on or creating new 
benefits for the instant parties and, potentially, new parties.  
Acknowledging the existence of secondary externalities, therefore, 
requires issuing the same challenge to proponents of the Coase Theorem 
that Coase issued to the Pigouvian tradition. Just as Coase would require 
accounting for all costs and benefits for both parties to an externality in the 
calculation of social product, the costs and benefits of the parties to a 
secondary externality must also be included in that calculation. Coase’s 
own broad definition of social product suggests that he would agree. This 
part uses the Mackay Radio doctrine to illustrate how this multifactored 
analysis of social product might proceed. 
This is no mere accounting argument. Secondary externalities may 
have two important effects on any Coasean efficiency analysis. First, 
negotiated agreements and dictated solutions that appear Pareto optimal 
when taking only primary externalities into account may become 
inefficient when the costs associated with secondary externalities are 
injected into the efficiency calculus.274 This part of the article will 
illustrate this effect, again with reference to the Mackay Radio doctrine.  
Second, if efforts to redress primary externalities are attended by 
transaction costs, then efforts to redress secondary externalities may also 
involve positive transaction costs. Bargaining or other methods that would 
resolve secondary externalities therefore add transaction costs to the 
calculation of total social product. These new transaction costs have 
profound implications for the Coasean lawmaker’s choice between the 
transaction-cost reduction approach and the dictated solutions approach 
and, therefore, our normative vision of government’s role with respect to 
externalities. This part compares this vision of government’s role with the 
NLRA’s definition of the government’s role in collective bargaining and 
concludes that they are incompatible. 
 
 
 274. Some secondary externalities may also bring benefits that are not included in the Coasean 
efficiency analysis. So, it is possible that some seemingly inefficient agreements may be made Pareto 
superior by looking beyond the bargaining table. This part is concerned only with negative secondary 
externalities. 
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A. Coase’s Paradox and Opportunity Costs 
1. Coase’s Example: Railroads and Farmers 
Responding to Pigou’s view that forced internalization of costs best 
served the goal of maximizing social product,275 Coase sought to prove in 
The Problem of Social Cost that social product and private product do not 
diverge.276 He used an example that, although often repeated, serves this 
discussion well. A railway runs trains that spark fires in crops that border 
the railroad tracks. It runs two trains per day. The first train earns $150 in 
annual income at a cost to the railway of $50 for a net private product of 
$100. The first train destroys $60 worth of the farmer’s crops each year. 
The net social product, therefore, is $40. The second train adds $100 in 
annual income at a cost to the railway of an additional $50 per year. The 
net private product of the second train is $50. The second train also 
destroys $60 worth of crops per year; so, the net social product of the 
second train is negative $10.277 According to Coase, “[t]he conclusion that 
it would be better if the second train did not run is correct”; however, 
“[t]he conclusion that it is desirable that the railway should be made liable 
for the damage it causes is wrong.”278  
Coase supported his conclusion as follows. Coase assumed that a 
Pigouvian system would hold the railway liable for the damages caused to 
the farmer’s crops. The farmer is indifferent as to whether she receives 
damages in the amount of the market price of her crops or market price by 
sale of the crops. As a result, the farmer is likely to increase the amount of 
land she cultivates if the railway is subject to damages because she will 
receive market price for all of her destroyed crops.279 This observation 
required Coase to adjust his arithmetic. After the farmer has changed her 
behavior, each train causes fires that destroy $120 worth of crops.280 Thus, 
if liability is imposed on the railway, its net private product would 
represent a loss of either $90 for two trains or $20 for one train. The 
railway will not run any trains if it is held liable for damages to the 
farmer’s crops, Coase concluded.281  
 
 
 275. See supra note 26 (discussing Coase’s rendering of Pigou’s views). 
 276. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 28-32. 
 277. Id. at 32. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 32-33. This changed assumption arises out of Coase’s expectation that imposing 
liability on the railway creates incentives for the expansion of crop production. 
 281. Id. at 33. 
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Coase suggested that a different and more efficient outcome would 
result if the railway were not held liable for damages. The railway’s 
transportation services produce $250 in value ($150 for the first train and 
$100 for the second train) by employing $100 in production factors ($50 
for each train); therefore, the net private product for the railway is $150. 
Running two trains destroys $120 worth of crops. Coase posited that 
another $160 in crop cultivation on land bordering the railroad would be 
abandoned; therefore, the farmer’s net private product is a loss of $280. 
Absent any other considerations, the net social product (the railway’s gain 
minus the farmer’s loss) is negative $130 if the railway is not held liable 
for damages. 
Coase reminded his readers, however, that there is an opportunity cost 
to the farmer’s crop cultivation. The production factors employed in crop 
cultivation could be shifted to another productive use. The social product 
calculation above does not take into account the opportunity cost of using 
the factors of production in crop cultivation rather than in some other 
productive use. In his example, Coase assessed the value that would be 
produced by shifting these inputs to some other use at $150. He arrived at 
this value by assuming that the farmer, as a rational economic actor, would 
invest in farming only if she earned a positive net private product from 
that investment of her resources. Since the farmer produces $160 worth of 
crops, the farmer’s investment must have been less than $160. Coase 
selected $150 and generated a net private product of $10 for the farmer. 
Taking these opportunity costs into account produces a different 
outcome in the calculation of social product. If the railway continues to 
run two trains without being held liable for the fires set by its engines, the 
net social product (the railway’s gain minus the farmer’s loss plus value 
produced by alternative use of factors of production) will be $20.282 If the 
railway is forced to stop running trains and the farmer continues her 
cultivation, the net social product will be negative $20.283 In sum, the 
social product is greater if liability is not imposed on the railway for the 
crop fires sparked by its engines. 
In his argument, however, Coase confined his calculation of social 
product to comparisons of the value of production, “as is usual in 
economics.”284 He considered only the bargaining parties and the subjects 
 
 
 282. Id. at 33, 40-43. 
 283. $280 in crop cultivation minus $150 in inputs resulting in a net private product for the farmer 
of $130, minus $250 in lost transportation services but plus the reinvestment of $100 in factors of 
production from the operation of the railway. 
 284. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 43. 
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of their bargain that related directly to production. In this hypothetical 
case, the calculation involved the railway, its trains, and the inputs that 
made them run; along with the farmer, her crops, and the inputs that made 
them grow. But Coase also issued a challenge: “the choice between 
different social arrangements for the solution of economic problems 
should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect of 
these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.”285 
The narrow focus of Coase’s argument regarding the railway and the 
farmer does not satisfy the standard established by his broad definition of 
social product. The following parts discuss two possible addendums to 
Coase’s railway-farmer illustration. 
2. The Cost of Opportunity Costs 
Accepting the argument illustrated in Coase’s railway example as true, 
Coase’s definition of social product tells us that his analysis in the railway 
example is not complete. Total social product, at a minimum, must include 
all aspects of production.286 The railway’s costs are as relevant as its 
profits. The farmer’s profits are as relevant as her costs. Opportunity costs 
are as relevant as the railway’s costs and benefits and the farmer’s costs 
and benefits. Similarly, any costs associated with shifting factors of 
production from one use to another must be taken into account. 
Let us return to the railway and farmer example. The Coasean bargain 
struck between the railway and the farmer permits the railroad to run two 
trains, incinerate a portion of the farmer’s crops, and cause her to pull a 
portion of her remaining cultivatable land out of crop production. The 
farmer’s total cost is $280. She does not receive damages from the 
railway. This loss is made up to the farmer from two sources: the railway’s 
net private product of $150 and the opportunity cost of $150 for the 
farmer’s factors of production. If the farmer reaps a $150 return from 
alternative uses of her factors of production, then the railway need only 
compensate her in the amount of $130 to hold the farmer harmless. 
Shifting factors of production to new uses is not necessarily 
frictionless, however. Assume that the farmer’s labor is one of the factors 
of production that her bargain with the railway presupposes will be turned 
to an alternative use. The agreement contemplates the farmer obtaining a 
new job consistent with her skill set; for example, she might become a 
farm labor foreperson at an agribusiness-owned farm distant from the 
 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. See supra text accompanying note 60 (Coase’s definition of social product). 
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railway tracks. This job pays her $50. The other factors of production she 
had employed in cultivating her now fallow land—land, irrigation 
systems, tractors, harvesters—have been leased in return for $100. So, the 
opportunity cost of the factors of production is $150, as Coase suggested. 
When she labored on her own farm, where she also lives, the farmer 
did not incur any transportation costs. Assume, however, that the 
agribusiness farm on which the farmer works after striking her Coasean 
agreement with the railway is 100 miles away from her home. Her round-
trip commute takes four hours per day, plus the costs of gasoline, 
automobile maintenance, and increased automobile insurance. As a result, 
the farmer incurs $30 in transportation costs, taking into account the 
opportunity cost of her time and her out-of-pocket travel expenses. 
Viewed in isolation, the new job makes economic sense for the farmer. 
Her net private product is $20. 
Putting the costs of the farmer’s new job into the context of her 
Coasean agreement with the railway, however, changes the outcome of the 
efficiency analysis. The net social product of the railway-farmer 
agreement, without taking these transportation costs into account, was 
$20. The net social product after considering the transportation costs is 
negative $10 (the railway’s net private product of $150 minus the farmer’s 
loss of $280 plus the farmer’s net private product from alternative uses of 
$120). So, the agreement between the railway and the farmer is not 
efficient in these circumstances. The difference comes from taking into 
account the costs of the opportunity costs. Since these are direct costs of 
production, they fit comfortably within Coase’s definition of social 
product. 
3. The Cost of Strikers’ Opportunity Costs 
Part III demonstrated that employers could not hire permanent 
replacement workers without suffering losses themselves or imposing 
costs on the replacement workers or the strikers. It also concluded that 
taking into account the opportunity costs of strikers’ labor actually 
reduced total social product and disclosed an even more inefficient result. 
Assume that this latter conclusion is incorrect and that strikers would be 
more productive and earn higher wages if their labor was turned to 
alternative uses by the hiring of permanent replacement workers. Assume 
further that this increased productivity transforms the negative net private 
product of the employer and the replacement workers into a positive net 
social product. Even with these assumptions, the analysis would not be 
complete until the costs of shifting the strikers’ labor to alternative uses 
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are taken into account. 
Labor supply is not perfectly elastic in many circumstances. Workers 
who enter into and remain in sunk investments/delayed dividends 
contracts invest in ways other than the acquisition of firm-specific skills 
and knowledge. They purchase homes near their workplaces and their 
spouses take jobs near their homes. The workers put down roots in their 
communities, enroll their children in local schools, help older children find 
jobs nearby or with the same employer, and establish friendships at work 
and in their community.287 If strikers are forced to leave their communities 
because they have been permanently replaced, then these sunk investments 
would be transformed into sunk cost losses. They must sell their homes 
and buy new homes in a new city. Spouses and children may be forced to 
change jobs. School-age children may be uprooted and friendships may be 
lost.288 
As with the farmer’s transportation costs, these sunk cost losses are 
directly related to production, although they might not be characterized as 
production costs themselves.289 Unless the permanently replaced strikers 
incur these costs, they will be unable to accept new employment and 
thereby increase their productivity and earn higher wages. Since the 
central enterprise of the “transaction cost economics” movement Coase 
helped create is to move away from an exclusive focus on production 
toward a greater emphasis on transaction costs, it seems unlikely that a 
loyal Coasean would protest that these transaction costs are insufficiently 
connected to production to be considered valid factors in the calculation of 
social product.290 As a result, all of these costs must be deducted from any 
 
 
 287. See WEILER, GOVERNING, supra note 13, at 64, 143 (“Work is not merely an economic 
function . . . . For the employee work is also a major source of personal identity and satisfaction, of his 
sense of self-esteem and accomplishment, and of many of his closest and most enduring 
relationships.”) 
 288. See Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, supra note 66, at 25. See also Hart, supra note 89, at 4 
(“[Workers suffer sunk cost losses] in the absence of firm-specific skills if the workers have to incur 
mobility costs to work in the firm, e.g., they have to move nearby. A separation . . . will again be 
costly since it means that further mobility costs must be incurred.”). 
 289. Of course, every new job does not entail these sunk cost losses. Some strikers may be 
fortunate enough to find equivalent employment in the labor market in which they live or commute at 
lower comparative cost to employment in a nearby labor market. In the latter case, transportation costs 
would again be a relevant consideration. 
 290. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 2 (“Transaction cost 
analysis supplants the usual preoccupation with technology and steady-state production (or 
distribution) expenses with an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures.”) (emphasis in original).  
 Some law and economics scholars might argue that some portion of these costs of opportunity 
costs should not be included in a calculation of social product because they have not been valued by 
the market. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 12-15 (defining “value” and 
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benefits to be derived from shifting the strikers’ labor to an alternative 
productive use. Thus, even if the opportunity costs of strikers’ labor could 
improve the efficiency of hiring permanent replacement workers, the costs 
of those opportunity costs must lead any analysis even further away from 
the conclusion that the Mackay Radio doctrine is efficient. 
B. Coase’s Paradox and Looking Beyond the Bargaining Table 
1. The Railway, The Farmer, and Their Neighbors Beyond the 
Bargaining Table 
Let us return again to Coase’s railway and farmer example. The 
Coasean bargain struck between the railway and the farmer permits the 
railroad to run two trains and incinerate a portion of the farmer’s crops. 
Assume that this bargain, despite taking into account the costs of the 
opportunity costs, proves to be efficient (e.g., the farmer finds alternative 
employment near her home requiring only negligible transportation costs). 
The net social product after considering the transportation costs is $20 (the 
railway’s net private product of $150 minus the farmer’s loss of $280 plus 
the farmer’s net private product of $150 from alternative uses of 
production factors). But the fires set by the railway trains (with the assent 
of the farmer) combine with the residue of chemical fertilizer previously 
employed in crop cultivation to create toxic suet. Assume further that the 
suet becomes easily airborne and, depending upon the winds, the weather, 
and the train schedules, is distributed in unpredictable patterns over a large 
area. The suet kills some portion of other farmers’ crops and harms 
individuals’ home gardens. 
If the total cost of these secondary externalities affecting other farmers 
and homeowners are taken into account, and they exceed $20, then the 
Coasean bargain struck between the railway and the farmer cannot be 
considered efficient. Should these externalities of the bargain between the 
railway and the farmer be included in the calculation of social product? 
The answer with respect to any distant farmers whose crop cultivation is 
affected by the suet must be “yes.” Since Coase’s Theorem is not 
interested in issues of liability, it does not seek to answer questions of 
reasonable foreseeability such as might be found in traditional conceptions 
of tort law.291 Coasean lawmakers should seek to maximize social product. 
 
 
“utility,” but acknowledging that his definitions impose upon consideration of efficiency “limitations 
as an ethical criterion of social decisionmaking”). 
 291. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (establishing “reasonable 
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A farmer’s land located five miles from the railroad tracks is the same 
factor of production and makes the identical contribution to social product 
(in kind, if not quantity) as the farmer’s land that borders the tracks. There 
is no economic or normative difference between the farmer at the 
bargaining table and the farmer beyond the bargaining table for the 
purposes of Coase’s Theorem. 
The homeowner’s garden is less directly analogous, but only slightly 
so, even if we stipulate that the home garden produces flowers only to be 
enjoyed by the homeowner and her family. Strictly speaking, this is not 
production of the sort seen in crop cultivation. As noted above, 
transaction-cost economics is not concerned with rigid definitional 
limitations.292 To the contrary, Coase specifically disclaimed a narrow 
focus on production: “In this article, the analysis has been confined . . . to 
comparison of the value of production, as measured by the market. But it 
is, of course, desirable that the choice . . . should be carried out in broader 
terms than this . . . .”293 Both production costs and property values are 
contributors to the common economic weal and indistinguishable for the 
purposes of the Coase Theorem. 
This argument should not be read to suggest that the mere presence of 
secondary externalities leads inevitably to a conclusion that a particular 
rule of law is efficient or inefficient, or even good policy or bad policy. 
The presence of secondary externalities merely signals to the Coasean 
analyst that the formula by which they are calculating total social product 
and, therefore, efficiency, must be expanded. 
The Coasean lawmaker’s first response to the emergence of secondary 
externalities would be to suggest the same efficient approach that 
redressed the primary externality: bargaining. But adding the secondary 
externalities to the bargaining agenda between the railway and the farmer 
cannot succeed. The railway and the first farmer, or the Coasean lawmaker 
imagining herself as their representative, are not agents for other affected 
farmers or homeowners. In fact, their interests may oppose those of the 
parties injured by the secondary externalities flowing from the primary 
agreement. The railway and the first farmer would not address these new 
costs in their agreement. The solution, it would seem, is to construct a new 
bargaining relationship between the parties to the primary agreement and 
 
 
foreseeability” as the standard for the “proximate cause” element of a negligence claim). See also 
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953) (discussing the negligence concept 
of “proximate cause”). 
 292. See supra text accompanying note 290. 
 293. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 43. 
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the parties bearing the costs of the secondary externalities created by the 
primary agreement. 
This new bargaining relationship necessarily brings added transaction 
costs, however. Transaction costs increase to some extent each time a new 
party enters a bargaining relationship. The new party must be identified 
and informed that other parties seek to bargain with her, negotiations must 
be scheduled and otherwise arranged, a new contract must be negotiated 
and reduced to writing, and new enforcement mechanisms must be 
constructed and implemented.294 All of these added costs attend the 
introduction of only one new party. When more than one new party joins 
the negotiations, transaction costs increase at an even greater rate per new 
participant.295 This may be especially significant in the context of 
collective bargaining where transaction costs associated with the parties at 
the bargaining table, absent strategic behavior, are generally understood to 
be quite low.296 
Numerosity alone creates an increased danger that some number of the 
new parties will seek to improve their position by refusing to agree when 
others would.297 But this prospective negotiation faces even greater 
challenges than “holdout” and “free rider” problems. The new parties are 
geographically dispersed, unorganized, and resistant to easy classification. 
Merely identifying and verifying the claims of the farmers and 
homeowners suffering from the secondary externalities produced by the 
toxic suet would be a Herculean task. Given the uncertain path of the 
airborne suet, other neighboring landowners who find suet on their 
property might also be brought to the bargaining table. Determining how 
these disparate landowners might bargain and what result best serves all 
these prospective parties given their differing situations poses an equally 
great difficulty. Transaction costs in these circumstances are almost 
certainly too high for the parties to bargain to an efficient result. 
 
 
 294. See supra text accompanying note 35 (Coase’s illustration of “transaction costs”). 
 295. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 56. 
 296. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 473, 476-77. 
 297. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 69 (discussing the so-called “holdout” 
problem). 
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2. The Parties Beyond the Collective Bargaining Table: The Troubling 
Case of Bridgestone/Firestone  
On March 8, 1995, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order No. 
12,954, essentially prohibiting federal agencies and departments from 
entering into contracts valued in excess of $100,000 with employers who 
had permanently replaced their striking workers.298 The executive order 
was premised on the view that consumers suffer when a company with 
which they are doing business hires permanent replacement workers 
pursuant to the Mackay Radio doctrine. Among other reasons, said the 
President, “[b]y permanently replacing its workers, an employer loses the 
accumulated knowledge, experience, skill, and expertise of its incumbent 
employees. These circumstances then adversely affect the businesses and 
entities, such as the Federal Government, which rely on that employer to 
provide high quality and reliable goods or services.”299 Efficient and 
economical procurement by the federal government is thereby threatened, 
according to the executive order.300 This executive order, and its self-
conscious focus on efficiency beyond the bargaining table, tested the 
boundaries of Coase’s definition of social product. 
Clinton’s executive order, issued a few months after 
Bridgestone/Firestone permanently replaced its striking workers, proved 
prophetic. Alan Krueger and Alexandre Mas have produced evidence that 
Bridgestone/Firestone’s hiring of permanent replacement workers to 
replace strikers from its Decatur, Illinois, plant in 1994 is associated with 
consumers being injured and killed by defective tires produced in that 
plant.301 Tires are produced in a labor-intensive process, so the hiring of 
replacement workers and the reaction of striking workers had important 
consequences for Bridgestone/Firestone’s customers.302  
Using data derived from customer claims about defective tires made to 
Bridgestone/Firestone and customer complaints about Bridgestone/ 
 
 
 298. See “Ensuring the Economical and Efficient Administration and Completion of Federal 
Government Contracts,” Exec. Order No. 12,954, 3 C.F.R. 329 (Mar. 8, 1995), reprinted in 40 U.S.C. 
§ 486 (1996 Supp. II). Executive Order No. 12,954 was struck down on preemption grounds in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court’s decision was premised on 
the conclusion that the NLRA preempted the executive order. The court’s decision did not require 
consideration of the efficiency grounds upon which the executive order was premised. 
 299. “Ensuring the Economical and Efficient Administration and Completion of Federal 
Government Contracts,” Exec. Order No. 12,954. 3 C.F.R. 329 (Mar. 8, 1995), reprinted in 40 U.S.C. 
§ 486 (1996 Supp. II). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Krueger & Mas, supra note 62. 
 302. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 10. 
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Firestone tires made to the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration, along with other data,303 Krueger and Mas analyzed the 
defect rates among Bridgestone/Firestone’s ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness 
P235/75R15-sized tires.304 These tires were produced in six 
Bridgestone/Firestone plants, although 88% of the tires produced between 
February 1991 and March 2000 came from three plants: Decatur, Illinois; 
Joliette, Quebec; and Wilson, North Carolina.305 During this period, both 
the Joliette plant and the Decatur plant experienced strikes, but 
Bridgestone/Firestone hired permanent replacement workers only in the 
Decatur plant.306 Overall, Krueger and Mas found that the rates of tread 
separation claims and consumer complaints relating to the P235/75R15-
sized tires produced in Decatur during the labor dispute were substantially 
greater than either the rates in Decatur before and after the labor dispute or 
the rates in the Joliette and Wilson plants.307 They also found a 
substantially higher rate of fatal accidents involving tires produced in 
Decatur during the strike years than tires produced in other plants or in 
Decatur in nonstrike years.308 Krueger and Mas concluded that “[t]he 
evidence we have assembled suggests that the strike and associated labor 
strife in Decatur was a major contributing factor to the production of 
defective tires.”309 
Krueger and Mas also disaggregated the data to assess when the 
defective tires were being produced in relation to Bridgestone/Firestone’s 
employment of permanent replacement workers and reinstatement of its 
striking employees. The relevant four-year time frame for the Krueger and 
Mas inquiry began in the months preceding the expiration of 
Bridgestone/Firestone’s collective bargaining agreement with the URW on 
April 1, 1994, and ended one year after the parties reached a new and final 
 
 
 303. The internal claims data, which would otherwise be private and proprietary, became available 
through congressional hearings and private lawsuits arising out of accidents involving 
Bridgestone/Firestone’s tires. See Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 2, 12-13. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 4, 52 (Table 1). 
 306. Id. at 13, § 2. 
 307. Id. at 15-16, 45 (Figure 1), 46 (Figure 2). For example, “[f]our years after production, tires 
that were made in Decatur during the labor dispute were eight times more likely to have a tread 
separation claim than were tires manufactured in other plants.” Id. at 16. Further, “[a]lmost half of the 
failed P235 tires were produced in Decatur during the period of the labor dispute (1994-96); by 
comparison, only 8.8 percent of all P235 tires manufactured from 1991 to 1999 were produced in 
Decatur during this period.” Id. at 20. Bridgestone/Firestone’s own internal testing confirms Krueger’s 
conclusions. See id. at 26-28. 
 308. Id. at 17, 48 (Figure 4). 
 309. Id. at 4. 
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agreement in December 1996.310 There are three discrete periods within 
this four-year span during which the Decatur plant produced an 
excessively large number of defective tires.  
The first period began when negotiations commenced in January 1994 
and continued through the expiration of the then-effective collective 
bargaining agreement in April 1994 until the start of the union’s strike in 
July 1994.311 In their negotiations, the union proposed that 
Bridgestone/Firestone continue its five-decade-long practice of adhering to 
the industry-wide pattern for collective bargaining agreements. In 1994, 
the industry pattern called for no wage increases beyond cost-of-living 
adjustments.312 Instead, Bridgestone/Firestone demanded expansion of 
existing eight-hour shifts to twelve-hour shifts, with a requirement that 
workers rotate between day and night duty; expansion of the work-week to 
seven days; 30% pay cuts for new hires; worker contributions to health 
care costs; and a reduced number of vacation days for senior workers.313 
The unionized employees continued working beyond the April 1994 
expiration of their contract until their strike began on July 12, 1994.314 
Bridgestone/Firestone began hiring permanent replacement workers 
immediately thereafter.315 Krueger and Mas found a substantial increase in 
the number of defective tires produced in the Decatur plant during this 
first period before any replacement workers were hired.316 
The second period began with the hiring of permanent replacement 
workers beginning in July 1994 and continued through December 1996 
when the parties signed a collective bargaining agreement that included 
recalling all striking workers.317 In May 1995, the union sought to block 
Bridgestone/Firestone from hiring any additional replacement workers by 
making an unconditional offer to return to work.318 By that time, however, 
Bridgestone/Firestone had hired 1,048 replacement workers, and 371 
union members had crossed the picket line.319 Bridgestone/Firestone 
 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 6. 
 312. Id. “Pattern bargaining” is an effort by a union representing employees in a number of 
companies within an industry to negotiate a common contract with all of the companies in an effort to 
take wages out of competition between those companies. See KATZ & KOCHAN, supra note 53, at 160, 
167. 
 313. See supra text accompanying note 249; Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 6. 
 314. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 6. 
 315. Id. at 7. 
 316. Id. at 29. 
 317. Id. at 7-9. 
 318. Id. at 7. 
 319. Id. at 4, 7. 
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informed the union in May 1995 that it intended to retain the permanent 
replacement workers. It also unilaterally imposed its final offer at the 
bargaining table, including wage cuts and lower pay for new hires.320 The 
union launched a boycott and eventually broke off negotiations.321 
Nonetheless, a large number of strikers eventually exercised their 
reinstatement rights and returned to work in the Decatur facility.322 These 
returning strikers worked side-by-side with the permanent replacement 
workers who had taken their jobs, including line-crossing union 
members.323 
Krueger and Mas reviewed anecdotal evidence that “replacement 
workers were less skilled tire makers, and perhaps more prone to build 
defective tires.”324 But they also concluded that “faulty workmanship by 
novice replacement workers is not the sole source of problem tires.”325 
There was a low level of complaints regarding tires built in the early part 
of the second period—that is, from July 1994 through May 1995—when 
replacement workers predominated in the Decatur plant.326 Production 
levels declined substantially during this period, but lost production does 
not fully explain the second period’s increased defect rate, according to 
Krueger and Mas.327 The complaint rate increased when the strikers were 
legally able to exercise their reinstatement rights after their unconditional 
offer to return to work. The complaint rate peaked in the third period 
beginning after a significant number of strikers began returning to their 
jobs and continuing after the execution of the new contract between the 
union and Bridgestone/Firestone in December 1996 that guaranteed and 
effected most strikers’ return to their jobs.328  
As Krueger and Mas concluded regarding these second and third 
periods in the Bridgestone/Firestone dispute: “It appears likely to us that 
something about the chemistry between the replacement workers and 
recalled strikers, or the cumulative impact of labor strife in general, 
created conditions that led to the production of many defective tires.”329 
 
 
 320. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 7-8. 
 321. Id. at 8. 
 322. Id. at 9. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 10-11. 
 325. Id. at 30. 
 326. See Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 29-30, 50-51 (Figures 6, 7, and 8). 
 327. Id. at 29. 
 328. Id. The new contract included a small wage increase that left the returning strikers’ pay lower 
than the pay earned by unionized employees working for one of Bridgestone/Firestone’s leading 
competitors. Id. at 8.  
 329. Id. at 30. Krueger and Mas later described this evidence as “circumstantial but suggestive,” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1185 Harris book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:33 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1266 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1185 
 
 
 
 
The hiring of permanent replacement workers alone did not cause the 
increased defect rates, particularly during the first period when the union 
members remained at work and before any replacement workers had been 
hired. Rather, the contentious relationship between the union and the 
employer, of which the hiring of permanent replacement workers was an 
important part, apparently explains the large number of defective tires 
produced in Decatur, Illinois, from January 1994 to December 1996.  
It is, of course, possible to have contentious labor relations without the 
involvement of permanent strike replacements. Nonetheless, hiring 
permanent strike replacements pursuant to the Mackay Radio doctrine very 
likely sparks or contributes to contentious labor relations.330 These 
contentious labor relations have productivity effects that, in turn, generate 
secondary externalities for parties beyond the bargaining table.331 
The secondary externalities arising out of the Bridgestone/Firestone 
case included defects in the Wilderness P235/75R15-sized tires that may 
have cost forty lives in resulting auto accidents, according to Krueger and 
Mas.332 Bridgestone/Firestone paid millions of dollars in settlements to 
consumers and others injured by their defective tires.333 The century-old 
 
 
and “more persuasive and comprehensive than that in favor of alternative hypotheses that have been 
proposed.” Id. at 32. It is worth noting that Michael Wachter and his coauthors predicted two decades 
ago that this kind of phenomenon could undermine the efficiency of internal labor markets: “Problems 
with coworkers arise if . . . the consent or active cooperation of workers who interface with the task in 
question must be secured each time an adaptation is proposed.” Williamson et al., supra note 66, at 
267. 
 330. See generally supra text accompanying notes 134-65 (discussing some of the destructive 
effects hiring permanent replacement workers can have on a collective bargaining relationship). 
 331. While the Krueger and Mas study analyzed the effects of only one strike involving 
permanent replacement workers and its effects on one employer’s products, their conclusion is 
consistent with a larger body of labor relations and economics literature that supports the view that 
contentious labor relations have negative productivity effects. See, e.g., Brian Becker & Craig Olson, 
Labor Relations and Firm Performance, in HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRM 
64-68 (Morris Kleinen et al. eds., Indus. Relations Research Ass’n 1987) (focusing on the effects of 
strikes on firm performance); Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Impact on Economic Performance of a 
Transformation in Workplace Relations, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 241 (1991); Morris M. Kleiner 
et al., How Industrial Relations Affects Plant Performance: The Case of Commercial Aircraft 
Manufacturing, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195 (2002). See also Harry Katz et al., Industrial 
Relations Performance, Economic Performance, and QWL Programs: An Interplant Analysis, 37 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (1983) (discussing the effects of cooperative labor relations practices on 
firm performance); Saul A. Rubinstein, The Impact of Co-Management on Quality Performance: The 
Case of the Saturn Corporation, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 197 (2000). Cf. Casey Ichniowski et al., 
The Effects of Human Resource Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines, 87 AM. 
ECON. REV. 291 (1997) (illustrating the positive impact of innovative human resources practices on 
firm performance). 
 332. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 33. Apparently, the number of deaths caused by the 
defective tires would have been higher if not for an April 2000 recall of these tires. 
 333. See Bridgestone/Firestone Settles Tire Case in Texas: Closely Watched Suit First of 400 to 
Reach Settlement, NAT’L POST, Aug. 25, 2001, at C08; Danny Hakim, Firestone Said to Reach Tire 
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business relationship between Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Co. 
ended in vitriol.334 Bridgestone/Firestone’s stock market valuation 
declined from $16.7 billion to $7.5 billion in the four months after an 
April 2000 recall of its defective tires.335 The URW, effectively 
bankrupted by its struggle with Bridgestone/Firestone, was forced to 
merge with the United Steelworkers of America.336 Finally, 
Bridgestone/Firestone closed its Decatur plant on December 14, 2001, 
displacing 1,500 workers—former strikers and replacement workers 
alike—who were still employed there.337 
3. The Coasean Lawmaker, the Mackay Radio Doctrine, and the 
NLRA 
The question remains, again assuming that the Mackay Radio doctrine 
is efficient after taking into account the primary externality’s costs and 
benefits, how should a Coasean lawmaker redress the secondary 
externalities that may arise from an employer’s hiring of permanent 
replacement workers?338 Plainly, asking the union and the employer to 
address the costs imposed on consumers will not succeed. Neither party 
can represent consumers and others who might be injured by defective 
tires produced as a result of contentious labor relations. Neither the union 
nor Bridgestone/Firestone had interests identical to those of the 
 
 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at C12; Caroline E. Mayer & Carrie Johnson, Firestone, States 
Reach Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2001, at E01; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bridgestone Agrees to 
Pay $7.5 million in Explorer Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at C1. 
 334. Christopher Bowe, Firestone Cuts Ties with Ford Over Tire Recall, FIN. TIMES (London), 
May 22, 2001, at 36; Keith Bradsher, Firestone to Stop Sales to Ford, Saying it Was Used as 
Scapegoat, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at A1; Robert Manor, Decatur Tire Plant to Close; 
Bridgestone Move Costs Jobs of 1,500 Workers, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2001, at 1N; Miki Tanikawa, 
Bridgestone Split from Ford Is Seen as Most Un-Japanese, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2001, at C2; Text of 
Letter to Ford from Bridgestone, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at C4.  
 335. Krueger & Mas, supra note 62, at 33; see also STEPHEN SLEIGH ET AL., UNION BUSTING IS 
BAD FOR BUSINESS (Ctr. for Labor-Mgmt. Pol’y Studies, Occasional Papers No. 12, 1992) (detailing 
similar corporate losses arising out of other strikes in which permanent replacement workers were 
hired). 
 336. FRANKLIN, supra note 134, at 233. 
 337. See David Barboza, Bridgestone/Firestone to Close Tire Plant at Center of Huge Recall, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at C1; Peter T. Kilborn, An Illinois Tire Plant Closes and a Way of Life 
Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at A24; Manor, supra note 334; Jason Strait, Firestone Closes 
Illinois Tire Plant, CHATTANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Dec. 25, 2001, at C1; Mark 
Truby, Firestone to Close Illinois Plant, Firms Oldest, Largest Facility Falls Victim to Tire 
Controversy; 1,500 Workers to Lose Jobs, DETROIT NEWS, June 28, 2001, at 1. 
 338. There may be some instances when an employer’s hiring of permanent replacement workers 
does not result in any secondary externalities or it produces only positive externalities that benefit 
thirds parties. The analysis in this part would not apply to those circumstances. 
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consumers. Would the union have been willing to subject its members to 
rotating twelve-hour shifts in order to protect consumers? Would 
Bridgestone/Firestone have paid the industry wage to prevent prospective 
threats to consumers’ safety? As with the railway-farmer-neighbor 
problem, the better answer is to construct a new bargaining relationship 
between the union, Bridgestone/Firestone, and consumers who might be 
harmed by defective tires. 
Transaction costs will inhibit or eliminate the possibility that these 
negotiations can produce an efficient result, however. Like the distant 
farmers and homeowners in the railway-farmer example, the parties to 
these secondary externalities are geographically dispersed, unorganized, 
and resistant to easy classification. Owners of Bridgestone/Firestone’s 
ATX, ATXII, or Wilderness tires of the correct size are not the only 
relevant parties. Passengers in vehicles using the defective tires would 
have to be included. Bystanders to accidents caused by the tires’ defects 
would probably have a legitimate claim to a seat at the bargaining table. 
Ford Motor Co. would have a legitimate basis for arguing that it bore costs 
arising out of Bridgestone/Firestone’s hiring of permanent replacement 
workers. Other suppliers and end users of the tires might also seek 
representation in any negotiation over secondary externalities associated 
with the defective tires. 
In these circumstances, prospects for reducing transaction costs to zero 
or near-zero such that bargaining can produce an efficient result are dim. 
The new transaction costs would include identifying all of these 
prospective bargaining parties, informing them that they are invited to 
negotiate over permanent strike replacements and defective tires, assessing 
the parties’ interests, sharing sufficient information with all of the 
involved parties to permit genuine bargaining, defining the procedural and 
substantive terms on which negotiations might proceed, bargaining to 
agreement between all of the parties, drafting the agreement, and 
establishing enforcement mechanisms to assure compliance with the 
agreement. The transaction costs in this case would be excessive to the 
point of irremediability. 
The Coasean lawmaker, therefore, faces little choice in her selection of 
tools for resolving these secondary externalities. Pursuing the transaction-
cost reduction approach appears futile. Secondary externalities must be 
taken into account in the social product calculation. Transaction costs must 
increase to some extent whenever secondary externalities are taken into 
account. As transaction costs increase, the Coasean lawmaker becomes 
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less likely to employ the transaction-cost reduction approach and more 
likely to employ the dictated solution approach.339 Since the heart of 
Coase’s endeavor was to focus greater attention on the role of transaction 
costs in parties’ decision making, particularly with respect to externalities, 
these costs cannot be ignored. So, if the consequent transaction costs 
cannot be ignored and are unlikely to be reduced, then taking secondary 
externalities into account increases the likelihood that the Coasean 
lawmaker will eschew the transaction-cost reduction approach in favor of 
the dictated solution approach. 
Of course, this conclusion is limited in many respects. Some efforts to 
redress primary externalities will not produce secondary externalities and, 
therefore, will not add transaction costs to the social product calculation. 
Some secondary externalities may require very low transaction costs for 
their resolution. Other secondary externalities may bring benefits to third 
parties as well as costs.  
Nonetheless, in circumstances made possible by the Mackay Radio 
doctrine and some number of additional cases involving collective 
bargaining, secondary externalities will be substantial, and the transaction 
costs required for their resolution will alter the Coasean efficiency 
analyst’s calculus. Bridgestone/Firestone is not an idiosyncratic case. 
Many strikes that do not involve permanent replacement workers may also 
produce significant secondary externalities, perhaps including layoffs 
among suppliers’ employees and loss of retailers’ sales. These secondary 
externalities would similarly become factors in any calculation of total 
social product, as would the transaction costs associated with redressing 
them. As a result, the Coasean lawmaker would be inclined to employ the 
dictated solution approach and impose an outcome on striking unions and 
struck employers. 
When these circumstances arise, the Coase Theorem collides with a 
basic premise of the NLRA: the substance of bargaining is the near-
exclusive domain of the parties. Coase and the NLRA’s sponsors shared 
an interest in efficiency and a belief that bargaining can be a means to 
achieve it.340 Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes a duty on “the employer 
 
 
 339. It is not necessarily true that every Coasean analysis leads to inefficiency when these added 
transaction costs are taken into account. Many secondary externalities will not manifest themselves in 
the same form as those arising out of the Mackay Radio doctrine. 
 340. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2001) (“The denial by some employers of the right of employees to 
organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to 
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of 
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency . . . of the instrumentalities of 
commerce . . . . Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and 
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and the representative of the employees to meet . . . and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment . . . .”341 But the NLRA does not permit regulation of the 
collectively bargained agreement’s substantive terms,342 and the NLRB, 
the NLRA’s principal administrator, “may not, either directly or indirectly, 
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive 
terms of collective bargaining agreements.”343 Similarly strict limits have 
been imposed on judicial intervention in the substance of collective 
bargaining agreements.344 The government has generally regulated only 
the process of bargaining and relied on private negotiation between the 
parties to establish “their own charter for the ordering of industrial 
relations.”345  
The protective wall guarding collective bargaining parties’ substantive 
choices from government interference includes tight restrictions on the 
 
 
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the 
flow of commerce . . . .”). 
 341. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2001). 
 342. See NLRB v. Am. Nat’l. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952). See also NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ 
Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485-86, 488 (1960) (“Congress was generally not concerned with the 
substantive terms on which the parties contracted. . . . [T]he policy of Congress is to impose a mutual 
duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement, in the belief that such an 
approach from both sides of the table promotes the over-all design of achieving industrial peace.”). 
Other statutes establish minimum labor standards that the parties may not agree to violate. See, e.g., 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2001); Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2001). These statutes cannot be fairly described as government 
dictation of bargaining results; rather, they were designed to supplant bargaining in circumstances 
where Congress was skeptical that bargaining between an employer and an individual worker would 
achieve a socially optimal result. Cf. Harris, supra note 9, at 34-38. 
 343. NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 404, 408-09 (“Congress provided expressly that the 
Board should not pass upon the desirability of the substantive terms of labor agreements.”)  
 344. Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) [hereinafter ALPA v. O’Neill] 
(“Congress did not intend judicial review of a union’s performance to permit the court to substitute its 
own view of the proper bargain for that reached by the union. Rather, Congress envisioned the 
relationship between the courts and labor unions as similar to that between the courts and the 
legislature. Any substantive examination of a union’s performance, therefore, must be highly 
deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the effective performance of their 
bargaining responsibilities.”). Courts may inquire into the substance of collective bargaining 
agreements to “search for evidence that a union did not fairly and adequately represent its 
constituency.” Id. at 74. However, even this inquiry is subject to a strict limitation: “A wide range of 
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents 
. . . .” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
 345. ALPA v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 74 (quoting Local 24 of Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959)). See also 499 U.S. at 74 (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 
361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960)) (Congress “intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their 
negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate substantive solution of their 
differences.”). 
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NLRB’s ability to intervene in the parties’ use of economic weapons that 
might influence the outcome of the substantive negotiations:  
[T]he Board in the guise of determining good or bad faith in 
negotiations could regulate what economic weapons a party might 
summon to its aid. And if the Board could regulate the choice of 
economic weapons that may be used as part of collective 
bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable 
influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties 
contract. . . . Our labor policy is not presently erected on a 
foundation of government control of the results of negotiations.346 
The NLRA even protects the collective bargaining process from the 
conduct of the parties, on occasion. For example, an employer’s unilateral 
change of employment conditions under negotiation is a breach of the duty 
to bargain in good faith and, therefore, a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act because it forecloses future negotiations.347 
In sum, the NLRA constructed a virtually impenetrable wall around the 
substance of bargaining to keep the government out. Government’s role is 
strictly limited to regulating the process of bargaining.348 Coase’s Paradox, 
on the other hand, suggests that efficiency proponents delving into some 
parts of labor law’s realm must seek an increasingly large role for 
government in the substance of collective bargaining. Coasean lawmakers 
must dictate solutions to parties who are blocked by transaction costs from 
reaching an efficient bargain. The apparent reconcilability of the Coase 
 
 
 346. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. at 490. The substance of collective bargaining is 
not entirely free of regulation. Certain subjects enumerated in Section 8(d) (i.e., wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment) are “mandatory subjects” of bargaining. Other subjects are 
“permissive.” The parties may employ the full range of economic weapons to support their bargaining 
positions on mandatory subjects, while employing the same weapons in relation to permissive subjects 
can constitute an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 
U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958) (holding that parties’ insistence on permissive subjects of bargaining 
constitutes failure to bargain in good faith on the mandatory subjects). Since the availability and 
effectiveness of economic weapons largely determines the substance of a collective bargaining 
agreement, this statutory categorization influences the parties’ substantive choices. 
 347. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-39 (1962). 
 348. One superficially appealing answer to this criticism is to emphasize the distinction between 
process rules, a domain in which government may intervene under the NLRA, and substance rules, 
where government should not intervene, and thereafter to defend each government intervention on the 
grounds that it seeks to address a process issue. Cf. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1367-74. Even 
if it were possible to draw this distinction cleanly, see supra note 346, it is irrelevant to any discussion 
of the Mackay Radio doctrine. Effective discharge of unionized employees is undeniably a “term and 
condition of employment” and, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) 
(2001). 
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Theorem and the NLRA proves as illusory in this case as the Mackay 
Radio premium offered to permanent strike replacements. 
The Coasean lawmaker might seek to ignore any secondary 
externalities (and those beyond) arising from collective bargaining and the 
legal rules that govern it. In other words, she might adopt a restrictive 
view of social product that encompasses only the costs and benefits, 
including the transaction costs and opportunity costs, of the parties to the 
primary externality. But this would represent a normative preference, not 
economic analysis. With respect to secondary externalities arising as a 
consequence of the Mackay Radio doctrine, her argument would have to 
be that workers’ costs, whether the costs of opportunity costs or the costs 
arising from secondary externalities, and consumers’ costs from secondary 
externalities are less cognizable than employers’ and producers’ costs.349 
This judgment cannot be justified using Coase’s own definition of social 
product. In fact, this constricted definition of social product necessarily 
abandons any claim to public policy. Absent consideration of secondary 
externalities and their attendant transaction costs, the purported “social 
product” calculation amounts to nothing more than the net aggregate 
private product of the parties to the primary externality. This is not social 
product. It is mere political preference. 
The Coasean lawmaker might also argue that collective bargaining 
parties’ private preferences may not produce the most efficient result. In 
this, she might be correct. High transaction costs might make efficient 
resolution of secondary externalities, or even primary externalities, too 
difficult for a union and employer bargaining free of government 
influence. But the protective shield guarding the private realm of 
collective bargaining from government intervention has not been justified 
on the basis that a union and employer are best able under this 
arrangement to produce an efficient result. Other values also play a role. 
Most important, the NLRA permits the parties to construct and manage 
their own system of workplace self-governance and representative 
democracy.350 To the extent that the value of efficiency clashes with the 
value of democracy, the NLRA has long opted for democracy. 
 
 
 349. Stewart Schwab offered a better explanation of the Coase Theorem’s import: “[T]he costless 
Coase Theorem implies that efficiency arguments are irrelevant in countering a proposal to give initial 
legal entitlements to the needy or the deserving.” Schwab, Coase Defends, supra note 32, at 1195. 
 350. See generally Cox, supra note 94. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Mackay Radio doctrine dictates a solution to the externalities 
associated with an employer’s hiring of permanent replacement workers. 
The Coasean analysis performed in this Article argues that the solution 
dictated by the Mackay Radio rule is not efficient. This conclusion is true 
whether or not Coase’s Paradox, and the costs associated with the 
secondary externalities that may arise from the hiring of permanent 
replacement workers, are included in the calculus. Employers hiring 
permanent replacement workers suffer losses, impose losses on the 
replacement workers or the striking workers, or impose costs on 
consumers. In some circumstances, the decision to hire permanent 
replacement workers harms all of these parties. 
The Coase Theorem effectively focuses attention on barriers to 
bargaining that would produce efficient results. Strategic bargaining is one 
such barrier. Rather than deterring strategic behavior, the Mackay Radio 
doctrine actually facilitates strategic behavior by struck employers 
recruiting permanent replacement workers in the external and internal 
labor markets. For this reason alone, the Mackay Radio doctrine cannot be 
reconciled with the Coase Theorem. 
This conclusion raises doubts about the efforts by some law and 
economics scholars to represent the Coase Theorem as a universal 
explanation for law of all sorts. The Mackay Radio doctrine holds a central 
place in NLRA jurisprudence. The Coase Theorem’s inability to explain it 
suggests that there is some question as to whether the theorem can be an 
effective tool for explaining American labor law. 
But this Article has gone further in using the Mackay Radio doctrine to 
assess the compatibility of the Coase Theorem and the NLRA. Coase’s 
Paradox is a natural outgrowth of the dialectical approach to externalities 
that Coase adopted in The Problem of Social Cost. Solutions to 
externalities may themselves generate new costs and new externalities that 
also require redress. But each effort to address a secondary externality 
necessarily brings new transaction costs. As transaction costs increase, the 
Coasean lawmaker’s willingness to leave the parties to negotiate their own 
substantive agreements decreases. The NLRA cares little about the 
Coasean lawmaker’s willingness to refrain from intervention in the 
substance of parties’ agreements. Courts interpreting the NLRA have 
constructed a protective wall around the substance of collective bargaining 
agreements that does not allow the government to intervene. When rising 
transaction costs or spreading strategic behavior inspire the Coasean 
lawmaker to seek efficient substantive results, she will crash into the wall 
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erected by the NLRA. In this way, at least, the Coase Theorem and the 
NLRA are incompatible. 
To their great credit, Cohen and Wachter disclaimed any intention to 
impose an efficiency-based normative standard on the NLRA absent 
compelling evidence that Congress intended its law to be interpreted in 
this way.351 Congress cared about economic efficiency when it enacted the 
NLRA, but not to the exclusion of other values. In the struggle over 
government’s proper role in collective bargaining, it appears that Coase’s 
interpreters and their push toward government intervention in the 
substance of bargaining cannot be reconciled with the NLRA’s abiding 
respect for the private preferences of unions and employers. Efficiency, 
while relevant, does not reign supreme in American labor law. As a result, 
perhaps the Coase Theorem and its dialectical approach are not well-suited 
to the explanation and justification of many aspects of the NLRA, 
including the Mackay Radio doctrine. 
 
 
 351. Cohen & Wachter, supra note 2, at 124. Cf. Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 992-93 (1986) (acknowledging that Congress did not intend efficiency to be the 
paramount value served by the NLRA). 
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